Soviet-American rivalry in Korea 1945-1950 by Bartell, Donald Edward
University of Montana 
ScholarWorks at University of Montana 
Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & 
Professional Papers Graduate School 
1952 
Soviet-American rivalry in Korea 1945-1950 
Donald Edward Bartell 
The University of Montana 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd 
Let us know how access to this document benefits you. 
Recommended Citation 
Bartell, Donald Edward, "Soviet-American rivalry in Korea 1945-1950" (1952). Graduate Student Theses, 
Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 5176. 
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/5176 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of 
Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an 
authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact 
scholarworks@mso.umt.edu. 
This thesis has heen approved fcy the Board of Examiners 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree 
of Master of Artso
Chairiato'of the Board of^Esaminers
Bate I & 19  ^
UMI Number: EP40640
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
UMT
UMI EP40640
Published by ProQuest LLC (2014). Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
All rights reserved. This work is protected against 
unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code
Pro
ProQuest LLC.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
pemtmstilo has whetted the interest and m m * i m  of mrion# 
and sundry w M  p o m p s  for the pss# half century* ft bns 
been aptly termed rtthe oihmfSf'oids of the Orient* n  m  a 
m & m  of introduction to the primpr problem* the writer 
.felt .ft necessarr to m % m $ M t the reader 'with the series 
of events during the last decade .of the post century sad 
the first decade of the preseat century which made the- 
Korean peninsula -oh- arena -of ̂ rivalries and contributed ia 
-a. 3m m  degree to- the situation. sad. sting* 19^5~195Ch
for obvious r#aa«i% tte* writer did mot attempt to 
refer in .any m m m  to the present conflict in. Korea* 
Someday when mil documents and facts .are »mflsbl% them 
«ti attempt cam te made to- oliremicle the ramifications -of 
the- United lotions war’ M  U w m *
3&a$&*g Ills Still remain a fascinating sahlemt to 
the author0 It might interest: the reader that the author 
sorted In fhe 1st. Marine Division& m m m hor l f  W$Q*
%t  W % 9 which merged to & c'onsiiemhlo degree In 
Interesting: the author with the subject of Korea*
pm m§
4”it0©p «f etg $»«aR& *£ '%*pg :*as «$ &mat$ 'TOf
tmJZm *% t&tpg supi pw ■ wpt#t %nsfmmM * *
mm && ■<*$ impm *m m$mmrn mm m® mmwrnm ■ t
&mt$ tmmxxmix1 :mmm$m. ®m #% feswsii ^t%m% 
mm 4mpmmi%x m&mmm .mm «$' prpi p»
®mmw0 4|$k&- «pif #»
m$m%$m tww*i m jmw&m 0$$
tisiiOTa««s^
|! lf  o-bmmo-f %
w w w *  fm m M B - w m m m ^*™ ******.**™ -** * * * * * * &  
m *m $ m  i « : i w ® .  m  wm  m m s& M §
w  ® es w i  ^ c « .o  *,*■** * * * * * . .• , .*  .-# - * . w * #
t a t  beciiiiiibio w
e m fw & x tm  m  w b  w m m  w & t^ » * * * * *+ *+ *+ *# & k  
im M 0 m $m  m m m m  i®stsfasceu *■•■*.<.* ** * *».*■**
& SHI1S W  WaSt&GS* »*■*-* . ...20?
for ft ihoosahd years Korea depended u$on its relation* 
ship to. China as/«. ai@aber of a family' of aations-o Both were 
halted hy Gonftaoiss pri&otpXas of society sad goyerniaeati 
according to -ifhiotif society m s  hased on a -aortas of 
ta e Q p a X it ie s  b e tw e e n  m a le  .had fem a le^.; f a t h e r  a n d  sent* e ld e r .i * » , ' * t : *
brother m 3 yonnger isrofef̂ rg. friend, sad. friend^ and finally^ 
so»orolgii, .and minister Cor snbiect}*^ fheso relationships 
were held h# ho- as .porspmtsf and enduring as the noil&&&&•. 
flie hierarch ial scale of inferiors and suj^riors ascended . 
to- the ftftpm&g. with ascii Snlhrte controlled by a snperior^ 
3g& with proper rotas of conduct for oaoli.diass*^ fhe
bo- tie one except a vaguely fita&tyftft*. ’"fill;. * m  m m
Alt obi3$^%. m 3, to protect them and prevent Item. from, 
straying 'fm m  the natural way Is- tfe purposo of his
tjo% m  af Mfld&i. tbiAi: based, on
S w  itono* ■ fboif■ i&ibority fetyoi- '■&&&&#
hr #8$ :hit officials retained bhdiir positions'' only'm  'lo n g
AS tfioy ¥01*© virtuous and adhered to the rules of society,
fbo official example of virtu© im a 'm  ovdn&eliaiag' that it..,
#<»^eilod acquiescence;;
fbe im & tim  Of control through Gxaaaplo9 e#' conquering through virtuê . throws th© problem of the- control.'of society back m  the-' Individ*- 
• nul* Mm is itaGforo sxnsmp&t$MSM witb tbo Confucisn theoryw which requires‘that'sub-'' missive jtoopl# should, m  oomraefad by A display'
of oivta. virtu© « €  ca&fitoaNu1*'<*■
When the peoples' oh' tip-' fringes of the' Chinese 'Impif© 
accept## 'tfe Comfucian' theory tM j'm m  'MitMted 'list© the 
p l l  ̂ family of iicw.tlw modern state# ©f Chinas
B W b *  S1s%. fhiô Clil|»|. and lor©a, Although autoiaony m $  
given to- the local rulers^ they were responsible to' the •
- Chines© ©sparer f or the conduct of their subjectse Once a(■
yea% envoys mmsmA f r »  fha ^middle ?&&g$&ug* to accept ©rat 
renew the oatut -of' fealty bo fha Aauwreap^ ael&tlohshlp to 
the Mng§ots** -did. some obligations*. i*#>« i t
the atsptmr needed. a  military fore© in order to teach a
barterio sswegetgh & lesson in C cm fm im  ©thics^ th© &amK8$
pabiaob m$$mm mm  e&pocted to  fnrn ish  tig - tm»o^S7 
armlesn
sasti, was1 tbs philosophy P? gommmtit ^bioii boond
lo raa  to  S it e  tad  is o la te  th a  # t|w © 8 i ftm  t e i ia i i t e t  
p & t t t e f c  a n i  ©o^agom'SaX ^ tb te o o a r i©  w i t h ' t h e ' K o rb s n  $ e b £ ' * 
te a te -  ' I I I  lagan©se re c o g ttite  the
snttna roiattesbip if' £&g$& wer© to ©spend to fi» lain ■ 
with a lateral- of effort.*
m
tatly lapanes© effort# to hr ©sob the rtfsmily' of ’ nations* 
were O2£p»0 t 0td  h r t e  b r illia n t  Japanese- t e io f $,' E teyos& i^
hgft .1^92 A HO- im m dM the- peninsula and for sl3i:' yetrs teaged
tha- country almost anohedte^ B© m s  f telXr dofoatod hr
*
tte  ©oatim m l Korean' faM atafio© *' sad ‘ ia ta M a tte  o f ' yap®©## 
shipping by m  o ^ rs o M is ^ fy 'ft^ tlo  th© fo fo rttilm r
of m&mm arnor plstod nat-fel wsselao? ftie y$$e£&$& ar®l©# 
© reatnaliy withdrew not: threaten again fo r another
throe c©ntm\tes0
1*03? tea© hunted yearsj Korean frontiers wore cXosed 
to nil nations easeeph Chiaa> those snsQralhty. wad reeogniteu
HointtoniS with Japan. were restriete to- tin dispatch -of -&
. ^  . 1 •
congratulatory mission eeeh time « new Japan©s© shogua.wa#
a p p o te o ii « iti only fo r ty  Japanese ionics a year war#.
% ttte w  ir a it e iw ^  M a m  lo s y iy  Clfew fs i%  19W ) p2 i2 s
. to t o  important % amm port #f fuoaa*# %
H&if. tor aougrataiatar^ isiotfoo# to fmfSH -ceased ̂ and la 
l i #  m & i$ ? i t o n  'to ropfito *$sto# la toe to n  m m m & % 
■ to  & & £ $ a  k in g  t o  t o r  r o t o © %  ^  
mm £m- toiag bmsom renegades .of to' Oriento^
■S t̂o k t o a n  * « & *£ £  in c re a se d  " t o  M M t o b f p  P P ^ r f u l  
# a p » ® to  a liq u e  w ho o t o iQ t o d  t o  * t o  g o v s ra K e a t f o r '  
warv .Bat. to- conservative govornmatj formed \*it& tte $spg# 
pmW® » s  oonvtooi 'tot Japan- tokli' Imisband its- resources 
to promulgate demotic reforms fn enter- to- aito.-Japarr a 
n«rM .per,^ A i&g* vto& -tor dissipate sfrengifa t o  t o  
doubtful fain of gn$X2&&£a$ defeat on t o  Koreans,,. liisro* 
£«?©.£ t o  goverrmiant rabCitoi tlse mi" clique and followed a 
p*Ggraa o f o orre spondeace vttti tbe- eiiimse gm ®im m nt m ** 
gsr&itig t o  states- ofKorea* In 1873* t o  ̂Japanese ■ kroatod 
t o  t o O t i o a o f  C li in a is  p e s p o a s iO iii t y -  f o r  K o re a n s  - a c t io n s 9 
tit Ctiim Virgil w  rasponsiMIitr tgr mintaining tott0- 
totstk .Korea -was .frrsto-^ stats* 'It otUI. p6$m&im& t o : 
right te mice m r -m pead#*.*̂
f wo -^aro lator5; a Japanese gunboat of f the month of 
to-BHa Bitof in Mmmm 'tortftori. » s  fired on by Korean 
Mtorie#* fho Japanese .gowrsmmt5: advising t o  Chinese of
%osea B# Morse andftoley P;*. Madia tr,s. gg£ lagto** t o ©1 ayfclgttai Belatlens *( Gambr idga * 1932. )& 3%f| «T* 'Soil'Sfair Iliw iorfc*. ifl#J aft*
% r © « %  193*
tfeetr intentions* dispatched two warships and an eapeditlon*-
syr fora© to .Korea fh© result was the m m m *0m m m m
treaty of commerce of February 26* l8?5 a. Ostensibly a
commercial treaty* the first mm prophetic of Korea5©
ĵ lliioal.fttttm r# for it recognised Korea so Kan independent
stats enjoying the earns sovereign righto m  4oes\Japan,)Mi^
Oitssr olanees abolishes trad© re-air ictions at Pusan* opened
two additional ports to trade* and gave the Japanese extra**
territorial rights in Korea®
Curiously enough* the United States was the first «t*-
«  nation to conclude a treaty with- Korea* The treaty m s
negotiated by Commodore Bhufeldt of the United states few
.and m s  signed fey the Korean -fcing la- 1882*^  the treaty
provided for ’'perpetual peace and friendship** and stated^
If other pikers deal unjustly or: oppressively 
with either government* the other will exert their- food office#* m  being informed of the os#% to Ming shoot m  amicable arrangement*':h thus showing their- friendly feelings* 3*5
It allo provided for the exchange of diplomatic rspresenta^-
tires and guaranteed certain trade privileges*: Similar
treaties were signedby 1M $ &  with, the following European
Sy©'§iei#ii%; 4  History g£ .the- .fair iastf. (How fork* 
3$3P$3« 6 2 1 *
1 -"  ’
33g#nrr Chung* Korean Treaties, (Sew y©rk*3,919)* 197* 
■-^Sls©% XhÔ lh*?*
£Mfe3,*t5»
■$m m m Great Britain-in 1882$ tt&sr iso*** m & W m m ' - 
to  1886.16
; • ■ -ft» : first decade after the oj&ning ,of Korea disclosed 
the ugir-«Otur® of garopean $&£&£&& intrigue In the Far ' 
t e s t *  fh s s a f%  m .W &&9&S&  $ 0 s » %  m &  w r i t i n g  ^ A e t ls r  t o  
establish. herself in the #&** East* £h 3.86%  Bessla had 
acquired - froa China the Marlfcfjaa f ^ w i h e % ^  that esctsmdod 
frets,- the-- sioiith of the isair Fiver in the north to the norths 
•eastern border of Korea* ■ It m e  Inconceivable that the 
fets'ians m nM  .permit -their Japanese rivals to -ooeupgr a 
psaitlan so menacing to Vladivostok* the frans-Siharian 
which would link European Hnssia to a mbia-W-ter 
mbl#t? .bad teen planned as early as 168%  although actual
did not f&g&pigi&EL iB § \ ^  Korea in possession 
of a hostile power w u M  tar' not only froa wars
but also from the mssfet&'Of southeastem Asia* 
'Without Kore%. itosiu had not the assurance that it could:
ovao M i  the- W & ttl«o fxm ^xm & p. such M m  penetrate father
into 'ifeiietoarta-:*
289.
l? S te ig e r s 620o - '  <
i9ta)1% ? 1’ **on8?t*’ m s im m  m  iiaissa & & *  <«** » m %
A& the end of the ®eanco was rapidly becoming ■
the cre&ltorof Busslaaad at the M  ttoe m&M.ing th e foot 
will of Japan* Prenoli Interests in southern C M m  mat in 
Sm M e Isrnhihi'It. Into an alignment against tbo Shtoeso*3̂  
f?he opening of Korea ifeat Bpitaifc* Bor yaar%
the latter had been concerning ihhtlf 'With placing 'obstacles 
m  the path' of Bussiate southard advanced In April 1885S 
fearing 'that the. Bussians contemplated' the seizure of a : 
harbor on the Korean coast$ .dre&t 'Britain suddenly occupied 
Port Hamilton* on the' peninsula °s southern tlj>* Although* 
■WsSm did not protest Brilaints actto% iusoift. seat a formal 
warning' to the. Chinese BmM&nt in Korcas .stating if the 
British consolidated their position^ iusoia would seise a 
foothold in Korea* Bowing to the Butti&isx* tftra&ip. and wary 
loot Japan be inclined' to imitate the m s s  tons*. the Chinese 
W m m & the British for withdrawal* Negotiations continued 
for some months until the British finally' evacuated Port 
Hamilton early In 1 8 8 ? /20 apparently because of.Br.ltish fs3l- 
tng that as long as Korea, remained under the. shadow of the 
Chinese* British Interests' to the pantosnla were secure*
.to tbs bewildering *&$» of pxeppem- diplomey* tress* 
planfeod to the Grlont* ,fht Baited states mtot&toed a fairly
W* MeM and Bo iv Gooch* ■.ggafe SamtbrMgo History of 
Saltish. m m - i m  m m m *  ( Q m h ^ m g e ^ z W T w C "  * * *
neutral policy toward both S kpm  China*. because M &ati&m  
toterssttm m  4epmi#«t upon tk© malntea&nce of 
peace between the two countries,^ fhu%' th© limited .itate# 
government instructed it# rspr© senbat tv© s In  Peking an<3U fokyo 
to 4o everything possible to arrest- the- growing irritation ■ 
between is p m  and China* while at the ssao iiaa trenting 
.®@a?#a as an' independent and sovereign nations22
''g3ttc^a'pas»s& reltitioas 3m Korea' became iecMMiy 
strained during the last months of 138 b* when the 'Chinese
abruptly decided to- take a more' active rale, in Korean III'
sthe trade regulations which China published In September* 
XSSh.j Korea ua& relegated to the inferior statu# of trl&f** 
tary state *.̂ 3 fa December^ iBSb* while the:- Chinese m m - at 
mm with the frstiel% -Japan attested a coup d°etat in Korea 0 
A Japanese representat ive visited: the 'Momm-. M m  and hinted 
darkly at the result to -Korea' were - Japan and China to fight 
.on. Korean sei3U 2tf In response to th© Japanese threats^, the 
king issusi m m & im  of ref orm decrees* which m m $m & in. 
effect for one day*. the following day* the Chinese Bssident
^0 a » B 6 ie t% ; •
'23»©rse -and ifesifeirs 392y 
■^©ymett.^ b79.
apps-ara# mv®m% thousand ® htm m  % q s i %  wa&- fores# 
th© y&psnes© to m tm m t, to their ship# «t otemlpo,;2^ the 
o ld  t* m  o f m s  reestablished*. tall the X&pbbc&&& .
mM, p ^ J a p s 9se Koreans' who lm<3 .not #aM®s# m m  sought 
M t  «s# i s M d *
fh# Japanese. tisMteh©# ammt ;lt# t# $&&#$$*
tb-mw&t&Mfc*--* m ttlo m n t to  relation to fM#©*
fwe ■ days after M s  arriyal* the Ghlnese^Freneh war- cane to. an 
sMtpt sa<ls ana Japan eouM not afford to; be aa^eooporaiiv#*
Count ft# M O  to content himself with a treat/ wfiieh still,■* '»-fail short of recognition of Sm om  indepsMeim©* yet sads
substantial aO-mnoss in that direction* On April 1%
Japan. an# China agreed to a contention which stipulated!
that th© forces mte* t M  Chinese Issidsnt as. • wall as th© Jaunts#' legation guards weir©- to M  completely withdrawn from the ■klagdoii. The ££ore$n -liiag was to tc- ©rgaais© -a feram m w■la. th© formation of which neither the Chinese -or Japanese- wars- not to he employed*. In ©as©- any serious -disturbance- in Korea M i ©  it i»ea#Mrif 
for ©ibMr Chlim «» Japan to Mhi troopr 1st© 'th# 
pentoshia* th©' chMtry sanding th© troops must 
notlfy the previously ### 'is writ iht of■the-- Intent i m  t©&- # %  an# th©' toa-pi s M h M  M
■ w ith d ra w s . w hen  ife #  n t f a r  M i  M a r t s e t b lM ^ o
f M  rirhtry diminished In  the- next
yMr#*. fepa% d m r n ^ l s ^ m &  pass!
■ ^ -^ m d l& n s e v * . 2 & *
while Ite Chinese* encouraged W  the ^itlsh|../feoas©
■ a a t y © ^  t i p  C hine© © , g o m m m n fc  s p f ^ S t i t i t  a  ;j^#2 & a & &  W ®  
:Enr®% w i l  Isso^-jNa*1 hi©- snti^Ja0 m m - anal ,
K o rn s  s o o n  jH r tu rn s ti t o  C h in e s e  c o n t r o l*  t h e  m m $  C b fn ® s% -
■ mm politically a&s&e* in Item* hsS£® to strengthen their 
.position by magus*, A Chims.e^hniM' laXsgrsjfti..
lisa©-, m s. completed he tween Seoul end .PeMing* while- at $&». 
same; time* the Japanese were refused permission to build a ■ 
telegraph line between Seoul and Pusan* fhl© liaa was built 
later under' Chinese supervision* which gar© China. © virtual 
telegraph monopoly i» Hiso apprehensive last Koreans
need for capital should turn it toward the wests .the chines© 
took m m  the flnsnhisl .affairs, of the Korean .gorerment* In* 
sitting that all Korean loans would have to ha.' .approved hr
the Chines© government, ^0
The strong Chinas®-- policy toward Korea divided the 
Japnap© government into two- camps:*, fh© ©jfcU&Hjy 
©tagnttA at. the fgroiftli of the CMnese ©svy^ wanted to .strifes 
hofor# it was large ©nougb-t® threaten the Japanese homeland, 
§te-.mnSsfmMim: .pace fgrty^ however* recalled that Chirm 
hat; consisrfetnhty isvsiat off .nfttr such soflvs psrints sn§
l?b*
^ B e n n e t t *  % 8W
■ ^% K iS 0 l%  1 9 9 *
its national dbfons#© to weaken,-. bhan this occur ed$; 
t o  conservatives asserted*. would toe the moment to ■ strife, 
filer also stressed that a pm m pzm - war. in Xoroa. would only 
incite t o  Snsafen© t# aid the Chinese 0 For the- %$m toeing* 
tb© -Japanese government vtm m d the W m &u n ttm & tm  with 
apparent ia#i£f©?©nc©? marshalling its fotos for the appro­
priate momenta
$h© rebellion in tee© of a -mMgSm®; sstohy town as 
the- fong*»h&ka .provided the- impetus for'-the Japanese invasion* 
ih© fm&«b&l.cs. were a revolutionary group ©f cultisfe opposed 
to foreign interference* whether ■ Asiatic or W©sfcep*u31 *pjj©, 
initial outbreak began in the southern provinces* end $$$&$$ 
of the rebellion were laagnifi©# considerably toy ‘the t#aaf they 
reached ®e©fe On dune -2* XSfb^to Korean court telegraphed 
t o  Chinese government' requesting assistance^ poklnft" 
notified i’Qkyo* ‘in accordance with the toiitosta Convention 
©f X88JJ* an# dispatched -approximately 2000 troops,, 33 However* 
t o  Japanese troop© were mm  aobife an d'When t o  Chinese' •- 
arrlved ia Seoul* they war© -starto# to. discover' t o  -Japan* ■ 
©S© there« .Although Japan hh# not been, requested to furnish 
assistances, 1* ted sent nearly 15 ,000 tosoj#^ fedtiiasH.*
3 % o rs e  © s#  !% © i© i%  3 9 ? *
enough^ th# W m m i asw was Ohio to ;|mt 4 ,mm the rebeXl&xi 
long iefos'e the Japanese' and Chinese troops disembarked i t m  
fheli* transports*.
, China suggested that ail troops evacuate. the -country* 
tut the Japanose refused to loom* and proposed to cooperate 
With the Chinese _ in the Intr^teMoa of m tm m - into the. 
Korean adninistrat ion* The CMnesa no fused .and on July 23 5 
the d&p&siesa seised, the Korean king' sad his m m  £mm® a 
gdvornrssnt which denounced all Chinese treaties and asked 
Jspans.se aid in driving the Chines© f r m
When the-' United States .gorernaent received the new 
that troops of China and Japsh were in M  and in a posi*-t!
tion to fight j It ■ instructed the United States isinistaf is* 
Seoul thafef
in view of the friendly . interest of the .United States in the welfare of Korea and Its.- peoples 
you are .instructed to use ovary possible effort, 
for the .iffiosarvation. of peaceful conditions,,
fhn United States was hound hy treaties, to okttoi ••good
offices at feh# rsqrnsi of both China •aaS .lpr©a# and to m t
m - a friendly m xltm m  mt lapaimm^ request* fbs Secratary of-
ttath in 1871S however* had interpreted such a ro<p6si as
lifting that the United States could not nedfeta in a dioj»t#
m M m  both -paattlfts to the- m m w ^ m tw  accepted the President ■
as the m & t& tQ F ^y
' f  ha 'W m m m  appealed to Fr&ne%, tout
must th© United .States for alds and &3,l great' powers responded
with a act© asklag China -and Japan to. agree to- a slitotanato
withdrawal of their troops* Both rafuto-3 ^
He got la t ion o wore kept of between China and Japan by the A m tM m  mlnlstsrs until late in,
Xmmagy# l # 5* ®ba two powers distrusted each ©tor * m& Chibs ms- always trying to- aseortaln 
in advance what tha,dia»to» of Japan would be In otor that she might pros$B?a tbs teterteiit-te of Great Britain or Ms.sla*d?
fha Japanese- naval and land, forces ofsmtielned. tbs Chinese
at almost ©very engagement* fspsssse ships- bombarded Port.
Arthur at ulll 9 and Its troops fanned out. over the Korean
l»ainsuia* in April* 18959 China and Japan signed the freaty
of Bhimonosekig which eompelled China to Eeintowledge.- the, full
Independence of Korea 'In addition* China ceded
and tlio Pescadores Islands s, thus- giving Japan strategic con***
trol of tha southern approach to Chinn northern Asis*
Japan appeared to be firmly estronohod' on the Ahian oontiii@h%.
Ill
Within, a year sfiay the frosty of s kimonosskl * - the
<.jafpnesb position in lorea underwent .* sudden reverto,*- lb 
:Maroh;|:. 1896* t o  Korean kiagt a pitiful and. Isteffectml Jafcags** 
escaped froa his 3&$&ns3S 4a liars and sought refuge at 
tbs Busslm mUmm?*- W®&- postoe> -rtf krto ftoslafi saliva 
t o  mrines from their ships In the- tetor At CteiiiiO s*fr* 
r e n te d  a  J a p a n e s e  ■ -a tte a p i -to , r e c la im  t o  k in g * -
3%bi&«,«. #EU
39|feroo sx4  haoIaIr.s.
*%sisc«it asi.*
§ m u $g&ga in centreI #t hi* ropsi tfet- M m
isstaed m sirtos of smelling the detested
Ihjsansce reiMs* . irti^sfanesc sintiaenb iissW  s oilne^ 
ana -several pr©~iapanese cmMnei members %fe*p@: Billed by nobs 
■̂ htle attempting to escape .jfom  the country-, #& *1 1  nppof* 
ance% the tnssfehs &£& taft; ama^fft the liberty -of the liiigr 
bub there 'nan little doubt that the Hussions assumed the 
snss advisory eapa-eity uhich the -$iiimso and Japfiess bPi 
■and* occupied, fhe centuries of being an inferior nation M  
the family of- notions sensed to prsist la the minds of the 
Koreans,^ 1 f ho Jhaefican minister cabled his Secretary of 
S ta te  that*
1 only ianur that the King -and the gmhiast defer- to- Snssim opinion in matters of consequence* the King aiders to govern with Russia tehiaa the throne*^*
in :i§arol% 1896., Inssii negotiated m  agreement nfaibb 
gave it control of Korean finances* the right to fumish^ 
sHitay a dviso rs to train, the Korean army* and indirectly 
advise the Korean government,^ fti© following month* -a 
aining concession aiong1 the- lumen M im t wm- granted to the 
■Busslans-g and in August*, the Russians were given an enoaabn© 
tUtfhe# -g tm t along the liivar*1̂  By September* 2.89?*
Russian 'P?osti#* ims so tremendous that the aggressive
« - * -  
i°  f.
1* % o rs o  m & - Ife e liftia ? *  p (B «
_ -lfi!2£0. the- Conflict, (lew foth*.
do, 0 ffa&W# t o t h e  mwmm% M h f  that hetio®̂ : 
forth*. be imst tab? Bussian «£vto» on all letters* lie Spayer 
also lashed out &$ the growing importance p i gm ^'Xm n s d s e im *  
hri©% when fee toforaed the forest* offtotols that nay 1160 
shewed frieodshilp to the m m tim fts would be disatssed fejii * 
the goversusQnt,
fbe I'ejsmoso government -Aid n o t forsnte an active role 
In Korean affairs* to spite of the feet that Ihiseton influence • 
was tt its peak,, By eleven -diplomacy and ttoato* ’the Japan® 
&m  laiaisifcr* .teen. Eomum* concluded 0 I'm m m M m . with the 
Bmsslim. reprebent at too * ff*. Waebber* on Kay ih* 1896* it 'pro* 
vMed that both, countries would. leave the matter of the1 
itogto stay at the Russian #©tossy to royal discretion^ al* 
though Waehher agreed. to advis© th© Mag. to retorn, to fato 
■patoeo $a soon as possible**9it was declared that the- .present cabinet to tteeo wore noted for generous and .©fid. prfacto 
■0 m t  and hoi been appointed to their post' by the king of his own accord* Tfm Japanese rand lasston 
2^p?esontotto#s should m tm f® sate ft. their &$m t# advise the ktoc to govern the people to. a generous spirited
Less than a taoatb later* Japanese .and' iussito *&$*$* 
atotofivas net to Of* f^tofsiwfg to negotiate regarding the
rstotoe. position- of the 'too pmmm to. lores*. By toe 
T h s s h i& to ^ fio te a o ff  B ? e to ch 3 %  s ig n e d : t o  J u n e *  1 8 9 %  th e  to # s n ^  
attempted to Halt BusStim Mlttene© to Z tm m  flimaotol
matters by agreeing to teoi mmy- to Z&mm W  mutual
aa§ to leave the creation and m izxkm im m  of the police and
m*w: to the Koreans* fte final clause permitted the
ego to coat'lime the adain.lstratioo. of the country*s tele*-
graphy Xtees<,i{̂
ft "was- unfortunate for Russia that the mild feebter wao 
transferred to Msi;iec% and replaced by the haughty and arro­
gant ie apsyur. ShortXy after his arriral^ do Spey®% 
irr-ftated because of continued anti-Russian Sentiiaent in the' 
country demanded in.-n tost of strength that the: Koreans giro 
a snail island- in the Pusan harbor- to Russia for a coaling 
station* goafe tine prior to the Russian demand, an' Am?lean 
representative -had marked off the island, as the site for. a 
ffeste.ign settlement for- fnsaru In a peremptory note, which" in 
tone ■and. content amounted .to an ultimatum, do Spynr suggested 
that 'if -the Koreans did- not ■ acquiesce to the Russian 
tho latter would vacate ■ the- .peninsula,. leaving the Koreans 
to their fate* ttm  astounded Koteaite replied firmly and 
politely that portete- it would te more -convenient if' the 
Russians would depart* To the chagrin of the Russians and 
tte glee of the Japanese,, ie Speyer m $ left to no alter** 
native but to mho- prepstetions for his teihriure.* Se mm- 
summarily relieved of hid pool by M a  government,, and the
&»a3$eg* ailttsrr advisors ttei te Fort Aftte^
«&£&&- the M & m a t i tal, o^prt# M  m a t  to f ©§ip»r#
th e  pro fited . S&m $ &  ifa&Mtom te io*
in  Ia iw  ^  the W MlSMm m , fW0 tmsMf  sigaed w ith ia  a few  
1 *M $  -a fte r de fipepefte 4Sf$&fta&e.-* ■ fiso protocol, be&te both
m m sm
«« ftto talcs ao fsea sores in j&apeot to- the- appoint*- 
ate! of' mlf Iterf fc#$t«ot^ 0  or fimaofal a&risors 
. - w i t t a i t  M r t n g  t r r i t e t  t e f |P t© te s &  a t  •« ' o o fe ia i 
®0w£®mnt m teb
$ # $ m  also- seenred a pledge from lu ss la  ■ rscogatei&frj, r,tbe
wtSa teretepaesit o f coiM ercial $$& in d u s tria l re it itte ®  tw * 
tween and Sorest Both |»rtlso #iso ?soogntebi tbs.
end #a$£m Ma:poa^enoe of ported sad pieiigei:
- -^»^*»»»3fei3r t o  m A 0 m  i t e n  d te te fe -
in tbs- tetemirniM&a of the ooaatr^0wl̂
IhterpreMiii tbs. $Mb$K$09e% fswtebbi, to m m  that 
laosfta was «fIAfisi te abandon .its. Rom m aspirations for 
0isl»S' £fe the dalles© teasediatel^ began the tetir
of seotirlhg; i^fasohat e.oB©©relal interests la Warm.* $eo>«* 
. m m & m .  £ m  m $  pshite'htHitie#
were secared. .for .fspsmist M m j q p w ^  f^p^es# diptesiite 
woeasfiiil^ blocked. &-itsite» «iteaspb %o bo»erb isssastp%
Ute fi^st port m  the dbi wip i »  lafies tx m
% * H O S t  $ %
in to - *fe m m &  %&&&■ .«&&& 't to m ftft  Wm m & $m  
W m -  lot#* A itite of' -the fopoisir emiaaSBr ftSaGal das**
■oefPS- fto pittfto of Hfi -&& fttlos?#*
■dar'. p l t o r  f t  io f o o  f t  v t s y  # $ $ $ » |.  f t  c o n s is t s  Of .«nr ahstftooeo £r«& s m m rn tm  'ft tbe .In* toroal afftftr oaf- tfsft ooattiQr im& to «*&& posft t&®. tt» of1 oar oOooooio ■ ftftrosft*itsfg plftf- Oft 'sodoivot the approval of ths 
iv#ft isajostftr of :oor smi m  do gta&
have a tiv tm m n  f t  d M ttp  f t *  5*
fti ft® smava ftesiiftftJsf sfftar- ft® ftf f ._
f t p o  o o i fto w t B r l f t f t  k | »  'to  o f f f t t  » i t p o i i t t t e  ^ ttp p p te # - 
seat otitft aoowagftg ftfta to -fosftfe .ftoiifttt fpftioai to 
lispWftf: ftdf P i  the geoeral support -of the mftod
S ftto i* .!^  ^ h f ig if t  g ^ f tg -  mmtikmm. « o i o m tt
Bdtftft coosiderad' that tft ftaaoiii® ftftŝ sft ft Q U im  otmft 
f t s t f  f t  . p o t e f t o i  f t i  m f t f t f t e #  t r  f t ®  o f  f t ®
gm m m - m vm wm m - m & m  opm  door io ’ t f t  a ftr f t ts *  f t p o  
pi l&agteaMt ooostiê ahtF to 3mm  than fIf %  1W %  aft 
Boftoto floftd ft© f ftftf p’sstigo Of ft© dapanose ft' t M  
i i f t i i f t  W m  f t f t n .  f t  f t s r e  -m m  m m  th a n  a g o -,
■oteia at stated ftps®©®® ifefefti pipŝ fvatf ftot “ItaPiipift 
« l r  ft *  ®fti»iftg. pftt for s w i f t  m i
ftos® air- vftol woooitr *oar ftpo*.
irftfto ofcetesnon w o  dwtoft# that as fong $$ teitft m ®  ■
in po&gtgsaiga of Haacts.m‘iaS: if Mould completely doistnito i&© 
C k S m m ^ m m t  at Poking^ to th e - ie t^ in a c f of B r itis h  inters
* $ £ #  ■ o n i  p s ^ s t ig © * ®
is a solution* tbo -German minister in Gondon suggested 
to  ■ th e  ^fnpnoso m iniated?* Count saptto li%  tha o f'
m  Attglo^apdnoso understanding in the for Bast*, Upon no**-'' 
noising tu©  jg g tb ia fttf f r «  foH^n to  $$& &  .out tb n  Brl% iisi%  . 
Bfegfts&i begun eor®ranicatie>Es with Sori. bsnsdoMne On ipiX; l? r  
1t& iiogotiaiionn continued until October ? ufeeu the  
8ssf̂ ns-'Wo@B$6: s.pf^sfaonsiw .lost on Jinglo^ap&nese nlii&no©’. 
to signed Mteo- itse projeetod togio~Gpraa« treaty Mould te 
o o n s i^ io d *  f io  dos^no: p ro ta s fs d  to  th e  B r iitO it*  ubo m *- 
pli.oG th a t fSmem^T' could demonstrate iff. good faitb Qr p*#* 
tosting in St.*. fetorotet m  regard to tusoisn'nOfeicn In 
^mlairln* germane betrayed lib oentor^of^tte^noad policy 
%  d e lin k in g *  conse^uentlyy i/hea & & & & &  b lu n tly  msMd J#na*-, 
4 M &  M  t in  I te M s  should bo lis s rliid : to  J o in  the  
$&$ rtMob. rofnsei*^
i t  t h a t  $ $ $ & * M  t t e  f t o io f f o t io i i%  f l »
$$&$&$$ to ite'ir slaf% that friaie lto$ former Japanese 
f© t is lo iy  n & n  n &  f f *  i  ■ s t im ’f g i  g ro u p . in ;  ■
i&$ Japanese government ,|%lt that m- IWini&s alliance Mould bo
^ l i s t d * .  as^u-
# 0 # fe ^  # 1 ;
■warn -pifOfifefo to one 'trlth #1m o the amaatan -!»ite*f
s ts o ti& a g  w a s  « £ t  f t  w fi « . M t t s b .  S & tit f lc fe  M l .  
air©ii§hl». the J&psneaa position*^ f&Hsh- to
mm traitr ai§®& imfato $*&.*&$!$
tegia ifeiot&tiW’ fn p«i' offMia
racialist# fha%
•£*$&& Sa '^ittton to: $$». ixHtemrfe? Ohieh; ah# la 0M ® %  is iatoisatei ia a ^caii&rdegree loiftieiiif#' m  i l l  oa- sat ia# -clustrioll^ -$o t^iwu-*■*.§/
la :fts» o f toia %b& mm pM &b# m m  mmm- ttat it
w0%t&. t o t lor oltief of! them to t&lte m elt 
im m m m  m  'm f M- J^fafaaafhle jfo m & m  to aafOlparsf these interest %  'if threBtanetl either hgr■ sgi^aatve .motitsi. erf- .-arr other ■ fsowar or W - 
Mrnmm^mrnm ariafat $*r oiihaQ? €hiaa or X@r©%,&g& i««se#altatifig, Mm- intervention of either 
-■of' the Iffsfi- Parties for the fapsj*.
'taottoaOf' the 'itvta an& j^ofsrtr of- Sta; .suV ■
Jn the ovettt that sitter ©taai Britain or Japan fit &$$$&. .
Of thorn intoreata itaaM bacsana Siwolwd -to a fhir# m fctom # . .
the- offset pr-tr fa ttio oIMtoee- m s  to mint**!** strict
nm t, t o  m ao •£$» ■#&£&%$■■ t o  p re v e n t o t f e 5 $ m $ 3/
: f t i «  f o t a f n t  f a  ‘m M & M M o  M o  *& 3 $ v
When the |^ovtafo» of the fagioMopsaoso alienee m m  
m rn 'W w m krn m  m M m M , iy  m l& ta ln a c t  a  e a 2 B
%hrt'«h*l ieeehf.
th&# sietetotoh; # a p r|e €  I t  &$ & .
toofef, ani w m  quick tt feiata tot itetr t o t  m $M m m  
'Hitt Wmmm^ is ato# i8#£$ *&» aer ̂ w s t e © t  .se
% t t o -  f i i r  S e a t m  w M l a s  t t  t t i -  a re a s  f o r t e i r
$ii forfmf  the -IhMtJIm athlEte-- a :$rosiii» $ j M
tts fettitt grant m  tetter i&fetin#- m m m & ^sm  except to 
lto S %  and at t o  sane t!®0 «$£$$& to temish t o  meessarf 
a a p ttt t t t  h u ll#  a  from  f ® m l t t  W **# i* te s ls n s
nSso hagan to  a fp « r  on t t e i r  ilm te r  9m !w t o t t
/SftetH**. Since the eonaeEetEn afrsasMiist tttpttatod that should 
a fitshpEEiaeEi Etorf tt# MgEfin vieHS vqmM prevail* the 
fsptese and Kdre.au protests 'wra ignored t t m  'to 808$&bii% 
:inttrp?E%ef the EOfihesslon to totai# fell the streams .#IdgHtng 
In to  the i t o %  tth #  g iv in g  BossM  o o o tro i mmw m- m a t 
m m  tt northern Korea,, Eolations- heEfeae m  strained W  
©etther* 1003 » t o t  Japanese is s r to i^ E  and te & e rs  in © fete  . 
'teon aailiiig la their fjm m  $g& rotetti- tt m $ar tetor-
îki ■ '•tS" M̂T ;'l—i -’ '* - mL -7rtl tji/
to rettofe'to tension in Korea and ifeneteia^. t o
. .f& isnesh .suggEEtei t t  i t s  M a t t t t r  J a  it * .  B fe te a ^
t e g  e n - J m lf  a § ?. 1903,3 t o t  t o  g o ve rn m e n ts
^ h e ls < m r  S&9*.
^%isahan©9 29S„ '“
- the jscst-serious hareto consult the M m X m  government j& 
m' Oftrlt of ©onalitsihioh and freti3m a s %  wfttx the view toward concluding an understanding'
&.m l$m & i© caspose' fnestlOtis which are at. tfeta.
%%m tie m m ® ©f tb»if ubiety*,01
Japanese -anxisty tfas expressed by a -eoiamimioation fee® the
Japanese foreign office t© ifcs .isinfsfasr- -In St* l®tnro©uy%
fa. which wan demonstrated & eoncai'n sore seri-cme m a r
Buesi©*© advanc© into Manchuria*
stationed on the flanifc of Oorea would be a caasfcsnt ^ e o  ’to the s@-f̂ :smt© ©sdstoian© 
of that efiyptri% and in >mw owoat it would sort©-bo mis© aaasit 'Its© dominant pmmt in Corea*Otifea is- m  I&ppytaat outpost in Japan*© Ita©Of defense 5 and Japan consequently considers the of G©m®, e5 s©XuteIy -essential
to boy .own ropes© and safety*. daps® poeseeses paramount political as well as-commercial in* terest© and Xnfiuenco in Gores-* which baling to.gnMd. to her own security,,. she emmet consent to. surrender f %  or share with* any ©then . - 
power*®2
f b© ftuosiais^ep&ae se negotiat5,ons continued in #fe*.<•
Petersburg for six months uni were unsuccessful*
m m M , fit willing to-actoowXodge Japanese gredoaimmca in Kere%: provided Japs® would 
gmxwst©©- K m m * 8 ia^peadems@| sad Jepsa. m s  pro pared t o msSm a similar conditional 
aetesm^dgwi*.ia regard, to .?tnssXa8s position 
t n  I fe n c iiu r ia , , . ^
Us a re©nl%. the Japanese m m m % ell diplQisbic relation©
with Bussia on February 6 , 190kt: and Japanese warships
©tbsntead I*©#©-Arthur two days later* demonstrating Japanese.
•’*'*22*"''
desire aftd wlillng«©sn t© ■om tf the fight to the - fmeslans.
<. - fhe Korean govsrruasnt was sot unduly concerned about its
iml&iien to the Biios-o*-Japan©se War, ,ffc Xoohed to the. tr#&ty
of 1.802 with tber43tatlted S'ta-teg. which' guaranteed that*
-...if other powers deal unausily or op:p?essirely With oW m r- -government, the other will escort their good offices, <m being Infonaeff of. the m e .  to bring about an. asioabio a|ramgo«nt|. tto showing their friendly relations,5̂  .
to- the Koreans* the IT, 8. had- becoma o wM g  brother11 by £$&
assurance of gooff offices in the event of' a war. Xoreo tteer-
fore, Issued a proclamation of neutral Sty,
Concerning, the American attitude, the president of the
t&iteff 8tateo.j. Xheodor© - Beoseveit. is purported to have said?
As- soon as m ?  broke out, I notified Bsrmny 
and Fmast in the- most polite and discreet -fashion that -in, tli© event of a. combination against Japan. * I should promptly side with- japan mnd proceed to whatever- length
liras, i t  was apim rent th a t the. President $ou24 ignore  the
..lae rioa ir^Q ronn  tre a ty  o f fr ie n d s h ip , signed in ’ 1882, the
Sfefftrtft&ot of State .dispatched o- circular to both belllgitk- 
■ent% -admonishing- tteia to respect the ne-utrgllty of China. 
Both Brent-Britain and $e>wm& favored the the. British 
- beesas© it would drive Buesle f f w  Korea and iiasmtarin -where 
It threatened China- and 'British. Interests there, and, Germany 
'beeause it' wanted Bnsei© hogiot down In the Sent where it
Whitney ■ drisweldy ifef” Folicy of the
afe tw J (sU  x « ls 190C  « ~ & -® .4sa
<55j:ol3on5 85**,
Cduli.hto longer threaten deraiahy8 s- eastern toordciv franco 
msJfnssIa^s ally and otoligofed to the flmudial- support of
W . s the$m. dsps before the
topi- possession of the
1 . ‘fMis& to sign a. protocol op .fetoruary 23s. guaranteeing the' * - *,
in&ependfcnce and territorial integrity of Ifiotea la- return 
fm  advice on admfelsirahlvo - reforms* She Aoer icah.
sinister at fol-yo stated: that all his Infermtion : led hits to ~ 
thieve that Japan had %very Intention of respecting the 
integrity of the Korean lmplre*fr̂
From Hotfoatossgpg,- 19Cft> to the-end of- hie second ter% 
Pooscvelt was- to..-all intent and sft&po#&£ his c m  Secretary * 
Of State* Boast Ime- during 190b c the- president Pagan to pro** 
-fens fears c-erace^lnf the rise of Japan.In the far East-#.
With .the thought of a.. Jsmrese invasion of the Philappines 
in atmd^-the President hseaiae vitally .interested in. -a. polioy- 
ifc&sb- wtrnld harmonise intentions tomrd
Wmm&fi? In January* 1905* he wote in ,a confidential fettir 
tfestr
W& cannot possibly Interfere f or .the Koreans
against the Japanese* ftosy eouMnst strikeone tolo*r in their mm defense**3 '
*
fm  meks .Infer m  February 6-̂  toe mote to a confident thats-
^arismldf 13b-l£f*
^ 3 It Ing • 1 * Morrison*
(* s ,22M f . Hoosevelt: to  tm  bengsrk© Meyer*.
&&
. , peace; ...atsmi nmt%, Japan ought te .*
base a i ôbecisra-io m m - B©re% iihioh has- - .; : shown' Its utter Inability to stand W  Steali t  
m & ought to succeed touHus3la:5s- nights in .« ■ f and. around Port Arthur*®9- •
Bhrlng July*. !90hs Secretary of War ■faf% and the .
Jaj^aepe urter Mnlster*. 5pat reached .3 definite
■ -imdenstaMing in .yefgar& to £&@*53a& policy tm/arcl Korea ■ inti
the- Japanese- attitude ■ toward - the ■ Philiiipiise-Sv̂  In their
fohyo e.cmersatlonsj. Count' mtsin^s-emphasise*! that JapaMs
interest in the Philippines was llMt©# to a. dagire' to see
n.-etroni and friendly nation such no-the United states
governing tie- Islands* rather than an unfriendly BuropQan
pamr0 Be confirmed In the strongest terms- that Japan didI *• $
not-- harbor any aggressive - designs against the Philippine
liters*, in Saturn for - such fmnimsss* fait m m vlm ^ that
ta M s  op&iotts:
. -s^the estaMistoaent. by -Japanese. troops - Of a ' suzerainty m & r KtaHtto the extent of requiring " that Korea eater' into no- foreign treaties without the consent -of Japan m s  the logical re-salt of . the. present war end' would- directly emtritote to psrmoent peace in the-- Bestv1
President Jloosevelt. bcaafirsad f sf tsS opinions in a - cable-'
grata, several days later*
Tour eonmr sullen with Count 'Katsura- absolutely correct in every-respect* fMish yon would state, 
to Batgura that- £ -confirm every word yen -My©: seSdl
?%orripdn0:?, ’ iSi% to -feft*
Wtte tee American policy .sfatte in swell- disarming oiiteer̂  
te© Japanese fwrste few tee otter Western ppwer in tee 'far 
,lasft Oroat Britain*.
fm tegnst g 190^5 &roat Britain ate tea
Anglo^Japannso Alliance^ ate in .* totter of applanation 
acaomimnleO tee .azmonncer©nt5 lord Lanteosmo- wrote
teat®
ffta- no# treaty no doubt tsffirn at ttes poiaf teteptenowsif te m  teat of WQ&* ft ha% bou~
■&&&$ teeome evident tent Corea. 4 owing to its olote ppteWty to tee Jajffiaese'SiapiPe ate ite inability to- state .alone must fall under tfee Oteteol ate.vteteldge -of1 Japan*** Bnglate fess eterf peosott to- believe teat similar views 
&g& -teia Of otter Powers wite regard te tee rolattes wfelcii should subsist between Japan 
ate- CoPte**^ ■
f  te  delegatee' to  the $$&&& conference. ©entente o f 
forfSm̂ ite.j. So# Hampshire^. August 1 %  1909s ate. during tee
.following dayŝ  woof- Of ten Japm©©© %s^ls ware î tepfte* 
Wm$t® m <$&tesete to demates fop Port Arthur--.ate
tefteln territory nte railway concessions to l%mhuria-c 
0e«tep|. tee .groat piter% &mat: Britain ate tea Otetei #tetea 
^Otesfsi a Jajmtete footeeM In Manchuria.s- ate restricted 
l̂ tertete .fains to f ate«% IS9te% ote m war in*
^%oroo -ate l&eiste&g.
1 % r i s ^ 3 %  121*
1 to lapases© to®, ofcliterated Susstoa to» potor*
' dritoh-Jltosto from tmm-f tamhled tor In Man*- e t a i %  tmtor&toed the ftor% tygtfam# a&d. rs« dueed tor la the- Far- East to «- atoor p©tor0*>
tr
■ftes too tiars Mthto a. decade left the Japanese la 
tossptoto eo&tret «f SoreM# desttoy0 laptmese huslaesssen^ 
4£.g$on»t% axsd toMgrasts pieced their tolmgtogs ato to**: 
-prisd for the foreaa ;pealashia»
Hgrfafs Ito*. wieraii diplomat out four titled a prim 
s^lidi®%.'!wad stored to Korea M t h  the rtoSt of -resident*- 
g m t o l  to «Mte£ator ls$®8Sto $o£ti$ei& a«® ©oottcaie to**- 
toreoto* it© ato M e  staff were Impeded from the toglmtog 
to ttoto rafona 'ffmgem tototo© too Sftroaa Jtetog af Ctl amtod 
too eouatry through M s  advisors5 stototers,. and provincial, 
.govera©**a* 3a$snffa& advisors couXd only ssafee suggestions'
*o& conM not compel the execution of refcris Muoteito* ^aite 
mtoae*iHy$. the Koreans .tostoted -the Japanese aa& d M  ©vsry* 
tSKtSB̂  to hleeh the Japanese #£torto*
f to Koresn-a apanos© arrangement coat tewed mtil Ef©f^ 
it that totis? ito- Korean M u g  secretly dispatched three ■ 
Eorean% aeet&qpanlsd- hy .an- torican jaissioaarŷ . to tto 
Hague Peace- totttatoto* -f to Japanese delegates sftendtog 
tots -m^mtim- tod little dsfffoMty ill- jsreyeatisg the 
reaepitt^m #f the Koreans,?- and to? a result of this ill**
l y  simple^ At- tlm . top was tfee appointed
ty- tli# &jje&e$&' -aasaBor atid la tttt&gr ̂ a p s s i M a  to- a& oi# 
tat &Ua* ’$&» gcwemor^geae-ral issued deoFaes and appiated
ysrallelto' program o f oom orG M l and paliiSeai. afgr&aSis#*- 
sent in the far East,
’V
Bering tin f i r s t  decade after tie arsies&t;loi% tie
■Mmptmsm MM little to court tie Koreans,: Tier ■«©£» con**
« s n ^  With creating: a strong aiministrat'ire sssofein©̂  while
at the oaip time integrating 'tie country*s ecotoiiy ■'vtSMx ito
' ^ m 9 a  industry*. lend- and- natural resources were ex.pro~
priated by de v ions »@sn% while Japanese, -eerpomtloas
forssed bags bolding csaipanies sMeh took over lay§e segments
of tie Korean eeanemy5 managing st to- tie safclsftotJm and:
profit of tie Japanese*^
th o Koreans did not submit without protest* Haring
the .years foXltotng. the amerntimt;, they agitated constantly 
*
for participation in their government and finally for inde**
■pendesos* . il &1£bbx was achieved at a toga irindependonee#’ » ». ^
rally on the day of the old -king's funeral 5 March ls 1919*. 
fto Japanese retaliated^ with a u&ve of and Q m cuttm s*
Ifenr .proaiaaat' Korean leaders fled to .Shanghai mimm they •
orgial^d' a Z m m n lad 'by
Syngmaa Bbee* fbr®sr classas-ba- of Motorw Hilsc® at Princeton* 
Some reforms in Japanese adt^aSstratlon followed the 
iMepeateiiee demonstration^ a' Japanese .admiral replaced the
% t ^ l § s %  788*
Asrto m m  general* penal tors m m  m  fm m &  ■ somewhat by too
'■ i
of flogging* ahd polios affairs spes?® tatonltoxr
tbs' arsy f ia i placed la- m mmm to  ' & $$mm  ’
of-otoetivo' arid ' m m m iM  sas eetatotohto*.
tMch m g& partially ®fedto# by tto torn! fto- r *. -
mmmtJL ®to®bto»a wars virtually ignored %  the people to« 
mass of tbs puppet. ante® of the councils mad the toting 
r n m ^ ^ m r n M  -tm - W  urging the minor arto -
tooracy ®ni to 'start, small factories and
storeŝ . attosptod to build a'miadto ctos® as a buffer to** 
toeen them and the Koreans*
During tip’ twenties* thousands ef Koreans migrate# 
teresn to® tbifce !tMtoltot'®03d toto liver to- settle to Ite*
t »
churln -and /Sitoria* they constantly .harassed to®
Japanese with strong guerrilla raiding parties* ' Soviet 
political ooiaaiissars: emductod schools among 'these ■toitorian* 
Itoreans*. and they m M  useful additions, io-ihe Soviet m m  
to fto Sitefeii^mtotoa JSeresae toliev®# toepeii.
W?tos» against the- Japanese and si# from the Soviet 5ato% 
«bito 'the Korean: Provisional..' tovernment-to«03d.le * called the 
■^aaarteif* $$&$&$ tolteto# they could persuade the halted 
State®' to .totorveto to-behalf of Korean 'tofieptoi» «
loth* ̂ Koreato Heritage**4 ffatioa„ February %$9%6» i a a * x ^  . * ■>**■•»•» ■ * v
. #.». Iteliito B m lM - lussto ana tte Far lest, -Clow
m  Utti© 
n tm  to  $a 
msr-os'ge
d the party
a ttftKtsagtf 0 '
w M  .ft did- not flourish m g &iM until
osteĴ iistaaistit of" tte 
Koran0's ro io  as a S:S©..
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■ ■■Xm^$e&&$gr after the hosting of Pearl Barber*. &d3$$ 
Korean %&#$&&& hops fully applied to the Salted States .for- 
:vorM recognition o f the Korean P ro v is io n a l C&vezamnt*
Worn o f the. Mamm leaders m u te d cm official declaration W ' 
the: concerning fcfie\fu$ura .imdejmdenca of Eorssu
In Ctog&tsg and msMngio*% Korean groups "sere particularly 
Vigorous in. publicising’ the Korean eauss*. the <pa*stiriB' o f  
ssaMttg & statscs-mt reXatiye to future independence and of 
Ranting sons Icind of1 ■recognition to it© Korean fro^isiensX. 
^tesiaent im® Imfofsmlly discussed in t%shingtonS- os early 
as At' tt© conclusion of the® discussions*. it ms-
ty the goreOT^eni lenders to postpone m w snea 
aetis«t until 'St. sight fee is&$ ussfaX -4a aronsing.Es^ma'^ 
^sihion to the lapmes%. or until a declaration. might fee 
totoasd: in'®© neatest of a shateamf of gom m X -m g alias 
fm  the Pacific
'^finioX of the pofetes® -of :So®eim Ss^epsna^.
ones esse .in ta@isiia% at the of
<• Prosidont fteossrmit ? m rnm M X t9 and
issiffie Gliiang $Sai~shefe«. In the isosentons 'Cairo Daelcratto^ 
released Saeefflljar' Xf 3.9%*- the- allies la- the Pacific 
&im&@6ge&* ■ .
■. The aforesaid fhs^-great powers., «j£n&£t& of
■ people-of Wcmm® :«•©■ deteralnsd ttast $&d m ^ QU|S0| .gores shall hecoae- free and 
.M. response to that $gm®nsiir of -«i» Gtiro
: ■> '?  ̂ V
fortstr 3&&pets$y of State- Ges*deXX HmXX^ wrohsin M s  «s§fes
f i m  years late that President. Beo&m&t d M  not cesshXh
ifiti hie previous tos
’ *„.• agree, lag with Chisag. .K&SHshefe sad M m  IlSntster- CtaroliiXX on a stsiemrit that ind©~- pandaziGa would he mtaroed to Korea '1}in doe I: considered this staiensnt nm-rise 
t o  M M om l reasons* Gme « s  that the- Koreans <. mated thoir indej^ndence inffisediaialK fitrea. , 
was- liberated? m & hot' da doe- ooivtm # • ffeey dll' not w&oom ■ the Cairo IkBcXaratian, and • they .feared that their om r& zy m m M  m  placed under the control ofChiftsu Another reason ms. that the Soriet Union should M m  ‘ten'■ eosHJlted f irst, Although Bossia !ts not ah- 
map v»th iipi^ .cho- m o  ear «ily M  Snropc "
. and she had as interest in fSores,.?,
farther reference- to Korean indeiamdsnce • was ̂ also aade
M  2.9% tti a- Washington -conteenca -shf-ended by the British
f*oroigfc' Secretary lirjhhony Men, Ceeratary of" tteo Cordell.
Sail* and President ftcoeeveli*- . In  the discussion of •post̂ war
or ttste tosa.^s Independence*. fer .Atesteisr 
( Cordell .Bai.. Mei30irs,.: 11 ®N»r X5$f*
ft& ' tte a^oss^lt;mjgg^st©€ t£&$$
B& jr. .̂that M m ctm ri^ zm  Bovm m  hs
coe or ftttes^ gft;'
** s
€h«rdttliÛ . Isaffc «& 1&MJ&- $r tfee j
W *  2$**$$: tbs Jofeift status si
m m  w m m . 4
e m k m e  soothes* e-igafasu of nasp* possibly i
latter part of Hods# thass eiroiaiastaaoQs.g
is that;- tjbir #®rist &&$&& be M b  
»  «& rapldlf as jsosslble sad l-Jltix oil the 
could saistsr*
WswmB& stafto agate ft ofes®* 
the toms. .of the Ssisa assrsoieiSg the fnturs form of % 
■Sejma state or
I. 2®B -1
tbs «&? la- tbs ̂ ar last* 'ft:
mmBoxi 
I* 33 o
'the- tsar h®&' long ago tahen China and etwytbisg that r 
Japan had subsequently tarn®:, from  the tsar would he rstiirned3 k
to tiie- Soviet Union*. trTte- ftaier-'.fights of &gg|a-: violated 
by the treacherous attach- of -Japim in 130h shall la returned 
bn tec soriot U»ion*i*£ fhlr^Sb&Mod the recovery of .annth*- 
a m  gatell%- recognition of Snsstete imemiiisnt interest in 
blit nort .of' U&riens .restoration of' Port ks%hm as m Bussiati. 
m m l -tests. end an amnngesanb fte Joint Sttoo^ansnian Q$@3$t* - 
tion of the fenchiK’.ion railroads Sm m aTlj ■ controlled by 
gapan* . In-teiajmP> Cialitt. pmmisod that the Soviet Union ■ 
wnld enter the war against Japan terse months sfbof ths 
cocmtion of hostilities in .Strops-,? ̂ .Although Cblang Sate ■ 
shah did not attend the conference* ■Stalin insisted that •
* j-
.China sign a past with the Soviet Union to confirm the 
decisions reached at Salta*. The- Sino-Soyiot fact m b  signed 
, m August X h 9 19**5* the day Japan sued for p&ea&fi.
’ fhree months ■ after the Salta Conference, and fo lX m flx ig  
ItesMeni Eoosereltis- 4saths Stella, Ote^oMllp.'and ffas®ni ■ 
m %  at Potsdam*. hr 'this .tetej* *9**5*. it m s
nif^rsnh that Jaimes. defeat’ m s  issainsnte, although the - 
isllitey leaders of the United States beXierecI that the 
entry o f the Soytet teten into tbs' mr- wali staten £$$. om n
h m £ &  JP. Balllnft Boyfei .Bassis ..asft the- fhr Eaate {Hew
“ 'w i Z L .$eS* r • ..
*: ws. ■'m longer^ an essential iagfodluot o f
. dietary.? M titm n  the oilitury defcgatet -to.
the'oonfdrenee aa$e&d& *-.aew Mgh in cordiality, :f#2ts 
M d  •concoming the' disposition at forces ;&&& liaison ftp* 
■twgasm. ©emending offfears* anil sgfefetsats m m  fulclly -
Oft ife poliilcal &M&-$ the Soviet tfnion informed the 
lilies of an approach tssflfe "by the Jahunes© to tte
■ Soviet Union osfeing. it toadt'as an intermdinry in a m  
ranging- for the cassation of hQsiHitios, The Japanese 
offer felled to go into the conditions meter tfhiab the was?-
■ shoulcl be concluded, lot it ctmssod the futility of m m = *  
tinning ibo ■ struggle and suggested that it fee terjtttpshe# 
for humanitarian masons^ fbe mspons-o to this approach 
tso the Potsdam Beciaration, which called for mconditioiml
r surrender 5 but did Offer Japan the prospect ■ of mhuinfeg 
sosemigoty m : a nation, fho Soviet TJnicm -m&- not cmsol'ted 
. on ft!© deolerailorij: for it' m s  still a neutral in the ® o  
■oghiush Japan, but it :® s  promlgated - with Stales eoster 
' currussee*. , of t^:iCairo-Bsolai^tioa. fey the
: P m lfte  m o  also included in the Pots das lfeclaratie%
receive® Statin* s tacit *&&&&*$& j% m s  fertimate
for tfee Sexist Union that J«ap» tfee offer in tfee
■ *
fotstam pm tm z&M m s: for ibfir&&em&e$ tfet Soviet' Union, nith
\
the ' opportunity to enter
foitowintxih© f otscias/foafereace:r '©ertafa «at
pallbioiii events 'move® witfe i^jitag ssr-iftii&ss- to «a& tfes
m .  At' Pois®a% -Statin feat' proaise® irusan tfe&i tfea Soviet
latott: mml® enter tfec net $a*3&g the Isiiar featf
M  tte & I M &  t«f«®S® Mi, Sjroiifeijp*: August %  ffes
feigiort® event receive® scant not®©# to the- Soviet gasegfe*.
l&tlttft&fe it asst. 'feat© produce® cQnsMerafele cmstematioo
aiaont 'tfe© l©a®er% fori
&&&$& 'feat, to feuy .fear ticket in tfea Pacific peaea conference* feat sfee Afoul® . t e r n  to- terry ■«r the stew-mum tee starts® out ite seats moi® ail 'fee Maes***
'̂ tirty%*s|2£ feofflpt after the topping of ite- 
foreign Minister m0xmm- tended a fetete to the Japanese wm* 
mm&Mm- in listens* 'fh® Brief mm
fto©- only gteai $ m r  #£$%& &g&$9Ua® mm ®fer bte coattmaaoce 
of tie 'ta»$ opi gaftaMt ̂ aptu for faittup© ts ete©rvs
■tie teis» of' the :^s®a3® $eg|M&3iW'* ffee teot^&tfeai 
M  w  -$bb& on to tte eoaoiu&ing pategrirpli nfetcfe state® ttets
the-'Soviet ''Stilesi -aiding-ft tô .ietg In the m r  s
ij§r shorten thf^Ghrstioru «* frus to its; &ty
.
m & handed to the  Smpmrnm asteseedor m  
evening of i m g m t  8S Bui, w  considered 'to be in effect an . 
the ninth. Hofetov- la informing the Gnlied States ambassador 
placed particular stress' on, the fact that the Soviet Bnion 
m $ entering tlie liar' almost three ssntfts to the ©insta after 
the derma surrender In Berlin* ^feis m ?  a farther demon*-
ictitf' i&$e& Stalin held Her M s
X*#1X
after the Soviet de
g the- first
in  t fk g  to loss than. %©0 in end -offered
> the Importance
asm
brave Soviet armies and compared the -Soviet 
nfcr-a®-"
mrctied into 'Korea m  August 10s almost a month before
£»gse&ga& troops li-ni§i. ta .ooattoefK w®mk«- ftoo soviet forees- 
m-Qz^mn nmm of northern ..Korea tof foroo of mmnT while the 
^&$gtg$g$ f i s i  to  th e  apa thy .^ re fe rrin g  to  :wsfcft the  o r r in t l,  
of a military foe of four years r&tbar than surrender to a •> 
timitttcmhl otta^ of a half oeotey*:'
ftoe atmosphe^o between the surreMerod Japanese and the 
Soviet Soraaatti wmo one of anmltyS; wtotlo- .la the southern none 
the Japanese asautaed an altitude of .guileless eoomr&tiori 
toward the oeoui^iag authorities*, ftoe Soviet troops who
#»er nor Itoerii "$m m tPsre not the lei fcsaasrts-1&&&t :t&st
«sny of ttooa were ose^spfsmsre -rô
The end of f M  m r  ieimd the Soviets totally ̂ prepared 
f ^ t h a  task.of ©ecsttjsri&sg northern lorea-,. :$Sey ..̂ ptokly 
ported to ©siiimtea 35*000 of the 600*000 toresm emigres who 
hat. fled to fl&trta foiiowliig ttio abortive attempt at ia* 
tepftdtoto .la. 'W W * and wholiad become- Soviof eitiseas* Sot 
only wtoo they loyal ̂ i?fetea% bat tfeeyvwtoo sioo.ihoFtoftey 
im M 3 :m  with Bm tat ideology and ir&tkotoli&gyv ■ tlong with 
those.. !»Sfhsrfto. Eoretoa1*' m m . a itoap of from China
who- W m- Jaat as loyal fa the Soviet Interests as their 
C p to lto  tototorfarts,, Jkltttgogk tfeeap#- bat bato a Eorsto 
:fr^fslonal Oovermaeat-xa^toilQ established 'im Chungking, 
whito Iiad .a?eeo:tfe# the fnktoara. .approval of the .fiatioahlisb 
laaoy leftist IC.ore.ao leaders la exile had allied 
with the ckimm  Cb»m is't$ to t t.fi*ootst tte&iti?
< fi
Offtots from 'fehto* in. northwestern China.,, These Koreans
■hat totttlot thn®aelw-S'. m  tiso ̂ iteaoliJafelGte ifeagtiaF m$$. for 
years hat- vlet with the Ching&iag grrnip for leadership in. 
'the. straggle- to g&ia' world. fartalaly tfe&
Koreans in the. -nl;manoipstion ■Xtogasf' hat tm m  m m  ooS tm  ja 
4fr$m$»$bg $vb&3- msisttoso- to the yssgtoosa ttjto:.b&t..tfia 
®?0t# 4& Chtoglifagy who wars derisively- called .̂ iiisarican 
Itg&epmsF by the 'leftist' grtof* Iba tot #Jbtolto
Xtoto&a- aff orded m& Soviet .Cosstod la .Korea with' to .sas&W. 
*ltot- ant wap, tfftinot o«to@ leaStos '®to tto -$mItofe forth
> Tallin, 25?*
m
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/ its applied to northern the principles of Soviet
policy arfeodiei a ruthless- e^torslaaiioo of ml 1 f easier ■fa#*’ 
ms®m mM Sorean capitalism, along with the Kiddle class 
.nfefdti accpjapaafsd such m  M w of
oopitolts® lintad with the average loyeaara inherent filing 
'̂■nitiosmXisii*. which fneldeabally im& m m i m d forty years 
of fajfeneso effort 'to of &s%. would prove .fatal to iwrtet 
aspirations to the- 'Korean peninsula*
eorbninly another hasfe. tenet of Soviet policy ms. th© 
recognition 'Of Korean nationalism and dosirs .for self-goverii- 
wmB * Wba dff flfiaXtios %®&ieh the Ispanhse had encountered, fa 
thofr attempts to thwart -Korean political expressions re-. 
»faofi aa object losofoa for the Soviet iJuien* By the creation 
of a jssppst gorerasoat and a, emlittca with all lfhera.1 
parties' until soviet .-sysjiftthimrs were firmly ©ntreaehe% the 
Soviet applied. a policy which St m i  saccessMly using in ' * 
Bolands Bumnia, and Czechoslovakia* Soviet efforts were 
•«&£e$ • eemiw&ah by the fact that, ssoot-.Soreaas by heritage 
so® culture ■are- .socialistic*, .tftsr centuries of tightly 
fatetifwte village life #at -eoeparatlv© farafag la the rics. ■ 
jsndiles surrounding. the village,, an average Soraoo could 
hadsrsfet^. and gys^thtgp with a political boHof which -.held 
that oes-lsiy m s  based upon the .proletarian* fisa- resiil't of 
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•T
Ol&ttcbUt and President Roosevelt 5Imply toeiied Soviet post­
war'idr Eastern ai&itloag mm®mr:% toetoted that those- 
Int crests toe safeguarded and. gm rm itrn® . W  to© &it$&£st$2JBtk 
.«$* i|i.@. entire' £m®mh .pjatosmto*.
Bafortouristely* the .Halted States*. 'toy virtue of its" 
overwhetotoi. earfrtouitoas to. toe topspese 4e£m% . oeswihtod- 
toe ooetfgytog £mm&< la towtopsiase Islands*' A 
attempt • to aid the United &$&£&» to, occupy tog the' .topaue.se. 
isitoto asd.adatoistoring. postowar policies was sutodly re* ■ 
iacted toy the Baited State s asms sador to I-Ioscow tor tog toe 
totoc'toys- foiioî tog. the topuwae surrender*, By .reason' of' 
its .preiJonderancc of .power to' the Japaues© islands and to 
the southern half of toe JSosmaa peninsula* the tJaitod £ta-t#$' 
occupied a position, analogous to that Of Japan .a half century 
$8«vJUhi% Whoa Bosston. psast-lge to' the par- Inst wits- thorough* 
3y tostwyed.s. a M  ’tolJatoated to. totoot Soviet concessions t@- 
the ̂ ap^astoa tor tog the thirties, toe rsv.toal of another 
^drcstor Scat Asto -B.c^Prca^rito Sj&eafl#*** which ;ted ftartte«»S 
Japanese caaisterclel -cud. political totorests throughout M i a  
.for two deoa<le% under.to© .guise,of state# policy •
wtoM he total to the Soviet Union. &L$ct the’United States 
Ctoapaitoa .of -Japan -and .&$&& was a toototoc factor to- the 
.struggle which m s to. Glitoa totwson the latton*
ulists and the Chinese- togrartonsf*
China ms in a flax with resurgent commmist md 
mtimmMst armta% mllitantly powerful owing to lend~lease 
and captured Japanese- war ecuipsent? .in. a struggle which hr 
the nature of. the participants couM end only in complete 
defeat for one faction* Both :parties previously had &eaoa~ 
.stated their utter inability to nonexistence and cooperation 
in. the Chinese i©wi»ai*- Both -were racing across northern 
Chins to accept the Japanese- surrender of industrially rich 
Manchuria 5 for possession of the. MRuhr of the Orient** would ■ 
tee a powerful .and determining factor' in the forthcoming 
struggle*
Sot only were the Manchurian .factories valuable to the 
Chinese “agrarians8* hut the occupation of that region would 
also permit a harmonious and, profitable conlnnetion with the 
Soviet Bnioas while if the Rationalist troops m m  to occupy 
Manchurias they would pose a constant throat to Soviet Far 
Sastern ambitions* Although the Shines© communists were 
aided hy the Soviet Union in the race- for Berth. China? the  
United States by reason of war' time associationss m g  sym« 
pathetic to the. luomintsng* Within a month after the Japans 
em  surrender.5 the united States occupied, two strategic Horfcb 
Sfetnfr eitei©% fsingtao and $ least In* with. $0gQO& -Harlaes.« 
fhe presence of these American troops- represented a constant 
threat to the Chinese CoBssmi#is.«©
October? lfhft the nationalist Eighth Route Army landed in Tsingtao? after arriving fro® Burma In United States ilavy ships? and proceeded north .from the city to fight 
the Chinese Communists* At ■ that time? the Communists cob*- pletely surrounded TsingtaOs. and the -only entrance ms by the 
m m m *
lot only were- the Chinese Communists threatened by the 
Waited States troops Ja. forth hat strategic 'Soviet
ports in the Far Shst were rencered virtually useless toy 
the combinations o f Halted States f orces la. Japan* Korea* 
and China*. Vladivostok* the most important Soviet port .la 
iho'lajrt la last across- the Sea ■of Japan from Honshu and 
only seventy .©Has. from the northern border of Korea*2**
.Fort Arthur* the newly acquired naval base* and ferla-% 
both lying on the. northern coast of the Yellow Sea were-
t
effectively neurtalised by American forces in China and 
Korea* ' Yhe factories of" tlaachuria are within easy fighter** 
boater range of Japan* Such a forbad lag situation would be 
reversed if the Soviet. Union -wore capable of effecting hege­
mony ia Korea* thus dr iving a wedge between Inter lean in­
stallations .la China and, Japan* and restricting the United 
States to the conf ines of the Japanese islands*
th e primary and immediate consequences of Soviet success 
M  Korea and in the withdrawal of A m rfo m  military .forces, 
would, be strategic* for it would strengthen the shines© 
Communists ismpasurablyo f-ha Chines© CcMaaists would be 
able to achieve a coEf ortable and leisurely alliance with 
the t?eolussus of the north*1*-' %latiw© to the strengthening 
of the Chines© CoumunistSj the position of the United States 
ll&rlnes in forth -China would be *mi©mbl© and vulnerable to 
te&vaBsmnh by Gosmiunist troops,-'in  addition tm  being target# 
of accusations and- charges in the Soviet propaganda, network., 
■%&lMi**, 2$8*
The secondary'tad far-reaching effect of Soviet ascend- 
easy in the Korean peninsula wottLd he the neutralisation of 
Japan os mi* industrial giant in the Orient* f m *  years 
political economists hoi teem, interested in the correlation 
between the growth of the Japanese industrial machine and 
the dynamic expansion, of their political influence-.* which 
began In the Korean peninsula -and in a. few years mushroomed 
through 'Manchuria* re-named Manchuolaaoy. and on .into northern 
China* Japanese economic prosperity end- strong government 
wore constantly in direct ratio to the 'markets which the-- 
Japanese dereloped - on the la?id mss of the continent* 
Elfeination of 'those markets and sources of' raw mterlcl 
would inevitably contribute to industrial end' political • 
chaos*
If the Sm let Union could ̂ divorce the Japanese economy 
from the continent* the resulting: -cmsequenees ̂would un«, 
doubtedly waaten and embarrass the United States occupation* 
'paying the m y  for a eowattSsb infiltration of the islands* 
Strategically*, the-.Japanese well that gores is a.
land .bridge from the- continent to the Japanese islands* -and 
the armies of Asia could easily mlfe 'that bridge- into Tokyo* 
The' post-war struggle for power .in the Far Bast m s  conceived: 
at yalta* horn on the -morning of August %■ 191+5* when the 
Soviet fearcas marched against the Japanese*: and baptised 
September 10*, 19^5* whoa. American troops landed in southern 
Korea* Soviet preldaiinsry. success would be achieved m e n  -a,
Soviet hegemony was established m m  the- entire Korean pen­
insula*. Soviet, .far Eastern policy would be complete when 
the Suited States- evacuated the Japanese islands*
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Xn tbe throe weeks 'Which elapsed between the announce­
ment of the Japanese surrender and the landing of the XX¥
Corps from Okinawa under the- e©BBaand of .St*, (fenera! John 
Bead Hodge, the Korean people reacted violently and character­
istically to their long-delayed freedoa* they quit their- 
fobs, and with a tog# bonus paid by Japanese fearing re­
prisals the Koreans went on a. longed© Xaye&j unrestrained 
celebration* Political partes war© f ormed every tits© two 
.Koreans sat d a m  to fhey -.organised law and order
patrols and. -self-gowsn®ent councils under the supervision 
of resistance loaders, many of' whoa wore ccmimhnists, mile 
at the same tliae some of ■these cDrmaittees had teen created 
by the. Japanese Governor Abe during the last, month of -the 
war- it became apparent that Japan was about to due- for- |©ae©*
Many of the m u  elected to- these committees m m  with­
out political affiliation, but were- animated by the- prospect 
of national liberation.*,: ,& few- of the Korean liberals- also ’ 
Joined, the. .most prominent -of whom was Kyuh ttooa Heung, a 
well known resistance leader*, two days- before the arrival 
of the A m tM m  occupation forces, a. congress Of »People5©
2%ag© Olbsoa* divided Korea,** Com om im t*  loveaber 
22, 19^, 135*
ffeis elected*1 gm m m m nt el& im & to re**-
presaafc the tell of the Korean people, trade uniori% and the 
small CoMoaisft Party* ̂
■fh® abrupt Japanese surrender found the United .States luew  
and State Department without personnel trained for occupa* 
t im , functions in Korean, £©• complicate the sftaati®hs. a 
sharp rift devaloped between: the Waited. States government 
sad Chiang concerning the selec t ion of a aosmanding ■
officer for jtoriasa military topees .in.. .Korea*. w¥iaegar Jos** 
gtiltasil*. who Knew more about the Bar Sant than, hay other 
American commander, with; the possible emeeption of Osnerai 
Dougins IfacArtirar, had originally been scheduled, for the com- 
mad la Korea,^ ..It. the last, moment., someone high in the 
State Department decided that Stilwell5s appointment would 
hare to be cleared through Shia»g:K&i^she3£* Although -there 
never was. an official. statement made on Ohaingr# reply, it. 
was no secret. that a mutual aabsostty existed between the 
%wOs and Stllwell was hot sent to Korea, la" his place % the 
Poimrtent of the Army decided to send Lt» general John Seed 
Bodge, raberan. of campaigns' on Suadslcaiiei,. Bougainville, 
Xoyte, ’and O k i m m f a pugnacious pi’efessional soldiers; who 
was a competent 'battle- header, -bat hardly qualified for 
-occupation duties in Korea*
^kauterbach, 197,
A. delegation of t o  newly tossed People*s Bepablie mot '
■ •-■*'■ . /
General Sodgfr s t e i  to. ship which. bed drought dim from
Olctom, arid courtG.QianXy stated that they wer©: t o  recognised
leaders of a gbrernmaat which had. last teon ©lecbed by t o
.Korean people* f tey offered iiia tolr 'help ate cooperation
'la ©r©ry possible manner* Hodge,, srroasottsJy lumping • to.
ISareaas together. with to- Jaj&naee,, retorted - tot, xtK m m m '
are tbs $*$& breed of eats as the' Gspteese**1̂  ‘ ft w s  an
unforgivable insult to a people who bad. t o o  fighting -to
daimaese- for a half century, add 'who greeted to. Americans
with touts of JJMansei, W mmt#. {hm g. M m  ■ t o  fhoasate
years.)n and who m m - acclaiming to. oceujylng troops- as
'Hfes£Qti8H*'.axt& uot as eomperorso^ -
\ Hodge .landed in Korea with a draft directive which
failed to include concrete 'proposals concerning .economic v
8g& pelitfcai- ©attars* fhe one thlngr that Iso 'ted definite
ôrders 'on ms- t o  t o m l  sssrte&ar M l  disarming of the 1' j
Japanese troops* fte day after ‘his arrivals, vten'te'-aetept^
’the' toreador > of .approsimte.ly a$@£08ft military ate
650,000 civilian daptose la southern ..Sofas,, he began stepping' ’
on Itoean seasibllities *3®‘! Auaoteeiag that .Koreans desire
for tasdlato iMapeteemce would .not fee 'gr&ntsdy Hodge
, . .  2%ugg, 391! ,
^%sutotohy %0k».
.. • 3%teteaiion -of UdllG'lK, 7"%eptetor X9kJMaaguafc 3%.,. l«p% .department of Army, ySM&i
Snoh 3&psm m  m  tm s feQ tempomriXy retmimd m m  feeing utilised a# servants of tfa© Korean 
people and of' 0®  oecfesrinf forces only fee~
'fftQtt toir police. .stations tbs OtotrjW Sgr this
Initial UU S* attitude, toward t o  Japames©-:S t o  Koreans 
formed m. opinion of t o  American eecwpatlou .atttbcritles 
which m s  bo embarrass the latter cottstamtly far several 
years*
3& addition to tovldlng tor t o  aiiatoist^to m i t o
S^ge.feaa: tomi^oXidmto bto .pmlMto to regard to
\
to- 38th parallel* bM  -the mcapation forces of 'the tovtob 
'Usfm * Hodge m s  m i l  aware. of 'the nearness of the Soviet- 
Union and the frailty of 'to imaginary line bisecting the 
Im m m f©ntosnto* Sedge -did ttofe tomi to Koram $ U &  a jape*1 
rnt notion -tot 'rmtotitms with: t o  swtot. m m m wi 
wonld to ccofemtlve and’- !iarisonionsi,33
-if1
fh© responsibility .for' t o  estobllshHeat of t o  38th 
parallel mo the botomry between 'to' Stwtot Union and the 
United States has been varloasly attributed to. t o  lalto 
and Potsdaa Conferencess art to various departmntS' within 
t o  United States, p s a s s a h  the State Departont to' at 
ttos accused. to:- toparfcssemt of' $ & &  of-to- hetoaim crime of 
allowing' to. Soviet Union to- occupy northern Korea* On
Untie Sr 29**9.$ Undersecretary of State- Jares C» llebh stated -
33xm Unas Ifbf« to- former Sefnty Governor for torn from l$P*$°19b-8 stated that?
»aetxgmsoi» atebards*. ®lf t o m  feed 'ton & finest ion -of wb© got there c£ostQSf l?ith t o  tost© si* Hassla om M  .to© 
t& km  mom the 'whole-•ebuairyv could she notf0 lT
m tm m t 2 *8&#$ ©sd f -totolE m ®  of toora! ledgers ; m m  omeerns was to get mp to- t o  lias mm soon ms possible 
tofer© t o  -Hessians. got t o r  it*15 Hilo tesiliaeny is total froB̂ tfoe HeErlngs tofgr© the Foretoi .Mfatrg gommlttee.* Souse Of EepresiiSatives$ hist oongms% lst .Bosm m ^' m  S<M*.533Q.$it’2<1
hofor© th© foreign ./iffairs Cossaifct©© for the Bouse of S©$r@~
scmtativos iftais,
0,etfea decision was fst&m in the 8t&te«>War~
O m m lttm  .ter© in Mashingtoa and it m ©  apgrored hy the President*' .So, the State De** partjasiit did' have &jm $ t»  in. this drawing of 
mm 38th parallel,3r
Frost- all present available sourceŝ  the reader can- ® & m m
research indicated that the Bassimne 
all *&&&& Into S B mmtise tteir agteS'-;at'tba eic^si^mQe is, ■(iN^sdas#- that tii© AJasrteiihS ec^parsie *. 29*^lit-
as w  were i
ease at the 2alte. Conference
argent ftossisn. demndss:
At that tliae no one- a; 




ows^a^S speoobes ■ £b& precisely In. order to 
Inning. tin be wanted M $
& to the era of is clear that






Shamoa MeeCone^ on authority on Korean history and boundary 
Qnestioas^ states f&a 
Msttsfiohl precedent, at the 
when Bnssian«lspans se 
end t ’m  Japanese representative 
series, of disous-sions 'with 





Hease Misc.* Hist ‘Gongr e ss s 1st cjt a« 5 iivî se Be portSj- yOÔ lN;■$essiet% le p jr t  ffo* 962*.
f̂ raltoi*. The Husstoms were to hm& the 
sphere of tofluence to, 'the north and the «fsjm m m to the south* '£12©' j»opoaaX m&- ■rejected. hy the tmssims. on the ground that it 1*0024 contradict i&§Xr x&c&gp&lt&m af the toaeptiidecoe -of Koreans® ;
UaderstandahX^? such a. dtototoit would not haws allowed tl»
Buss tons the hams %?hlch they coveted $&'■ W&om*.
Igaln to XfOS* only a fen months previous to to© otiiteeah
the aiioso-^apaoese Ifeap* a slsilar division Xto% the
j, was proposed* this tlse ly- the Russians ms the
heuotory of s. neutral sona*^ It mesas quite
to -view of. this- evidence that the 3$&5 dtototom ale:
the BSth j^aXtol was hj no tteatts original*
to General Order Ho* ls broadcasted to t




*.*•*»» fng-. to»to® the Icag anslnme©Kfc of i people of Korea and the determination that to 
dm -©ourm Womm s M ll. teseo-ms free mad toflepesi** ŝ ktt people .are’ assured. that the pur**' is oocnpation. to to enforce the tos$ru~ -©eat of issserguder and to protect hisa© to their jjkredttmX m d religions rights* to gtotog effect 
to- ilsese. 3$rc$as@% your uctiw .aid. -and -ec to: required*
ty vested to me as.fSiqB^^iMrvHw*^ ?& ©tmtes Mnw Forces., Pacific* £ hereby es«' tabXish military control over Korea south of 38 
■togreto north totstuda auS the- S^ixhit^ts there- ’cst̂- s^jm&ras© the .£©Xi!»to§- cmdfitous ito *• ©
^Shannon ®acCnne.s. $*£.iss 3* 
?
-« I
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• par-esat of tte- oleot^lo
*
of tte isoa-aaS steel 
, -&&&
m m  is©**- 
g&t ibsmss $£oofes -*fto
sag
o f  tfe© i f e a j a  a r e a  m  i h t  m g j l t t  p e r n
• *
imaliu Itte atllltF a t this exfcfmalnr© la pses so davelojaaeat 
m o  mstresmd for. either m m  vrfcm it m s  discovered by shm 
m r  that -the port feoltltiaS' m r a  'located :|a mm m m  ttirt 
the fhoiorlea- la tfee.oiher*^ ifeithaf m m m feifip- eoiMii- 
m s  .inelioM to ■coo.p&r&tiotij., coase<|osutlFy. the re gion 'mo 
for p?p®s»-
fhe dfmmltr of oeonojale ̂ m&3uow^n%-miM the unit lag 
•of the coimtry of ntzsest $B$afet&tese to- the rational recorer^ 
of %®mm. sgrimimre art infetrs^ .art tte mtisste attain 
■mat of .n-<feeeiit siaaSari of Iffing- .tm  the mof&e1 of m t h  
£&a3&* .Sgr m r  of X9M>* the oocBpatlon policies art rlmlriea 
of the Soviet -titoion a m  the Waited g$&ts$ m m  apparent to 
m m  the .sosi optfeioiie obsemersS: and Shamon feeChns 
*ate thatr
If it i# the: intention to na&e -the honndarjr a. rigid barrier*. such a-, geoaetr-ie teoxmdnzy m i l  
respire mteh mm.- a&rtnlstratire supervision- 
than a. physical feonndarr* $n. the other toatad*- if it is the ieslfe to m m  the m n M s r r  mXy- ■ a loom arlaislstratim dories for the sspam atimi. then &" gfeaaa£%g$& bonndarj/ i %  £& .som 
m a e %  mefe !ser% desirable than a topographle boimdary* flms the- fm m tlo tx in g  o f the 38 d m  .grees parallel a# a- bopndarr lino depends on the* decision of the adsjialJbm®*^ on- each aide' of tte lino-ô 6 ■
. l̂ R c C m i <3 9
■ ItMrs - ’: atemda 'iteeomm *£tg’8j£a£ Baala £m? tm eom soaafr** 
m pM h? 288*. "
fi& applied to its- som to. the policy of the Soviet
Httioa mm expressed fcy Coloa$M®n©paX fereatyi B k tilz m t the 
senior Bussian delegate to the- SovleWaPevlessi Ccssaiss im.$ 
held io SOotii early in X9M>? tfheit $& saM that the. Soviet* t
Wnton m s  interested l& ssoings
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to aidtotott to ter tog mmm ttifc- -toasfetfers to> 
possessed a tfeftnagb Ite^itodio of Korean
©srtog to- first south afto 'to nassaftoii 
to'fettot n m m s& t working im m g k , t o  
#fffetei a steeping «$& rtotoaf $88$$$$$* of ete'̂ ihtogj,: 
jj&ttoia&t mat tot 'Hg®. tainted with .$n®an» i&pan^
mm adsjtotstoto*s- nai tfe#ri5teesi«a Is responsible joitoioat 
-gmM&mm who m m - allegedly j^o^sjjan&se- «?e teltorecl witte 
ant fetor aai aftor imprisoned - or stecnied,? g«#i nattoa 
m #  in dtoat npntost t# t o  astern, m  tospfe t o  kmm** 
leans persitt@«l tfa# topastan fe x$aa3& at tola1 .pnsto for 
fearlr tae- ttja&to* Ifenr fled tm to- .mtovfe «ipa.
«& tor Soviet forcos api^;afe<ls, "Whlto others gave thefe* 
ferean asaplsfaea a inga feans and resigned 'to&fetoaa to t o  
toevitfeto logic of ferfefi. s^trtotiim* feat festdowiers 
*mre topianse^ •# l&htowaer I® those hectic fers fesiag da-*
.f to# aa anyone 'Ifm  posses sad land enough to support j&ore 
t o m  two Jaf&Ilto* Old -aaoraa tatoas tofei«»r and tenant 
m m - settled by t o  epitot of' "^o^apafefe** fairtoi a%. t o  
■WDESQiEM̂ eN̂ t̂se. • 3i«setfŜUDgê*- % w ^ M - t o «  or an a^ea«tloa warn 
•to of to- leapto'to f ̂ tofeg
-toh an. asanssttoi*:
to- purge of p'o^apanese and W&&&B&S&X& Eoreans 
aosiiwd &a»Sn& t o  last: ssn&to- a# 1 5 ^  Sepinto Oftlaat-
ssaions %  Sho Man stfc and
Coo&lfefcee- of Korean People did little- to- halt the mve of 
Ht By the i&$$$£a- of - January* the -goftet Cmmmd.
m  the Korth Korean
€h© Man SIM with a revolutionary Korean
Seth. .Oho. -las SiM and .KSs: 11 Sang were &$$& x&jgj 
ImA&e&x although the* $&$&&a reslstanep adv-oeate*! $gr the 
r w s  soraowhat Qverstmdowed %  the latter cs- -daring 
against the- Japanese garrisons &n*&gg the 
thirties*., from MnachtSKte M s © %  he had ;pssei such a threat
*y m r e  fopsed to amtnfeain a 3srg# 
hir£t£e% $35© 11 Shag visited 
r h© became an apt $o$£& Of 'Marxist-lieninism j «u& 
from the Mgiunlng sb$s$ fc© lkg$& -mxmfled a preferred posit ioi 
in gtalhs^e affections*^ 'Many prominent South l^gfesas insist 
Sung was Milled daring ■
$$& .11 -Jiviag M : m  
tte Soviet pattern ■©£ ©mferol jp*hltaaljy esierpid 
.lowing months of ooonpation }$£■• the estabiishFant of
It r«gi»i- which would fpotifc 
ofex$» pam
Asia.*, Iffew Ko*% 1951),
to remain in the background as far a# tbs government m s  
concerned;, although there m s  m  teBitatiGS. X©. loudly pro­
claiming Hussian Tb*fcte*y ate oteeuvors* pieto## o f M bM m - 
tt»- often .teate oXafist that the soviet Haieu fete 
W  tte m r  against 1 spaa, the Soviet Cejsaate avoided %
.great deal of' eriticiss try hiding. teh.ite the north Screen. 
:**foo®Xefs wen though the Sngsteh control of
that gom rm iBnt m o  only thinly veiled*3”3'
Mitfe Cfeo B a  Sik. uteer .house arrest -in Pyoagyaijg ate 
££a $1 Sung no ncsaiml. boat, of toe government* the ioviat 
©wlom nmt .tevertftste a departure froia its Initial policy*
On February 8S 19**6* a Conference, of People * s CQEisittees iss 
convened of Pyongyang* where m govefsmnt of tmnty-five iasn|; 
tetete by JK3& 11 Sung* « s  appointed**^ Ail the .lumbers of" • 
■thiff. all^orsha cabinet were not Gmmmxtsto fwo nonteomaunlst 
parties were assipite to- represent groups otter than the 
Ccasainists* Their raster ship «  restricted, ommgli that 
they wera unable to'ejsert any political influence* ;f,te three 
parties making mp tlm  .government m m  the eoBHffimists* the 
Democrats* ate the T‘Shen fo- G2yo* {the Heavenly 'Way|-f.^: 
fhreo mote after the conference In. Pyongyang* Kim 11 
Sung announced a. program of late, reform for- north .jffiorea*
^George «, -Meeune* Korea Totev 52*
^%aroM E*. llofela 9. -̂ llorth Korean Democracy; .Russian Style*51
flii JiSSiE* fey 3i9; isfc?*. $■£*
^teXter 288*
S:C320 m s attached. to ftagrovetseofcs- in afrfenlitmmi
production* but primary emphasis was- attached cliques t ionably 
to its- political importance* although tenancy was not m  
widespread as ia South Korea* nevertheless* #3$‘ of the 1m &
m s. am ®cl l>y landlords- Who gogq^lhsd Imt three jpetfeenct .of the
-»r;population. Fntll now, fc&» Korean. fa rm e r, Ignored by tfes
.gemese&tioms of landlords* bad boon. 'unaware of such m  la-- ■
credible possibility to land omarship*. For msn&grites Korean
agrlenliursl ec.oroniy had beta pareeaifled by the feudal lord
who lived in the: capital and relied on an agent to arrange •
his rental foes with 'the tenants* . f
Four decades before the- ai^ival of the- Soviet .forces*.
the feudal lord had been arranged for the Japanese trasinose^
mn.?. who quickly demonstrated that ho :m s fur w e  ararlcions
than the noble* With -such .a Motory of rapoelotto landlords
behind 01%  the foriaer Xoohed forward with antloI|fetIon to
the proposed land- re-ferst* fha land, reform was announced la
a decree on ISarcti 5* 19**S* approximately seven sooths .after ,
the arrival of the Soviets* the purpose and $m m  of the-pro**
gram’. was clarified in Article 1*..
#**i!h© mission bf land ref os’s lies In. the abelitlcm'of Japanese land. oimersMp* land camei’ship by Korean landlords ?- and of land * 
tensoey* and. bestowing the- .right, to esqdoit tbs land on those who csutirate.B the agri­cultural system- In. north Wsmm- shall bo 
. founded. on Md-ividual ..ownership by farcers who- are mot shao&led to landlords* , „ ?
^George II* McCim.% Korea today.*. 201*
* % £ & * *  -202*.
lill confiscated land m ®  antyonfced to the Borih Korean - 
'People:* s OOmmitiecs* and- actual distribution m s  to b® 
achieved through tillage eoisaittoes acting under the su per- 
visiofi of the district* county*. and .p*ovlnciaX. committees.
In accordance with -irfieXe .M l of the dears©* all laud owned 
hjy landlords in as®esc .of twelve end m e  fourth ceres m s  tc 
he omfiscabed, band'belonging. to churches ims to he eosa^; 
fiscated ,@fem cultivated hylbireb or tam&t labor, fht fol­
lowing articlej, W % exempted certain 'parsons and their estates 
from confiscation*. It. ignored the land of those who had boon 
oatstandiagls' netive In the independence struggle and persons 
.occupying ..positions .of iaporfcsme. in the building of the ?>
democratic Korea, *f Bgr'these provisions*. the -new govern--' 
jaet: rewarded its leaders*- ihe last article of the decree " 
stated that wa!X lands distributed to farmers under this 
decree shall not be bought s sold* or rented for tBjs&ney* or 
mortgaged,^ later criticism of the land reform revolved 
.around this- arfeiclo| that-the new owners did not .have, actual 
ouoership of ftp- land.
By the end -of 19^6* the distribution of land had been 
completed, with over 725*000 peasants receiving aĝ -oxitiats,.ly 
fifty percent of. the fari&Laoft in Snrfb. Korea J & ' the Isnsd 
m £ m m  was- widely publicised by the Soviet Union M  an at- 
tempt to court the South Koreans info abandoning, the isericsn
policy,. where a formal •military goreraiaeni stifled lend, 
•reform.:
(ftoatQ&eni with .the popalor land refor.% tbs Soviet 
Waicm effected a sweeping asfiomlihstioa .-of all industry 
.in .forth &amu the lsnlk% Industry* temsfort^ -aad. tainas 
of e o m m n & m t i m  ̂ l^longlng to the Japanese aggressors m &  
to- traitors, of, the i&5fcan. people31 m m  confiscated and
i flplaced at the disposition of the Eorean feoj£Le*s Coiasitteoo# 
Although technically at the disposal of the Mxmtm people* 
the Industry tias in m a y  instances Managed and in nam  eases*. 
-operated W  Soviet teetolcisnn. Many a t the Japanese tech** 
nleiatss had fled smttamrd in spite of soviet attempts to,ds~- 
tain ‘them, leading mlnabie factories sabotaged m d  without 
skilled- operators, those Japanese technicians who did m * * 
m i n  i n  forth Korea m m  not -executed dr banished to a . •.. 
prison oaspj. hot rather m m  ratained in the&r former- posi-*' 
tions until lioraans could he brained to replace -.them,
Shpean sorters comittees ware. formed to assist in patting" . 
the, plants and .factories hank - into operation, ■ By■- the. Olid ■ of -
K2ei H  Sung professed -that - a good ■ start had been m d o  
tward the reeonstract'ion and rehabilitation. of-the oomtry^e 
Mhsirr*^
BarlRg the summer of X9M** in. i^faration for the
3k%f*a B* WashMrr, ^Eussin looks, at Her them; Korea- tr 
ffaofflo Affair su 30U X9b?„ i ^ 4 f ,  ~ •
t&  . ; .• meorge M«. KeGurae.j. ICtsgaa. feday, 213.,.

and 90 county zm m & ttm s m m  a e ism to i* ■ th e  
bought m% 99*7$ of the mgis%®m& w£$mn% M  tb© 
Wesmm la t im a l D tm m aatic :$am t \g&li2©4a s ifa e fia g  ‘ea&drse*. 
M i% . re c e iv in g  97^ O f .«l3t th e  b a llo ts  east*;^2 s '
& corLS titaeat asssmfcd^^, '-rapm sm hisg t& $ $$$»
isttimt ate©|e®. im . Mmmm^m-' nm m m & fa Bstg*aai^- at
;̂ ©tigpseiig the title of ^m m nttm  of the People %
$fe» sem l^rsM p m s  chasm  t r  the  
S te te ip l, ft. .mati  U s w ilr e.cfeftfce® %  w hich e le o te t m © **fiftfe  
of- their ©sister to *©p?esmt tti$B« lo the tteee day seeitag^ 
-$** ie ia g & te s  a l l  -ifefest &g$glo&f$* m o ftn i h r * * » -
li Saig -cteing'tbe pcwttmt &w&t. aioftei a mtlaaal ■■ecoopmie 
fisaas, proposed fiar- lt» li Sm%- l i e U ^  to- a Rfs:opiei's
Ass&gbty- of loath. gors&$<* saa -as a eoaoMiiig m t$ the eor**
■
- '««̂ *ilojted a petition te tfe goverimsmhs of the- 
tSSSS m i  the United States, ara^Best&jg the sp e$ % .■ aesa»|tioa of' the w m h  of tte-^oiat Sovisfeihteieaa 
G€®af ssirn with regard *»■ tit- fssmt&m- of the Salted • fafcerte. Zteooe^atie Korem' toiearasaaafc in ascmdanee with the decisions of the ̂ hree fomm 
C m fem nm  of Iftefstors ;of Porolgp ifffeljso*.*®
. .-$$» People% IS^a&lr $f Soath ‘loaoo was creste® 'tr the-
isat o s s E y - t o . t a o f c s e l i d ; .  ĵ ssfcas,. ft
ms; ite &$g$-'or $jfe» ©m$safel©f% $$& oo$b s m & s&
tto; Pri^inoialg, Jimieipai*. m ®  County Com£ti©es*. $gg» £37 






































































































































































































toe too. ©mistoies ■ etosav tog©tter-e M.
Im & 0m  of imi?ersal.?_: toe©.*- peSms?' education tos ,p»o paved 
;IH tos fall of and mam sofaooto' tm  tatfc itoS&toto $a& .
m m  -. iotto©- j$& w m  w  -osfcals*-'
lltoed to the teger xforilx Kteaa iotos^ ttbgE& to addition- 
to l o i t e r  ito'toto^s *
on ffctsafres toss* Milt: and M m $&3m Z
tooiipes toto- o^ganisedo Afcoutfc forty r&tog&peris- and a teif 
to«to m m  sg& by toe ga&aa? of
sto to&to broade&sttog stations. mr© to
1to eollmml rsnptosaace tma -effected to sose degree. •
W  tto-etoso. totelleoinal tto# developed toitosa toe- too- . ■
ccnmtries* ftseto cultural totareourse too- bigblighted by 
a; toaa -of tto Soviet faion bgr a, delegation of1" Ifarto. ICoresto 
totoi2lp®si% *&*#$ '^fstt.toiaato $n& ©osr-
iiaosdf or app’cssfcmtoly too montos*. ftey visit ad. Soviet • 
totQ.ltootuals- .and toclixstrial centers^ and --toea totorptowod, 
ty toe Soviet $e«a%'i&&- iOreams -gj$l& to gioiftog.tarias of- 
tto Sovtot m y  of litotoitoe .aehieveiaenis of toe:Soviet ' ., 
regim*
'12to ^ p m t  ease nitte vbito toe Soviet €:stemd seesed 
to %a goveyaiEig -Sortb ftorsa too. mIetoaStogi to tfeo itoerioaii 
m m m M lm i autteities to 'too sontliem m m * CensorsMp of 
toto created «n effective m  ptolic toforimiioa.. toes














































































.tm M w m  «£>iie8tte£$feg&
mm m m  
Uwarn' 'I
of $&&$& sootb *&sf tfeo 38fefe parallel %  
Ssfegr Mgsa oa 0«p@ia|s©r-S.5- 













































































































































































thsif oblectlvssf the separation of .lores- frc© lapsn w t& the
/scirXy estsblisi«it of Independent Korean -goveiwmentElg social 
and beenoatc institutions,,
l}xu?ing the latter part of Septembers, a new military 
-gm m m r w s  appointed,, tnfaatrpma Hajor General trobihcXi - 
AnacM took over with 109 military -gomsv^ab officers^ wot 
■mm o f mom tmB M m  trained for service in Ko?ma fbey had 
all. M m  trains! for military government dot las- in lapawo^3* 
Military gm m m fm k# with it#' .offloes la was organised
to correspond to. the existing' oowtral goveriUBawt organisation 
la Korea* called the Government Geaamlc Separtental .and 
bureau activities ware closely Interwoven*- lo assist, the 
military governor,9 s. civil administrator coordinated tbs . ,
activities of the -secretariat and of the Wine distinct bor~- 
ecus, 'the secretariat assumed the inactions of tbs civil 
service* general service* foreign affairs* intelligence* 
infosmtim t . property custody* and planning and accounts0 
-fhe: bureaus administered finance* mining and Industry* wiri-*. 
culture and- commerce* public .safety* public healthy education* 
|ttstlec9: cctacrouwleet lows * and transportatione 32
Although the- bureaus m m  headed by military government 
cfflcorsj attempts -wore made to staff' them almost completely 
with teeswsu. Gradually more and more authority m & given to 
the- agHfeoor governor so that In civil he
paired to clear fewer-aw# fewer policy decisions with the
general staff officers o f M W  Corps* im tia m  military 
government operated fairly eat tofneb orfly n». the national 
Xovel aM' in and around the •malw cities;* Iwrt its great weak­
ness Isf' fe- the iimftoettoe direction of cifll.. .affairs m . 
pwtoctot m&. local levels I3e0so.se of: the conttonence of' 
the tactical unit typ© of control, •
On lanrary % : the United States Army Military
Uo¥©rniseo.t in Korea (USIMS1R) m s  estnblisbe# by General.;•
■ Order'So, I, United. States Army "Forces to Korea (tJSiFIK),' ■
26©. control over all' military goveraosnt w a its passe# from 
the tactical cDtrsanders to ©his iiasedlately in­
creased the authority end enlarged the position of military' 
.government to Korea and at- the '$3B» time provided, for snob 
closer cooperation. It established military government on-' a 
territorial basis consonant with the political and atotoistrsi- 
five ''tofe-ditistons -of the eoenpto# nrea, faettosl. ta&fc -.cem- 
mmiers m m  relieved, of the to prevtons. re opoasfbiX iiies . over 
ito-Mlitary^ actltibtos* and the administration of civil sf- 
■fairs 'ym- place# to the: hands: of tnstos# military goveriBaarit , 
■officers,. 'Instead, of Ip tog held accountable for •non-military: 
ncttoitlas^ the tactical mwmMBm- were charged with assist-.
tog the .military govemmnt officers .to- accomplishing their -
3^tasks.
Sedations between the taertoto em m a& an# the Korean
aoi rmtotstoed ■ with m m  -or 
M  Jterto&n directive on the subject stated ttet no group 
would te reeotpsihad ms: te?tog gsfn&nsssntal authority act ttet 
all pnlttimt if&r&tera woxiXit te; -treated Impartially* ̂  I». the 
.first. sonifes of- lasorteiiit there were literally _
dossats of .mw. parties which sprang up overnight0 "It soon 
tecejss apparent, taiovers that two groups would .dominate 
tte political :Stene* f te literal and left-wing Peopleto _ 
tepiahXie enjoyed a considerable 'organised following among 
rtte Eoreuti people-, while the right-wing Provisional 
sesi,wfaioh ted only recontl^ returned from Cismglcing,. ted 
little organized strength. In  ©etoter* X9b5? Pr. ■ Syngman 
Rhee, a tell teown conservative, returned f  mm the United 
States «gj& teXXtoi Use %%vering rightist parties i n  .support 
■of--tte/fb?©yisJte»X govsrnsent.^ although the imertosn Com­
mand nominally ke p t Its neutral position, it % j  no secret 
that it favored tte eomsermiims0
fteoagteat to .fall. -of 19̂ 5:S scattered, otesenia of tte 
S§op3o% lepthlio continued to govern in outlying districts 
while: roslstiag: the Provisional govemment^s challenge to 
pellMmX leadership la the Is. rger cities and towns. to the 
y talent agltat ion. against the tmerieans which followed the 
atmodncement of the Foreign Iftelsters® decision-sat tte
3%^orge .E* SeCwns, lare&: loday.
% 4 . . ,  W .
Moscow Conference,, ..syogisan lhae seised the initiative and - 
thereafter neter t^lln^iislied the ootastrŷ 'S i^iihfdsl. leader* 
sMf»*
- fhe geMt'ical situation continued chaotic and ty Kaast&$.- 
Î t6;|. 13^ per ties feci, .î gistereti usiMt the nilttazy .govern* 
m m furious nttespfes fee .reeenoi3.e the left and ri^ht 
proved fhtSie and gradually the larger parties absorhod m a y  
of the gs&l&tt* groups, the general tenor of the pdlitidel 
dteeussions mr© far from emoiXtstorir %smM the military 
government„ .ill parties uhuted a. Korean government, the
id^ftinn of the 38th parallel, the ellsliiatfon of trustee-
■ship, $&& the contr ol of .fnrsaa m m m p*
-:%i a move ontenMted>to ufirni te.-the i s ^ a i s a i  eflfc* 
tain, their support for the military govemiisntj the military 
•gove^nr fortasd the E o m u s  Bsahsretio O^ahCiil*
on February lt-T I9h6* Syngmao -Waste appointed chairman of 
this' oll^orean body which m ®  to set in, aa advisory mpieitr 
to the ooismhdihi' general» ' Sine© •the appointees m m - almost 
-oil. rigfet^jing oonserimttvesfj the .leading literals refused to. 
prtie:lpnie# with: t-he result- that 'the Comicii m s  'of little 
value.* ̂ . in# following r a t i %  sya@g£® ih.ee attempted to y©*~ 
sign,. but m s  -persifetSed to accept a six soaftis 'loavh of ah»- 
soiree* A sonth later he -was., %&£& and tendered fats resign#** 
t i o %  doelariag that he m n t e i  to te ffee frost nil nolltioal
3%M^tson. Of 'UgMfdlf^ is*. %  Harsh, 19MS, %.
3%eorge m,. HcCune , JESaafr. jjjffitoy 51»*;
■i'Sest. s© that fee coold wafep Unbiased aid in the f©rmtt©ft 
-of a new g o v e m m n t^ -By the first of A|sril9 tsllitery gomfn*® 
mnf< amlysts reported that a® sil^fins low had Me-a. reached 
ia AiBFiaaa. popularity,
 ̂Far reaching reform were- initiated fey the rjlXitary - 
gomrnnent fesglming In Seesmfear*. X9^5S whan .an ordten.ee
m s  published mating title -to- all forrasr Japanese- property
I*©in the ■ iailitsry gommnent* f© facilitate the -sale and- re*» 
distrllmtlon mt Japno-ss property to the- Koreans* the- military 
g^m-mnsnb- established the- f,He?r lores Company” to assnne the 
assets of the ■”Oriental Bern*lopjeat c.orapanyyfe a tage holding 
■no2!fetno nbic'fe had ex$3te$$&£ Korean resources daring- the Japan- 
esc ooeUimtion*. Ife&rty 6 0 0 * 0 0 0  f a r m s  or t t f o ^ t M r & s  of the 
Snath Korean femXanrl iias owned isgr this Japanese ©Giossits.* 
in addition to- 52,000 cattle through the "Chosen Mmstoofe
Other s^sidiariss were the "Oraphite Mining (Took 
pany?tt the yKoras® Woolen Company*" and the "Oreerhill Coa**-.- 
S'tmction Company,,"
In. the -hectic days- followisig: the Japanese seerronior s 
mcorffa m m  femmed* and' in sea© instances.*. ■ Korean land 
grafefesrs'af|^i3riatsd.,^psnase 'lard*. fh© most difficult -.tabfe 
from fte.dnertgsan sdis.lnistratlre viewpoint m s  locating' the 
property^ reducing it to actual possession* and' demising 
reesvdft coisipehensi.r© ©nough to sialniain control, hath omr
.*8lw
the economic activities xxt the property and its m%m-* Ik 
the nest two years, -the new Korea Q.mpmp roc.ove&ed .Borisor 
Japanese property, sold 'fsnss to Korean farmers to- ha paid 
for ia produce over a twenty year pertMy and. finally was 
absorbed tote? the. ^Eatlcml land Mmihistratim# on ISarch- 
22 $ X ^ S * ^
Another notable reform' was- the de~Japcmisat ion. of the 
Korean legal system*. Ifemy ■branches of the profession, par­
ticularly the Korean Bar wore reorganised i the prociarotor 
system ms- modemised to canter' on prosecution rather than 
inyosMgatiott; and all the court decisions and opinions ware.-: 
■made pahlic*'^ ffee Korean Civil Service, was reorganised to 
include a Civil Service fmining &e&dte8$y along with an as?* 
tensive in-service- training progft&t in ell launches of the 
goternmento^ fhe basic police system, designed and sgmo&d 
by the- Jnpame-sa prior to the occupation, was. .reorganised* A 
total of j,btOOO Japanese vmm femoved and Ip ,0*00 Koreans a?®*
crofted and trained into-.an of fie font f loyal, and depan&ahi© * 
Ids
£&m* " farther internal stoarity m s safe possible with, it®-
ea?geadusat£on of a constabulary force of 5V&&&* yfaieh.tftti&' 
»tsly would h a m  a streagih -of 2$PW 0*̂ *,.
■ Hŝ ler tbs Ja.pi063%. supesrvisloa of public health 
welfare had been a Mt-imd-nlss affair? with the police in
ntmrgo of' tealth and welfare policies* Shortly efta* the. 
mrrlrnl of the Americans;* the Baimrtsmi of fhrblic Health 
m&d lib i fare was organised into- an affective and: serrate 
agency:, program  -of MSP spraying of 'buildings-,, pa opt® f m &  
trahsportatioa systems vara urad$?taft&% and, sjBsllpox incid­
ence m s  reduced .siahstantia3,Xy by eity-irtde raeelnstions* 
Haaith. education m s  popularissl and resulted la a declining, 
rate of sicluiess and disease, Education, personnel in South- 
SOrea faced the problem of an e-sthiated S fOOOtOO& studentŝ ,, 
with few teachers and no tsaefcbootes., fo mp& •with this sitsa**
tSm$ the ■siXibary gower'imest allocated a large ,̂ roenta'ge 
of; the national budget toward odwcat'10% resulting in ia.«chwr
t r a i n i n g  p r o g r a m s *  t h e  p u r c h a s e  o f  n e a r l y  3.,$O8.f: 0 S &  t e s t -
hooks*. while- two shifts of students' attended schools in ae$&* 
shift classrooms*^
Korean political parties can-tinned to be the focal point.T' .
of irorhls' for the military govsriaaoht, A’ rice limine' dial­
ing the spring, of X'3̂ 6 occupied t£& people *s minis with $np®#* 
feXeias other- than politics! 5 also the political parties were 
on tbsir bast behavior awaiting the outcome of the Soviet*# 
African 0omission iBetings,1̂  .Attempts were- made by































































































fe m Aw lm w saisioibis.s« ̂  Paring Sotbher the first 
s is s tio ijs  is  Sostfe W&S®® s lits e  %te-$®guewm  s a s is s tio a  m m  
held* Forty-f ive sabers im  the m w loreaa tstsrlia* tm%%m- . 
Is iiv s  AsssaM y m m  chosen. ie p re  senbation  m s  d iv id e d  
.mmm M . rightist Msexv&tiw**; S. &». lefi**-
_ W & &  Pm ple+s Committee * mt$ M  fBddpsa^nta, B a m  -of the 
- liberal testers protested that the elections bad b a m  ssifsir*.
■■ssl d m m & d  th a t is »  w  tm" M M ^  m m  th e  metm m  -m$$?*
s©r?sb3y% Sysgsfgo. Ehee.,. iws not sstigftSM with the sieofic® 
3®s«lfes and the progress of W §  party* and on December %  
lf%6t departed for 'the Baited States to plead bis cattse 
fa^we tte BatteiS WatKms snA t&a A»arteaj» jsopls.SJ
• Eight days after his.. depy*te% the- mowsmn&im general 
gti&j&Mt & list of odatttoil. .Eormn mm, and mraa® 1A0 
'twHSfcd ioin the slsotei %5 i^:i^smt®t-ive€ in ffes form tins 
of the Emeus. 'rlhteffe. i^§fsilst*Ve According to ■
it®  cosimBdilsg genera l^ the  s s le s iio s is  m m : ttg$& & m  s e a ls * 
mMims by the dmfitioa, Ctossltteo and fi*o» sossbtl^iotts 
nlth m a y  other leaders of plttiesl .parties.^1* -Elftees 
m rnm rn of - the Besfeodfc .Desecratic Party boycotted the legls-- 
Istes for the first ten days in order to she&f their dis­
satisfaction- *$$& tte soasBiaB&ing gmssrai% appointmnts .and 
tbs desislms to- hold w  slmtioss is stwrsl
®o* 3il% -3* ̂
% b i d o«/lte* 33* October^
 ̂mo. - Peceabar$
■ 'Although .Sn$gssii. l&e% tfe titular head of the •rightist.
eoalliioa. was in the ffaithct -Stetes* lls p a rts continued to
*' • * ’ Itoslt sli m ttm p M  mf legislation* Si January*
1$**?# general- Shiga issue! -a -.fengt.W sfaietiinh is iMefe 3»
eaXXel upon the W m m $. tm  unified motion is tbs Inter 1®
&0g i8$&%9x e # ^ f tie moxf Bs&j|tbt the iiilftafy' governor wot'e
"in. a letter to the chainaan of the interigi legislature that*'■
*1 raganl a$ both msfafnX. mat hsal&sa the lisaussioa -of pier
mesas whose solution is t$yc*»& the. power of the Segtsiat^#» ^
the first legislative .m t of tbs Issesffily u s  passed on ,
fereh S* and provil&S. that no. nether of the ilsseishly eonld
hold m is otter pbiSie offiee0 ̂  Mot until Ahgrnsf 1 %
AM, the hsmmMs eaaet a fmnehise is# acceptable- to the
tiClitarr g m e rm r*. throughout the debates* if m e  evident
that the coRservaMfe a s . i n . .  the Assemlftf would not
snftsit to the .passage of sinr liberal logislation0 Much of
the tieeie! 3®fer% therefore #. was blocked W the land-' ' -
--holdiiig class,.
She Interls %gihlafara coali hardly be- -classified as 
s $&«&$*£ though it dll give the .Koreans a vofe® is. tiplr 
gm um m m t sal ms. .of -mine in' .helping them fa ta&r the next 
step la «,. Many honest mol sincere efforts. .$£
the Asse&iar ware, often, overshadowed the extreme propa*- 
.ganda end’ oritieisus, of the ,JSu? night< and the fte .Isfi* 'and
^Seorge 8*;lfeSufi% m^ea/fotek It*
^Jj& ..'*- 83.
%aKBatlcr, 0 f UMiaife Ho* l8j. ItBWSii* IS. ■
it m s  fuibe evident that the Koreans wm&& M m  to t«sm a 
great Seal, before .the Msy* 'V3M+ elections 
lafeioaal Assembly and the '
'Seesa# She embryo governiaent' m s  
lack of s&lllecl legislators^ 'bat also by 
ssont of the Soviet Union -and tbs Mortb 
goremueot^ tfhieh cmtriboted a ̂ 
confusion to. the. post-war polities!
of Indecision and 
.in the two zones.
Overtures were m i s  by the People8 s gc
lag. 6 oath Korean liberals as early oe Secember.g
.■seriously discuss the re«uaification of the edo&tryv This
sal by far the most astute more by the Soviet and Herth Esr**-
ean UoiDMmists -and perhaps the isast deadly to- the weary and
clisiliusioned -South Korean liberals, fothing had been, aor
-eosplished In the joint Sovlet-ise? lean Commission meetings
fomris the country8s -unification*. Hmny of the
South Korean liberals felt that*
»•*•&& least stioh a mwo. -asy lead to  the $-0t&h*- lisfament of some fora of goyernjosnt for all .
Korea* T&eaKat a  la te r  te*43L3L purge th e
-Sines a - ̂ tem porary a llia n c e ”  with th e . Oorasamists had
tessaon ■ In Czechoslovakia and 
conditions were laid. down by the South 
Mould consent fa a conference held i n '
that the- conferences {!} would
the foliating' 
Koreans before they 
teen bs
%iasjgt &$£«
fp®p»se -esfitslfas hut M&geiia»-tt*o right ©f
■ pirnt© -enterprise* -CSs'l « i M  oppose th e of *
dictatorship* including a dictatorship of the $ro2ot&r£&tf.
lU/weaM support the fO&sas&tat of -a- United Xosteft .govenaaont
> * •
through ©lections fei ,®11 of Korean <%} would oppose tbs 
siainteaame of railitary tees, In Sana hy any foreign power§ 
*s& £5) f « M  advocate the withdrawal of Soviet and American 
arsed. forces- through..* two«y©ar agreement*60 fhe American 
Command replied imsediaioiy with & denimeiatiQii of the Mortis 
Korean invitation* and general Hodge- issued -a lengthy state-* 
xmnt m, which ho warned the South Koreans of the clangers of 
m e t an invitation*
Despite enc-h opposition* sore than fifty political. 
leaders. in- South Korea decided to attend the coaforonce* 
fhe Coalition Conference met ®m .Aprfl 22* and 23* 19*4?* at 
Pyongyang* and was .attended ky 2^0 ’South Koreans and 205 
worth Korean -delegates*. significantly* the BJortk Korean 
People*a government did not attem pt -to oot̂ &oisfeer the- South 
Korean representstIves* -and the conference quickly passed a* t « *
resofetion. agreeing to- the- five conditions previously- egreed 
Upon by the. South Koreans- ,-aii presented to. the Merth Koreans 
before. the- conference.: easnteg,.^ •
Jfefe* i» AprH* the South Koreans returned to the- £asr* 
lean m m  -and:- were outspoken in. their- appe a l  of the Mouth
^%ongjenng Kim* • «she COM- Wars Korean Bfecticas*** Par
& & B &  £89988* Mijr^r *
^teaciga fc SfcCans, gores Jodag, 263.
■*'-*» 87”
s moderate vis®® However ■ ̂  ■ General Bodge did ■ not; 
concur and issued a stinging rebate^ warning the South Kor­
ean people- against heeding the counsel of th o rn ®e% ant sag** 
jesting that the*#' mwm "blind men” who -bad been ^baited by the 
Gmmmtsfoa*1* Under such circumstances* tbs unity listings,, 
told by the South Korean liberals proved abortive and 'after. 
the Hay 10 ©l©afion% they decided 'to postpone soy ■ notion ■ 
because the Amr icsn. .C ©arnod sad the United lations Temporary 
Commission. vigorously- disapproved,, 1 further invitatieii by 
the llorth Korean Peoplefs gQ wrm m ni to- attend another eon- 
f©reuse" in '.Pyongyang m s  rejected- by the- 'South Koreans***2
'the entire situation ia Couth Korea ® s  sore than a 
simple solution of right versus left controversy* Conflict • 
between the right.- and the left would have arisen. if'Kateon 
.had not been, divided in two- by the- 38th parallels and oc­
cupied by the foremost- exponents of contrasting political 
ritoalogies* Tb© divided occupation, made a. test of power 
inevitable.̂  and the Soviet W nim. to o k up the. challenge early' 
in the occupation* it is difficult to assess the ties&$at -of 
infiltration and., direct assistance_ fro® the north, to the 
souths but Is no secret that the American QommA- believed 
that the Soviets- ted trained mad scat to- South Korea & 
strong undGrground group to control m &  direct mil Communist 
activity in the American none*.
% M a „ 26U-, 
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fh© p>terr objoetlw of South Korean Sessaantsfcs- t«s 
to discredit the military gm m wm m t and to arouse opposition 
to the M w rtva m * Xn order to o«inS©r~&ot Ctwaaamiasfc influence* 
the fserlcsn Ooissmnd strengthened the rightist ©leesmte, 
which la Miixy Instances ..respited in the support of conser- 
vntittss tafeo ted heeo, associated with the Jagmms®* Ihe 
second sethocl naed h j- the ftsffcins was the outright sup-* 
’pgetsion of cewaist activity vim m m v it reached .gragGf** 
lions threatening the umintensmae of peace and order* In 
Segtesii»rf the isilltsry g & tb n m  ordered the arrest -of
the three ranking Coiamanlst leaders in South Korea5 while at 
the- same %Sm three newspapers in Seoul m r s  suspended and 
their editors failed for printing Inflamtery .articles 
■against, the- military goirernssnt̂
ffee SWiets demised several ingenious methods, for 
t iimaoisg.; their activities' in the Aiser lean- rone®. Early in 
their occupation, they called fa all. Korean sonsy and. Issued 
worthless "occupation rubies" .in, -return®^ Since the con­
fiscated Sank of Ghosen notes were still considered, legal 
-header in the s-omthsra. « f it was an. m&yr miter for the 
Soviet consulate in Seoul to distribute the-funds taken in 
the .Worth to Coiamnnlst .agents in the- south* .Farther CG&* 
..amtst fteanial chicanery » s  unearthed in May, 
with the arrest of 19 persons who were assfters- of «a mtgm**
% m a e ,tteg of m rnm -m ,  S o , 33, eapteater* 1*5, V-?.
isation which flooded South Korea w ith  9*000,000 ¥ to bogus' 
tim m t l i t ® # ?  g m & r m s a n t  m m p m t t y  Q a a o u n o e d  that 
**all tlm oGtoteffeittog m$n%pmmt tod toes t#m& in- a 
in® which housed the bea&ciuarterH of the Korean Cosrautost
farty,,^
Hash of the C m m anlst activity to South Korea was dir­
ected f£e» the B m i s t  m m n Z ate which eonhtoued to -funetiea 
to 0@sssl natlX lone* the eoonsal g g m a m l f  M M m t
.fo3ytoslsyt. tod. served to the ssase- -CiEjaoiiy trade?- the toito*- 
one -sad tod even ctottowad hie work during the sto**day 
S ov tob-topsno s© war.*,. He mintatoed contact with the South 
Korean Coaawntsfe leaders tod stored as as latejsnedisiay to** 
tween fyongyung and the southern SOnraaRisfcs* to 19̂ .*,
as tosrtoen uXttatma re-tpesttog m  answer with to one tsp&bb 
was delivered to the Soviet; authorities* dcaaaiidtog that 
they either p a m l t  the opening of to Jjaerioam. etosuXstQ- to 
the northern gone or close the Soviet office in Seoul* fto 
Soviet governjasnt 1 M  not- reply* and the fellmctog' raonth 
S>olyanslqr and his staff were fctras$ue2y ordered to- Issfs-.^
Frote&ly the -snoot effecttoe taeatts used by the gagna&isfes 
to discredit- tbs im v it& m  aHitasy gover-niBab was through 
labor anim agitation*, the suppression of'trade tanlonism 
■^s.’ORe: of' the issny ways by which, the -Inptnom .stocoodod to
stltwte aom  re tu rn  in working- oohAihiniis by encouraging the.
‘ labor im7©H3nt to develop along linos of the .iaeri&an path©ra*: 
■ lalK>r«Lmmgons3nt relations became ■ strained* howewry as 
prices continue*! ■ to rise: siid the 'waSms assumed & mom' de&* 
iatte .for®* fenslna increased when tb© la&fcooa teoajaa ija&ta*** 
mats for ■politio.al .station*, In W xWf the mXit&ry govern- 
gjsnt termed the Korean Fedor at ion-of labor as an % 3Ctre£a© 
.rightist” organisation* while the A 1 I n b o r  Gpm&tX 
was an leftist*:1’̂  tendency for labor to sfertlaa
irlthdot .px’asantation of -pm Xim Xm w demands- or aagr attempt- trfe 
spread through w&n& .Indnstriss. and -osowfatlons tsi 
■ culminated In a maamouth railway .striker on September -22* 19k6$ 
which halted rail transportation, in South Korea M r ®  
days later * General Hodge* in -a radio- -address to .-the- Ibrean 
people* frankly admitted that, 'the strike .had ub©en ibmented 
%  radical agitators to discosods and discredit the- teer- 
lean teces in. .Korean1-1 ■ $h© Qensral ar®©*! that the- ©trllfing 
railway worlaer©-return to w m k and allow the milftsry gpram^ 
isentft© m lm ; the problem in a fi truly democratic4* istmer/^ 
The railway strike 'continiied until October' 26* ser­
iously threatening the waysriag South Korean ecanomy*,'
^%o«a?giB II*. McCmmf Korea feday*. 162*
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jw§Jao ■; 
mM MmozSmT* *
%  tti@..#i»«gsiats. -m m  
aa
a ®Gt 4»M§aefi. solaXr t#
_ «# 
r «n s
la tJiteft was oaiasi- 
r I9 MJ*. It:
fomasl Igr tbo issaMeaa
8.̂.- an 
.IE sat u
■BstteoSi a&ra&t«$ tbar i&a
9 ttei© m »
a
cmmMBmb'kB awilbar of C M #  
m m * Once 1
■M i
AU6. m gS m nts m m -
‘9
m  m m M  a
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i?eg!2lts, the Eorsan mssst wm bbDreaghXy *®wN*eaa^' tm  mm*a 
lasnlgts ant tfeetr sympathisers *■ so® isor units « ®  eo©* 
pletely merpaias® until- fcfe© elements m r o  maSsA
Perhaps the ©mr^pmseni gut threats
emaating iron llorth Korea had a sero dlspniebing effect -on 
Soriot-luBeriean sat: so«t.h relations than m s
sctwgilr Tm M m ® at the t t a fe th e  eontirraal stream of 
tia&at&g* -am® ererteres t?hieh flowed tw m  lerth _
:®eroii& radio transmitters sat Sn addition to tim
.setooriog- tales- related tjgr ftortfc ro£ttp®% certainly
-wet© potest festers- in #& & & & «
Sm W m n propaganda derM-ed oat ridiculed the son them 
g a $ M ^  as- being the «»6wMStSfi®tSa?y poppet* of teortoss 
t&o sorghb - to m&&- 'Kfcn&a the ^springboard of 
iteriom.issorisXisa*,^ fteo m s  .0 jiomistont sal «£&*». 
spread feeling -among that the ©pen ©XXttsloas
to- ispsading' -©onfXiot broadenst bp- th© .:%oi^ang radio 
-ststim nero not $&$$ throats -mM tbs* inmsioa m s  • lm im n t??^ 
Wmy Worth Koreans listened1 to station. dOBK? the a£XJ$nr 
to^HW©afci.s-»oms!fni stgtim la sennit .sarir in X9%9^ 
the- State Bepsr:tont5s assistant chief of northeast Aslan 
hesitantly admitted that. - programs in the 'Korean
Ĉle-orge ih, Me£met JBarso.
75Ib ld .. a65.
7’%antoi'teoh, .21?,
language tore bm m € to  ’dlorth lores as m i l  as to Sm ith 
Steto% Both Bros Hew IDorls: the ?oies of Asertoa and
.frsns. .local radio -la the- south9 the' loaders
o f  rto®. a d r fte ®  jsagtoe m$®  to to lB i as, who toa4 s o ld
0$*®; their aoontcjr tooths Soviet Xte&m* ■"■
Soviet intentions l»iS. the military government to 
p^iinsalgr >osaOB^r'iwtor varied* irarsMng & constant policy 
'Of Boa*»®ooiOtoti®i £8>1 dlsimptiw -tootles*. Shortly oftor 
fiapsl Hodgoto arrival in Bore% to attempted to toltiato 
conferences with the Itossisiiis co®ee.nitog. too y©OTf&l o f tbs«o
j ^ a l l e l  ms an In to r ^ ^ n in to lir -  tra d ©  to m to r ,* / &  ««**■ 
co u n te re d . s & ft& t m sM ’m ountot)!©  o p p o s itio n  to  ^ b t& to i& g  
a n y th in g  ffcosr to e  S o v ie ts .,, and fo llo w in g  ttes K osccrj C o n fe r* 
anee o f F o re ig n  M in is te rs *  tils ,, e f fo r ts  were e o ia g to to ljjf 
imffootlsa.» '• 1
Mitooa its" imatoiaoi between the two commands m&& W  
tte- presence of a ai»li -Sew?tat. delegation to Seoul m & a
tog tertoan group stottonoi. to J'pmgswag-^ About 
the only ?iwork'tog contact,? v& ich the  m m rnid ted '
witb too Soviets- concerned an totereteange of "m&% tratos 
toto every too » k *  By April 13:̂  I$b49 tst&& three sail 
©changes tod- toon. ee^fletod hatween -the toft sone%. atxi from
mtor -piriftoaMm* toeato 
aggrirmtod anttl finally lodges »  mM.e to trorfc out an tegre** 
ment tosr-ahy 8 oath iCorean ©atom. f a m  toss trades f m  tteoa 
rafiro&d mra- of Setfto, Wm@mi iefctoapfRfc*®̂  fash mmosto 
stomguX&tlon coattoned to- easert a jarall'stog effect -m
totit sonto* Hto&s to tto sorttom sea® ramtoed idle' to- 
•aaas© issK&&£$ mr© amitfe o f 'to©' par& lie lj the large *®sn®»* 
voirs todch•cnsiomrily flooded' smtfcsra rica peddles raw 
mtoad'^dsedf ©to' the light smtmar industry to the south- 
a m  tone did’not fmetioa until. the military- gotoriimamt togas 
to • import tod seeded -'Chemicals from lapan and -the Uaited 
States*®®' Sot all the hardships caused î r the 30to .pmXXeX 
igare confined to the. Atortoaa for -during I?5*? and 
3tjMJs it- t-ms nessstory for tto Soviet ooamto to- tostitoto 
a sever© ratlorxing sgs%em to t 'm ir  zmi& to order to- ovoid a. 
fssSae^ avas though ma*£ifto -of the .po^lation had .flat to- 
the. gmfctora sse&eJ®®
■ fto- ©mstaat ftraaa of' 'Sorth- 'lorom refugees w s  a 
m j m  problem to to# &aefls&& ;®flitary gototoamto they re*- 
totoat medical aite*iblG% food5 and Msprtif ©toXtom until 
they ©mid to- totorto^tod -and re-imato# to ito southern 
provisoes &ppr»tomatsly :StOOO.sOO0 people ftoi t^ m  the
SoTiet into %m irm ttm n  %am* 1 fhey vsve d riv e n out "feyt
economic m & - ' W  the systematic actios of the Hus—
siaus to oXisimto the small XnnX.o\mm,%: tm  small shopi£G.ep̂ rs. 
m A the nor© oonssrvativ© sleiaentS' of the population* Is. 
other words ̂ the middle class* M ong' the unwanted Korean 
m M & t a  ct&ss drliren ■$&%& the. Sm&ttoM. sen& % m m  Japanese-«bo 
had m  special -talents • lustliytog' their retention fey the 
'Soviets tn M m t b Sace-in t h ® ‘A m v l m n .  % $ m m  
Japanese .bad to fee repatriated-to Japan* thus constituting 
iSMitiisml lafeors for the- already o^cr^or&ed'.te^ricaa 
patriation teams busily evacuating marly $5&£pG0 Japanese- 
from- South 1-oroa*
throughout this- difficult .parled-A. and reflecting the * 
country^ s political aod economic strangulation fey the 3dth 
piraiIols loomed the ô ii;p?'eae-nt problem of north iCur'taa 
olo c trie tty» Before: World lar the Japanese' .had developed 
©a adequate potier .system ha the peninsula* feat the prepender* 
aUt shore of this electricity ttss generated north'-af the 
parallel* The lael: of electricity became significant to 
the Americas command fee cause the coal Burning- thermal plants 
Is. South Korea could sot begin to cop© lyitb the ne©&* 
factory >arrangeson.ts «cro concluded between the trio conman&s 
whereby payments Bare roads to the fhisslans in m m y r m M ' i
electrical eouilmem.%, both .of* which baa to'be imporbed fros
In 19^, there was little electricity produced. Is the 
southern sone, sail iwo~tMrds .of the comtry's power . can©
were larger,, despite, a definite teroas© in the amount .of
cat. off the flow of' elects? Icil̂ r eaiae from -the Merth Koroma 
governseafc after the halted Hattons iomporary Coiaaiss-ion 
arrived in Sorea to supervise elections jps?©pecmti08?ar to bfee-
eounted by the mlii’Sary govorament, as. the usual propaganda 
Masts* Broadcasts from Pyongyang intimated that unless 
representatives were seat fro® Soath .Korea to- discuss inewer 
payments* the power weald be oat off , but the- Ksssriaati 
command. believed that the' principal purpose of the ultiimtuci 
was to secure Jfe facto recognition for the north .lOraaa. 
government*^
On Hay lb, 19^0, Just' four days after tte, general elect® 
ions in -South Korea and fourteen days after the adoption of 
-a ^national51 constitution in .Sortk Korea.,.. this last vestige
lapsn and the ’llaitci'-States
from Berth Korea.„^ • By 19W, * the purchases frtsa -lOrth Sores
therm! el0.ctric.ity generated' in- the. m m tfc.*5® 'throats to-
establlsteont of "a formal government, but those were -lie**
^Stamon HcCune, «fbe 38th PaS-alXel "
Is  t9%9, 230, r n m m m r n
Bouse
S 3 %  m *
' 8a!bldOT1 8K0
%©erge »« KtfStti** 8afiWfr & £
of edimemie relations.- between tfeo two zones: terminated* The 
United States $m m X l& protested the hlgfĉ feahded action to 
■the Soviet 'Uaih% and -a series' of discussions followed is 
which the Bnssians adaomntiy tetstsd-that the fMitsd States 
■had not carried out' the - contract*^ The Bus-sistis- insisted 
that the power shat**off was -the doing of the “free 3 Independent 
■and.. deiaoombio* Ssrth Korean .gwoM^tstt -the Soviet tfclm feed 
absolutely nothing to do viith '-the action*, farther 'attempts, 
to solve the situation through conferences proved fruitless^, 
and the- discussions were terminated J*3, Heedless to say* the. 
power sfet-̂ off catastrophic to the straggling auwth 
Korean .industrŷ  and the military gorermnent made hurried 
attempts to restors some sesblaiios of: electricity- to- the 
strlcfcaa -country,, ; Power targes were moved fa from lapan,f 
-while- coal siaihg was accelerated in .crier that the preelection 
of tbeimi electricity Bight be increased* Still, the' power 
shut-‘Off was ■demstating to- Sooth Korean fedustry and: !»©#** 
lean prestige*
Considerable ecmteovorsy" between the United States. and 
the Soviet Union over the Hessian ■"evacuation** of Horth 
Womm factories m m ttrn l la the- visit or savin.'f?« Pauley' 
and a halted States Separations 0 omission to -forth 'Korea 
:Ct: President .frmmaa*s' behest* Through lay and lime 5 19k6P
^%aariags. bef ore thoUomtttes 'on ■ foreign -Ifihirs*
Mmm of. Bepreientatives* m &M ggju ; 's* a* S 3 %  8*** -■•.*■
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fteemeo* *
fwtete m m tn  'to te &&#!>
tlorfng' tbs etissiog o o b t t e  Bstetioiis b it .not?
t e w  & & $  t t e  t o ^ o a .  $ $ & W m  f a r t t e o ?  o e s f O t e s s t e s u .
llpte ti® «»©aamte®t -'of fte M u i  ̂ aotete®^ Mm
o^p t^iw as # r  fte  $ m m m  m m - aflaslw.
fOotei*. i l l -  fdH tSM . pa%te# fa r -irio ta tt sotte®
'«&gbi2& ife# .g09G&&fea^  ̂ in  to  tte  0m£a&-* *
s m #  t?te® fte tetm tefi: tee® Mterp’otei- te•» ;
c e m  - m d  m m  m m  t o  tte.
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IS^ t o t
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■ fO 0 £ *
had. % to n t a r  Aststod of,' a fA^-goai* tosto®-
sMps arid tether It omitted ^orlsAeri for tta ioterim - 
estahlitoMsnb: of .« tortssltoA Ksmom gommmo&tg m M m n  - 
declared tot the tafgiaaX $mm?$®m s&aa* m s  act a plan ta 
'tfe sshse that At gfogeta a spscific series of proposals.*
'At m % .  he sai%. a. .pager stated t o  g o m m l problem t o
directed oiieatloa to possible- svenass.- of s-olntioa* Itot 
Ini tots- stoesed a s  to' heeessitj for a aaified Komrnr.
-admAaistFatioa to be brought about-1®* to. t o  c'ommards la 
Korea*, It m  hot dis:etiss©d. f in  t o  paper whetor it s t a M  
be a gowrr^itt or t o t o r  It s t a M  he sametbi&g #1®%**- ■ 
but tor importo® tM&g brought fotiito for dlseesslos w  
tot M  -should beam a<̂ almlsti,atioa operated bj? Eoreaas t o  
crested hr to'.to eotsatoteo
ilaotte GOrrGS'psmdo# -^uestioto ‘t o t o r  it w  correct 
tot the'-falted states tod. first brought -’t.p 'to Mmmm embn- 
Joe® at- to- coaferohCG*. ststoewatk. 'replied tot 'tot was oor~ 
r®o%. and. added to® An -to 'jager there tit sto- disciissAoa 
of ■'•to toess.iiy or'.'̂ desirahility or «ofciXA®y# of a triisto- 
shig* It had been suggested that t o  might not he tos&SMPg 
t o  if -to ©ere accessary, -a glee staid- he made for fire
years*.2'̂  Mith the American positloo expressed $r hoae otto'<
t o ®  t o  actlag Secretary of State.s ©osstois® p'opagaa&a 
eta ted oosm ftm t eeasei- to- Is «a amoFimg eitamsstimt to
t o  !feerican military resresemtatirQ- attemdliig t o  -Joiat
Am'Stat:*3̂ 1 -
■ drrsagesae&is: for the eoitforoooo were rpoogaiaetS '«n& 
et»elt2d3& by m  taee&saga fif oetos between fammm1 Bodge «$$ 
fotasl feaersO. Cftlgtia&ov* as- l a m ® F  *** lioago received a 
femscpe- apt#- fete fhistl&kpv ip $g&e& the Boviet Bwmm&Q?
‘Colonel t e r n i  ffebilopr &&■■ tbo -eMef itesian delegate 
Pasig: lib© ̂ PtlA fee %eaity to -irast Mils year proper . x t ^ r e M ^  
tires bstwssa tbs Iftis sad 20th of tdsasary I» Secmi 02? «sy 
other ;pl&cs- eparsnient to ypa^!* Da wetfk?#. Hodge blmtiy 
stated tlmt suggest tfcsfc the plea©- of s©e*3ag be at 
Seoul #nl that tbs date $» met later than If Janu&sy^03*̂  • 
ffee ooMsrenco emwned- cm JPM&jr 3M& la SttCBPs swan* 
DeBte§m M t  loo -psl«ee% hope of .loreia Mags for eeateieo*.
if ter -an e^baisge of jdo&imntrtes bsttiaen Major -Seoeral
•, r
im xoM v m p m sm ttz ig the Amri-eats eOTstt&dg' atii Colonel Beaeral 
0btil£O¥̂ , the oenferenee formHy opsoM* Kisuoderstfmdings ‘ 
prose the first day bsttrsen the eonferees oof. the & £ £ & $ &  
ossd SMnmi p?esi% t&oiat /iM Bofift dMogaMim .i&Mstet ih&b 
tte -press. W  barred ffepfr all isaeiihgs and frt®. iaierrlawiog 
soy of the parfteipiats-o Is the sbssnee of any real
Uxo. m ^ j » :̂yiaaa- indulgs# In spaenlstiw stories based m
~ 18 mwd®**
■Spins- ©©BSeaffcne© m frk l. 'fetemajpy 5L m $ taro
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tetter uteii S b M t o  declared ttet mm  do not intend to deal 
w ith  any Korean parties m  itelvMuals who toe opposed the 
decisions of' the three foreign ministers in. Uo-som^1̂  
'W m tim M om  of toikdv'*s address ore apparent «tea. the 
reader recalls ttei nearly all: Korean political and social 
oftetetetiens with the exception -of the Cosatmists? .ted. 
violently opposed the Moscow teoiifio&* Gn such a tenuous - 
titeteealitys. the Soviet delegatioa Intended either to force 
the American delegation to consider only the South Korean 
Communists? or break off' the co»issicn ate destroy what 
little Aiierfem prestige remained in South Somm* It was 
manifest to the African .deviation listening to Sbtikov0 s 
speech that the following weeks promised to be stormy ate. 
^compromising*.
fte American military gcvertaasat- attempted to take a 
cmoilisf cry attitude toward the soviet delegation* Ihe day 
following Sht'ikov®'s startling ateonncemeiit ? the' military 
governor ftortoente arrest ate iall terms for all shakers, 
writers? publishers?. editors? ate. pamphlet distributors mt**-. 
possible f or statements ^calculated to disturb pease ate. 
orders Moreover? he stated?. freedes: «£ speech ate.
$mm- dli- not mean unrestricted license*Jj2̂
ftetegtent'tetet%. the commission continued to m o t ■ in 
tec»4oyt .issuing only guarded costenlqtea which mm. des~- 
merited h# being evasive ate unsatisfactory*2̂  ffiswerer? ■it 
^atttertecb^ 231* George M*. MeCune? Korea Into* 280* 
^%te lew york March 2 %  19^6? 1*
31? A -
"ms uo \aoer& t to m m . casual th a t stscKettgr- sesst*®®
ares# m m - Interpretation of the preceding Joint Soviets 
American Conference concerning ^consultation vitfa. democratic 
political and social or-^mizations*** The clash m s  person*: 
ifled'by disagreement over -the eligibility for disdttsate of 
such noted conservative- euti*Sovie.t Koreans as Syngman Shoe 
and -Kill Koo9 both former leaders of the defunct Provisional 
Government at Chungking* The ■ American delegation refused to 
have the®, barredf. the Hussiafts refused to consult the® -on 
any teras*-
the cosmlssicms dramatic fifth eosMimique m s  Issued, 
on April 17 (nearly a month after the.: opening- date) and re~ 
ported that a decision .tel been reached to consult uith 
^democratic*1 parties and social organisations. In. the forma* 
bios of a future $&d?$sioai3L Korean Benoeratie Government,2^ 
The commission decided to.- Invite, the .assistance- of 'truly 
^democratic11’ groups by requiring that* before such groups 
m u M  he aoeaptei fcr .cctt^ltctto^. a statemttt -but to he 
.sipscd to the effect that they 'Uphold the alas of the- M&mmf 
Gm&smm® on Korea to re-establish the country as m  ind#*- 
pmtent ©tes®* They olso bad to *&$&$ W  tb# decisions of
the Joint Commission iu-.mrking out the: $o*i& for- the future
2B- ■ *.g»@n®ant*. " According to the communique* th# actual
mehaais# governing ’& &  consultations mr© Isa lag mrted out
2 %ma®stioft .of: m a s m m * . m *  ?% April* v M , t. t %  -
■2% e  appendix 0*
by a 3-oln.t m h-m m rtsston ffo* 1*. A second- ioiat
mission would jrepsro Ite charter &  which would he incur*
porabed. the structure and operation of the Provisional
-Govertsaaah at'-all levels.* while & joint snb-cosmission Mo* 3
would work out' the political platforms for the future .govern**
m u%  embracing all politicals economic and cultural fields*'2?
1 week hater oh April the -co-mission stated la its
sixth coiasauaique that the- chiefs of the delegations* generals
Arnold and ShtilcGv* were still, discussing the problem of
consultation 'with Korean democratic parties*. fho first sub**
commission m s  unking progress ta wording out the procedure-
for consulting Korean political and social parties* while the
sub-'coiamission 2 . and the ^b-ccasaiss ion 3. were working on --
Questionaires ultimately to be submitted to. repraseahatives
of the p©litichl and social- parties the purpose of these
QuestionatreS: m s to -obtain' -Hr the ccjmaissions .
***a broad and clear understanding of' the opinions of the Ibrean people-- anil to give - consideration to their advices and 'proposals: on the structure .and principles of organisa-- 
tion of th%'|rovisioml Korean Democratic Oovemiaent*
..Further- clarif lea tloas'Of eoimamifoe So* 5. «is 'released 
to the- -South Koreans by the euas&adiog .general on April 27*
South Korean;.,political -parties-' were fa m, quandary* mader- 
lug. what their position- would be if they signed the document
outlined in ocmm'iiq.m- $o» 'Kseir- inquiries- were well •
angered by General Hedgers atatesie-nt?
Seaaral. Arnold* ay chief representative oa the 
Joint .&0QBd8Sld&* coaftsiia to me the understand- lag that 'by signing the declaration ©united in 
Q&mmnMm arc* $  of' the Joint Commission* polit- leal pertias. and social nrgmtsatloas thereby •assure themselves of the. privilege of express-':ing their views to the Cosaaissioa? either for ■or against trusteeships Signing the declaration for consultation with the- Joint Commission. does mot indicate that the political - party or social 
organization favors trusfee-shifg. or- that the organization eoaslta itself to support of trustee-:- 
. ship* those -who will.not sign the declaration^'however*, will not he- consulted by the- Joint
tiiree -days later*, the Soviet, -delegation as sussed the 
position of excluding those repre sontEtlve s of social, and 
political organizations* who !saci.iveXy oppose the MoBcmi. 
Decision**1 is this m s contrary to the conditions of the 
previous agreement {coammlque Ho* and was clearly con­
trary to the principle of freedom of expressions the- African 
.' delegation refused to assent- to the .Soviet proposal* - However* 
in- Order to facilitate progress.^ it. offered to discuss, in. 
the ■coasaissicra the. eligibility of a m proseats tive if the 
issue' were raised, In individual eases*; the Soviet deleft ton 
refused to agree- .and. insisted, that a stateaent be published 
warning the organisations not to select representatives who-' 
were opposed to the- Moscow decision.*.
discussions- were- at 'this point when the Soviet delegation 
Informed the eomaission tnat all partS.es and organisations-
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ghtlkoy again called. m  Bodge ansi .informed • hist that 
■after having- sm m m lm ted with higher authorities,, he tmA 
received orders to ©ease work: and return to Borih Korea w ith  
h is delegation,^
Kite? the Joint dcmimisslimts nd$mmmm%, Colon©! General 
Sfctikov was ixt£eem d by Its Jos* General A rm M  that it weald be 
possible to resist work immediately if the Joint Commission 
agreed to recognise the right of all democratic groups and 
individuals la- Korea to .freedom of speech, This would mean 
that they would mot- te excluded from -consultation with tha  
Joist Commissions or from participation in the Provisional 
Korean b because of' their statement os trusteeship,
the Moscow' decisionj or any other political issue,..
V .'■'■■
lb© abrupt termination of Scvlet«Ameriean negotiations,
was.- as outstanding development is. Korean: polities,. For- the
S 6 w « w f this event postponed 'the possibility of am early
abolition of trusteeship -and the 3Stb parallel m . m boundary
dividing the country,- Following the: breakdown of negotiations.,
tbs possibility of 'a sepsrat©' provisional government in
South Korea was openly discussed 'by the general public,32
U&mv&Fj -ms time progressed discussion of this prospect
diminished and » s  offset by -a. growing, desire for- the coatin-
/
nance of American m i l i t a r y  govem*pttt,33 yith the prospect
3£lb ia B , 21, 
21—23«
o f apparently m m  m m te i&m. owwy ttsere- w
a srorofliog stood of d&s&^iointsmt towering os despondency
btemighont the aeestry*
itemwkil%, m tir'& m ri& m  ia?'©$ag8S5fi& foptteod Usr ite
C o m n ig t iroab-:nrgaatetXons nmsit^a in  both north an®. south:
Koreas the tenor of the f̂ epagpaeia being that' it ?as. Amries*©
fanlt that Kozea &mM  not 'bo nolted. On. 3* X ^ f pravtet.
devote® three enXuisas to  **fbe Question o f Bst&bliahlag a
$frw&s£m &Z 'Go.vartaBaat in 'Korean it eracrlated Hodge an®
the tot the CeBsatsaleâ s failure* otssa?g,tag that
the tea^icam ware attempting to infcrodtie© *re#«ti©nfcxyrr
leaders4* "sko spoke openly' against the soviet tF&lcn an® stee®
la the way of the da&oerefle Gewloptesnt ■ of Korea# the -safe*
■< . 
ere limt loti of Korea to tU3* Snfluszic&9 tshargre the £rs&®&
artioiê . iras-the real perposo of the Ijaerie&n aep*eaantstims
in. UOTea* msijuereding tmSe.2* talk of «®&feas© of feiaaeracy“*'IJ:̂
Additional aEtMserloan. tmorc denounce® .Jamtfbemi ttttKUfem
noapstties- which wmsM ayrere in  Bsrea w ith in  th ir ty  to
©iisSy days to establish w1s?a&© xel&tdang* between the two 
3fnenstreen, Sfe© S tate  &e$*£ta&afe senator©® - with a long
policy stateiaent of' M m t & g m .  &Sm- .in Korea* stating that tip 
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'leg. to the 8*
sareai
t o  C h i s t i a k o v  m  A u g u s t  X 2 ?. If
.̂ our lat t he
comneetlon that I m ' impelled m  point out.af! 'He called -attention 
to the fact that there had bean nothing that ibo 
could .road into the. Moscow Becision which would require or imply 
that only those parties, and organisations are to fee. consulted 
%  & &  doint cbs&isaitin*.. '“which fniXy with sup­
port tela- decision and: did. mot coi3p?0isite themselves by
opposition to this decision** Hodge lashed out- «t the: 
Soviets freqneui use of t5deaoemtlc*‘: in describing the- Eoi*̂  
cans whowould he permitted to., participate .is. the f cassation 
-of- the govarnsmto. -He stated that, there.was nothing that 
defined the word ,tde©oerat:iciT throughout 'the wor-Ms whieh 
rostrlctod. its ̂ application only , to organisations and parties 
helonging to .schools. -Of thought favoring olsssos la
||Sthe- oowmltr .oter others:*® furtherMores.: he wots- that 
teem m s  nothing la. the Moscow Beeisiom 11 that prohibits 
Koreans la conferences with..the- Cosaaissioaj' -or elsewtere..*. 
from freely ©spressing their- wishes and desires^ la the 
t m m M m  of t t e t r  goveamgisai* . in amoiasio%.. Hodge m s  
eertetm that the Soviet delegation might wish -to “rastudy
' T . ,
the loot Siam ia. the light of" the views expressed above**1' and' 
that, oa this tests he incited the Soviet delegation to w&*- 
t e m  to loint CQ sm tm lm negotiations in Seoul*1̂
Chistiakov ignored H©i§e% suggestions and lavitetioos 
until October ate then te m carefully worded ate
sosewhat tsrt note* the Soviet oowg&ter wrote tlmi the., 
“Sorlet ■ delegation is gaidod in  it® work fey the terms of 33ft 
itosoor^oislm of its® thro® W&mimMSMi.^srs .***. and Sis* 
tends to sfsadfastXy adhere to this doolsiotuf Chlst labor 
'tool:; $ sly tbra st at Bodge5s i^mrks eonceimlag dea©er.aeyt 
fey.aotfiKp
■ *•„..* that- at fh© saao& time? it is. Ispssi&X® sot to not© that there ts so obvious. eont radiation fee*-
tttsefe. %b© interpretation la yoar letter.of tb®Wttd ttden0ei*aey*‘ ant theactual position whioh 
the* Amsricaa delegation assnaed during ta» period Of the ot*& of the Joint C o m m iss io n ^
M  fefe lengthy' letter# the soviet ®mmmior constantly r e ­
peated the Bevfdt asssrtatioa that the. Soviet delegation a® 
always. ready to mssm& negotiating as soon os possible ‘‘on 
the basis of the asset fhlfiilmant of tb® 'm m m  .feeisioii*:» 
Hedge- waited ©aly tmm -lays 'teffcso y®ii$fiag-t© -the. 
Soviet note;, Evidently ■sffef .seven ©oaths ©f oorre 3pohdence9 
.fa which Chistiakov had demmstratsd only desultory interest§ 
it had feacos©. increasingly apparent to. Bodg© that ho weald 
fey©' to yield . somewhat 'in order to get future' '&m Mt parti*
in the Joint Cesaad.ssi.oa*. Accordingly, Hodge .oftee#
. » * »
the following coaeassSOns, Ho agreed to Interpret the deo»
Mratioa in crnm m ^m - So*. f to m m  thoti
^ m s k  indivMaalsy parties and social organic cations shall not foment- or instigate «&#s; op* 
jposition to 'the wort .of- th® joint; gomsisslon or the fn ttX llm n l of the- Moscow fteelgftm* these. ga8M&tt£%. parties, and. social organisations
hkjfeld.-,: ̂
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paragraph* the wily soviet cosmnder regre&ft&ty oo&atod&d
that the usif condition# toM dcam. by Bodge. to sttteteaec did 
met differ "from tbs position "toM town. to your prsrtotis; 
letter*. -yhicfĉ  la the 'opinion of the Soviets **** is in 
contradiction to the Boseou Decision* n1̂  ftxrtliermc-re j 
accord Jag to Bodge °s ”farmies** the Joist aov.M
consult sot only the democratic .parties and social organisa­
tions ntsxeh uphold the Some©?? % o i 0:J,o%. tet also the p&ybis# 
and orgamtottoms u&ieb arc hostile to it*
Chistiakov felt that the acceptance of such a proposal 
would appear % s  a call to reactionary parties and groups 
m% to .retreat from their hostile position** •.* but sorely to
curtail such me t toft las* „ * .so that they .say have toss opportunity
t*$to tale pari to the Comission see tings*.” Tm Soviet cob-
mander suggested the feltoiitog proposals be used as a basic 
for the resumption of the c-omissions Cl) the eomfssim 
mat consult only democratic parties and organisations which 
uphold the Moscow Beeisian9 <2} parties and. organisations to« 
uihed for consultation must not nominate those representatives 
who voiced opposition to the Moscow Oscisioa5. mad (3) .partis#, 
and organisations tovltsd for consultation meet not. and' will 
not mice opposition, t o  the.- Moscow Decision and. the work of 
the Joint Comtomtoa* Colonel General ChistIakov concluded 
Mb- .missive- with the proper .felicitations and the promise
January 2&r 1 9 W S:
* » v
-~X22»*
thut the Soviet delegation m s  ready to proceed to ieout 
should the Atierlesns accept the above proposals^
General Hodge did not m woe* the S-m M t eoismander -until 
Beeembsr 2h5 19h6* In the.nonth between the Xatter:% Hodge 
mad© m. careful ®mm&toon M im m . his suggestions for ending 
the toiptose and the Soviet counter proposals* As m  m m lt 9 
he felt that *£&3?ie& of ’the closeness of onr fesltic®*** 
suggest that yet© proposals- and- the following: sodifioatioag.
SjQbe imde the basis for reconvening the Joint CGEEatosiaa*11
First on Hodgeto l i s t  of eodifiestloas was the thought 
that signing the declaration .to eonramiqno So* 5 would 'he 
•accepted as a declaration of good faith with respect to 
upholding the Moscow Decision and- would m im  the signatory 
party 02? organisation eligible for initial consultat ions* 
Second,. any party or organization could appoint the repre­
sentative it believed would;' he -best,. honeyer.,, should snefe a 
re pro senioiiva prove aiitagcwistio to sitter of the Allied 
Powers', the Joint Commission could after Mitwol agreement, 
require the ds-ctorant party to ©ss a. substitute spotesrsm*-
Individuals, parties, and organisations tovited.• for consultation with the -Joint Commission shall nob -after signing: the declaration contained to comnuniqnG Ho*. 5 forient m  tostigato- active op*
. ..position to the work of the Joint Comission, m  to-either' of' the ‘ Allto&toowsrs m  the fulfil tocoi 
of the Hasooir 2teetsim*.^’~
M  Hodge Is new proposals differed may- little
1^170,
$° m m ^  170.
•aspire4'* £©*»■
ActiveparticipatIon
, jIs© fatal; for ® 
waiting tfee severed peninsula into a puispet state 
to tli© Soviet ̂ nion» fixer©fore* any proposal made 
abort of actually baming the &on~OoamMnist parties from the- 
oonsoXtat ionss would bo rejected by the starlet©,
Hodge ss proposals want ignored by the Soviets for over 
two months-, and it was the last day of February^ 19^?# before 
the Americans heard fro© the Soviets* Chistiakov opened M s  
Xetter with the debatable statement that the Aaarietia coneand 
■ m s  ready to accept %&■ a basis for the
*% the Soviet e&am&$o&
declared that ho was la, complete aceoyd with Bodge 9 s ygo* 
posalSj. advocated, M  the 'Aaeyican5 s tetter' 'of December S*% 
19f*6* Again* he emphasised that tbs organisations 
part in the 'eonsnltatlons with tbs Joint Commission be 
that they sssst not designate saeh representatives who have 
'G m r^m isod themselves by voicing, opposition ‘to- the Moscow
Such optimism was .not shaded la Quarters other than the 
Set lot cosmmnderls*' buri&g the previous' October , Major :®m m m l 
.&*■ ¥*. &raoM:̂ former oil It any governor and, chief AubcIccs - 
delegate to the Joint CcBgsi.s&£taat stated is Washington that 
'there ''*%mis-So hope of accomplishing $ recoae illation os. the 
occupation level Is Korea«»* if' anything is done, it must 
he dose on a higher His predictions crvshalized
.is. the months following the sew m inglj .successful conclusion, 
of Hodge *s efforts, for the. Americans waited is m i s  for 
Soviets appearance is Seoul.,.
While the .amerfeaa delegates, m.ited for the Bussias% 
-Major General Brown, a w  military' .governor sad .chief" Amer­
ican. delegate to the Joint CeisaissioSf, published a serfs# 
four reports an., an. attempt to reassure the South Koreans' of 
the- preeedure under the. Moscow Agreeasofe bj which Korea would 
’bseom independent, He rebuked them far. their initial out*, 
hursts against 1Jtrust©eshipri and attempted to. clarify the 
.meaning of the word,^
According to Bronte* $» laterpre hat i on9, the Allied .loaders 
who signed the fioscw .Agreement .had envisaged a troubled 
PDstMjar world,, inhere the similar nations would, not. be pro*- 
tec ted by a strong &it©rnati©nal organisation* In order to 
protect these smaller nations, who had. no armies and navies, 
United nations, was.-, proposed,, but until that organization 
©George M» KcGaae* & £ § &  SsSE* ©-
;lm  of ttSMG&m So. ?.?, februws> 1S&7* 15-16,
■couM be ■& powerful -operating ft m s  necessary fa?
Great Britain, the United States*. 5M«j, and Russia t.o
guarantee security to those smaller nations, This was the-
first meaning of the- word ‘’irustooskip**1
Brown continued that in.. order that the world might lire
In peace* it was essential that all nations remain stable*
and if s small nation should bccosis shake®, with. infernal
di sentton and -disorder* It becomes a threat to the peace of
the world, Moreover:
We ere all aware that the technical Knowledge and ®&n&g&mn% experience required to .guide 
such a development Is In ssom- degrees lacking to Korea because of long domination and oppres- sim, .In order to insure a healthy and- normal derelopBsat of'Korea which would enable it to participate on an equal basis of competition with other nations of -the world dad to assure internal peace, and tranquility during this .'. period of growth and: progress* the Four $dtnrrs$' in ..guaranteeing independence under the Moscow Agreement, undertook to aid and assist Korea for- a period not pp exceed fire years during this; development,
fhls was the-- second me©oing of the word «trusteeship, i!
Brown emphasized that Korean, translations of ntr«steeship”
v w e  both inadequate and Inaccurate5 that it did not mean
that it would become a mandats under the- protection of -any
foreign power, south' Korean newspapers .carried Brmm°s
articles9 and military government amlyists reported that the
Korean public had Intelligently received the- new interpret •'
tsttoas, -
^ M d ,, 20,
the. subject of &&&*& Independence ant 
unification was taken up .in an exchange of notes between $g&*e» 
tear of' State George C* Marshall and Foreign Minister Molotov 
dor log the m&mm Foreign Ministers Conference of April* 19^7°
TOE♦ x
-Secretary of State Marshall- wrote to Bolotov on April 
8*, 19^. reviewing the Korean sltmtlon $Smm the Gaiy© 'bee*--.. 
larat-Ion* and stressing that it had been sixteen mmMm since 
the Moscow Agreement* with no' progress toward implementation 
of that agreaBanto Marshall suggested that both governments 
agree to instruct their respective colanders in Korea to 
reconvene the Joint Commission m  sm n as possible and ttcharg© 
it with auditing its work under' the terns, of the Moscow 
Agreement m  a basis of' ‘.respect for .the democratic 'right of 
freedom of opinion-* fha secretary .©f state hinted that 
a mutually acceptable- date during: the summer of I9%? «be 
fIxad .for- a review by .the two Governments of the progress 
made to that date by the Joint: 0«wissSou*#^  iy his attitude* 
jprshali intimated that the ineffectual negotiations conducted 
m  the -%cc«ptttcai level*' would not be permitted* but rather 
would bo constantly reviewed by the respective gm sm m nta- 
in order to hasten the day of Korean in&opeodexiee*
$e& days later* For e i gn I^aister Molotov replied with 
* lung aiii fainbly provocative ‘missive in which. he briefly
reviewed Sfwtet participation in the tgmafc ton  Kam m  M e «  
jssteeace* He accused the teriean delegation of suspending 
the work «T the loint 0er(salssiem because of their state eon* 
tr&ry 'to the Moscow Agreement'^ end fnrthersone? insisted that 
the Amerlcam eomsate la South tarea did not- agree to Bs 
serious considerat.ion -of the proposals by the Soviet mrnmmA 
la Horth Korea on., the' question of m  economic exchange te~, 
tween the two z m o s J *^
Molotov related Chistiakov% ancient assertion that it' 
tias the jboarleaa delegation which had barred «whole series 
of large democratic organisations. is South Korea and insisted 
on consultation with groups , which ted taken a stand 'in. opposi® 
tion to- the Moscow Agrecwi&nt*1*'̂  i*fa© Soviet minister noted 
that tte «Soviel CcBsassdor in M s  relations With the imrioan 
Cmmmter endeavored to fite a test# for the renewal of -the 
work of" the C om m issions and os a result of an ©tehang© -of 
1&tter%. there had team a ^considerable rapproetenent of the 
points of view of both sides*
Mr* Molotov sincerely believed that an agreement would 
be- reached shortly and that Joint Commission would begin -its 
work in. the near" future*. Shifting M s  attack somewhat ? he 
outlined the %?ide democratic reforms ..*•». vfclch guarantee 
political freedom ate raise- the- standard 'of living of the 
populatle^*1 ate ended on the 'note that <fsuefa wide reforms.
%bia*„ tfay ht
-IBB—'
M m  M m  carried m t o n ly  t t i northern Korea* Hhere th o rn is
only iwo^fifttos of tbs pejaiintien of Korea** &  mm%mfym%
the Foreign Minister proposed that?
«*-* the Joint Commission resume its ̂ erk m ,W m  20 
o f tit© ■current year in the csst*gr of $$$&$..sa tbs , basis -of-on exact execution of the. Moscow Agreement 
m  Korea § and that tbs Ccgg&lsslon present the so** suit of its wcn*k on the elaboration of recommenda­tions- oltk respect to the est&blisbaient. of a pro- visional democratic Korean government for consider- the two governments in -July and lingust*
The Soviet Foreign Minister did: not -advocate anything that 
bad not previously been dealt with by Chistiakov*
Marshall5s reply m  Mm & m s brief and to the point*.
He carefully stated the beSQ. position in .regain to ^exped­
iting the -work of the Commission -on- the tests- of respect for 
the democratic right of freedom of opinion^” la reply to 
the Soviet assurance for the restoration of Korea as m  ini©* 
pendent democratic state and in the development of Its national 
eeoaomyg 'Marshall cast a thinly' veiled, hint thats
The Baited States M m m nm nt. tea under consider­ation a constructive.program for the rehabilita­
tion of the economy of Korea ate- for its- educa­tional and political development<,
This plan for Korean rehabilitation with American aid* m 
forerunner of the greater I&rstell Flam for European rehabil­
itation* did not .fell, to make an impression In.. Mmsmu
% M d *. 8l3«
% l l r ,  an*
6gibidoa m y ii5 i ^ s  ^7*
-,
dtoftoyedi mom urgency in his reply dated 
May 75 1$W$ for fas accepted mSMmsfa faasStotim9, the pro* 
posals' advocated fay Hodge m  December a^f: 19^6* Schist 
amrsuess of fibst Kcrsaa rebaMlltation would mean wap anal**, 
fested to Molotov" 3 .sly presumption that after the joint 
Emission had concluded their initial task of the formation 
of a Provisional Korean Democratic dorernment5 it ^should 
consider, with tbs. participation *** from the tmerioan and 
Sot let sides concerning masures of aid. tod assistance for 
tb© polit ical and economic progress **■*« o f th e , Korean 
peopled
Secretary of State Marshall® s reply- to Mtiy Dear Kr*- 
Molotov0 trie fly accepted the Soviet views and concluded 
with the reminder that the United States m s  Instructing 
its Xoraan m m m M or to %al£e immediate preparation for 
reconvening the Commission, to Beoulf^ all correspondence 
t e t m m  J&rsball and Molotov m s  closely followed fay China 
and great Britol% the other participants to the Moscow 
Decision*
ftone days after ■ Marshall®s acceptance* Htoeml Hodge 
issued a -personal stoteissaf to ffae 'Korean people* He- -called 
upon tfae Xtotons to abandon their petty issues and psr&oasl * 
qmrrela and. urged them to- work ^wholeheartedly0 to create 
”a united*. prosperous Korean nation which can stand as m
% ! .  , Majr 18( 19**?* 996.
% b t a « .„. Hay 25jj. ISft?, 3.01*3,
rived in Seoul to beg in 'the second session of th© Joint 
ScrsfJ.et-Amorl.ean demission*
The first meeting of the Commission convened the fol- 
lowing day at Sul: Soo palace$ and ms-devoted to the Com*> 
mission5© formal re-opening*
la the discussions which followed ■ Oaring the remainder 
of the. monthy it m e  agreei upon by the delegations that the 
Comission should limit itself to preparation of plana dir­
ected toward the formation of the Provisional Korean Govern- 
seat*. Sub-coimgisslons were named to study and recommend 'the 
type-* structure 3 and composition of the Provisional Covem« 
m n%  design a Provisional charter for the government* and
an elaboration of ' the political platform for tha Provisional 
68Government „ The Commission5 s main body continued to discuss- 
the method of consulting: with the Boreas democratic parties
draft coordinated proposals to fee submitted, to the Joint' 
wt&8$m- £ w  coasidorstios* ,
; During the first m & k  is. June, the Joist Gtxmtss£m de~ 
voted its attention to the question or consultation with 
Korean democratic jarties and social, organisations is north 
■w& -Smth lioroaf the thorsy snfeieci which contributed. to the. 
pilous Commission's l^esMewn* and necessitated the inter** 
mention of the Secretary of Blais and the foreign Minister 
for the Soviet Union*
ffea decision reached hr the Commission regarding the 
method of consdtatioa end. those with whom consultation. wontd 
he held, wa# contained in- a document entitled «the Method of 
Consultation with Korean Democratic Parties -and Social. Or*- 
i&nisabtoss is. Horfcb -mti  Smith. W are***?® fbere was also m  
agreed questionaire on the *rSinueture -and Principles of the 
Provisional Korean democratic Government” and a second ques« 
t Iona ire on the <?Political Platforms of'the Future Provisional 
Korean' Democratle fisc quostionaires were for­
th©. purpose of determining the views of the Korean people on 
the- proposed Charter .and political platform for the - Provisions 
«1 Government.» Each party and organisation would submit their 
views through their- central .party organs so, that only om  
net of answers was filed for .each: party or organisation^
Consultations with Korean part in s and organisations would 
fee guided by the conditions stated is Molotov ®s letter of 
%fei<t«* 22*
Uo/jl, Jtm*/X9fc7* 16*
•Hsy 7*. iS&rsball*s. letter .of May 13*?2 Joint Goib** 
mission would bold oxal in both Seoul bad
Pyongyang for the benefit of those pa1 ties which demand 
special soratiny*.
In the first ten days following the release of the
• questioriairess 3hh political parties and social .organisations 
la- South Korea obtained copies. for submission to the €esi?*-
* aissioiu^
On June 25*. lfe|or' General Brown* the chief American 
delegate*. addressed the Joint Gcmission in an optimistic 
tone:* reiaarking that the Commission. had tahen rsmarlmhle 
steps towards the "eroctioa of a. democratic state, of power 
■and di©iity which will he.' a worthy .political edifice for., 
the people of this ancient and cultured, race* la. M s  
enthusiasms the general seemed to have forgotten that the 
purposes of each delegation had. not changed* and that the . 
Waposed questionaIras did not solve the- question. which had
contributed to the- breaMown -of the previous Comission*'
Ife-tisod. of consist ion was altt^d .somewhat* but still, it did
fcofc- satisfactorily -solve the original -p^bloas. of which 
Soraan'.-political and social org§a.i^fioas- would he jormitted 
to partisipatdscsctiyoly in the fommtlon of the Provisional 
GoverriBeat *
It was-. inevitable that future difficulties ym&M -arise 
concerning this Interpretation* Brown paid slight heed to-.
this discrepancy in tots address.,, m m l$ " remarking. that ?- 
«differences o f -opinion (Korean) must' not* . J a o a & v o r *  lead to 
lack of harmony m  to non~cooperatloa' with the of the 
Jhtfint COE2iiisB ion« $
■flic following day* 5fl M m M m  aeeoffipanled ty Ansp^eaxi 
liaison officers* do parted for fFongyaog to. make aru?ange«*- 
scats for oml consultations wttto the garth goreos leader®*' 
CasBaanditog General Chtstiakcw welcomed the- American delegation 
at the Joint Oeraslssle&s® 3dtto seeting* held in Pyongyang. «o 
dune 30* 19t?o76
.five asetings "Were held. InJ^ongyajii sat -Sev5et^.p^i©sai 
differences- continued unsolved tferotzgb July Tm
Soviet -delegation, were adamant in. their dewi^Ss ttet the fci* 
looi&g’ typos of political psrtlef and. social organisations 
should toe excluded from the list for initial ecnsmXtfttierist 
tl) 'those net classified toy ttoesi (Soviet Virloxx} -m .social 
-crganiMtloss* (2> district sad other purely local, ©rganfe 
sat.i»s.§; and (3) those which it. (Soviet Jnlon) contends do 
not intend to support fully the Moscow B-ecisi0%  particularly 
ssetstoers' of Inh i* trusteeship Camsaiite© and similar -organisa^
Ss.sent.ialiy this toad- .ten th» Soviet ;position since the 
inceftien of the £3&gfe and had; omslstently
?%Md** 29*
•^XMd„ Jfo.-.27* July* 19W* 19,
plagwed amicable proceedings for the; past 18-'matte* SfcoaM 
the- 'ihasrlesn delegation acquiesce in fits S w te t demands^. it 
weald peivaanenfly ter all South Koreans with the exception 
of those favoring the Soviet tfnlesp t tm  esncalations with 
the Joint Coaatssioa* By such- as stead omterits, laarlcsn gras* 
tigs wonM te irrevocably lost is the- Korean peninsula*
S^eific Soviet - iatestisms w&rs that Industrial* s»r**. 
east lie mad preclacerte organisations* -aloag with the societies' 
farmed for ib© study of politics and - economics were act nia 
feet social organizations as the word teocfel8 is seed la tHer 
lloscow lfecisioSo R^
jiliiotbar Interesting conclusion draws by the Soviets 
stated that Jsst because a .party $& eligible for -consultation 
under the -sgreeiaent .of the Foreign Htnlfiters* end retested 
in the Joint Comsissioa SeeisIon* n&m s not m a n  that it 
must be admitted for- consultation by the- Joint Co 
la other' words* the Soviet delegation could for the sate of 
compromise concede that a certain A m riean~sponsored party 
W  eligible for' consultation,*. bat by the same totes deny ~ ’
that party admittance to, the Joist Commission* Snob a pite 
.fell was evaded by the imrlcan. delegatios is stating-thst 
their position- and mderstanding of Korean recognition*
;fh© imrican delegation stressed, again that signing 
the declaration in cowmlfnn No*, f  m $ agreed upon by 
Marshall and Molotov »s a declaration of good faith an
79lM3,» 20,
20,
respect i®  apholding folly the Moscow -Beeisic% mA “would 
asks the signatory party or -.arganiaation eligible for 
' laitialcousultetien*"^ Irritated l>y the Soviets literal 
interpretation of ̂ soci#1“ as ’used in the Moscow Agreement* 
the American delegation primly stated that the Moscow Agree*-, 
sent “does not define the- tern. *social organisation,5' at# the 
Soviet delegation refuses re quests of the American delegation 
to define the ter® In Joint CoMaission declaims**^ 'there**
r
tagfaf. the American delegation felt the term ’-’social organise* 
tion’- mat- he interpreted as defined, in the dictionaries -of 
the w r M » ,r Progressing through the remining Soviet views* 
the American statement summarily rejected them one hy one 
as being imprseiteable. and. not .la conf ormity with the 
llarshall**Mol0tov .ap,sesent«
In rebuttal to Bros®*# accusative stetessiih* Colonel 
General. Shtikov held a large press conference on July 21P' ■ 
1S&7* "Where he presented additional and. seemingly conclusive 
Soviet views* fho soviet spokesman derisively dismissed tte' 
African claims which, attached importance tc the strength 
of local organisations^ Mockingly*. ho expressed: doubt c o n ­
cerning “the so-called Korean Civil ingineers and Architect# 
teapi% which' had indicated a total membership nf" 1*200 *.00$ 
members*^ As#Log@tlcally$ Sb-likov minted out that the 
league “could not have- that -mm- mm$mm because all $&£&$




oesslhiily' aeompllsb th e estaMiBfemsiit -of ■m isnitet J&aroseu
#. and on $v&& S %  the taerinm delegation 
ttet .sttWeadn^sim m e  -be reconvened aa4 directed to gate* 
■$4(1©®' the application of .«&& parties m &  social wgai&satlqns 
vbloh tevs -a&g&i&d for emsnltatlen mffe the loint Cap**'
Brim these tte » $
m list of all parties-, and. organisations which tonro 
coasoliation,. to ad&ltio% the sub̂ ecaiiaission
m o  to ,p*spara m tte fe  .of' these forties. with which either* -'
-iolegatloa does not ttfsfe to oonsnitt tegotter tilth « state* 
seat of .spsclfio objections in each ease* file
v&msly rejected
B m t h  K m m  m n h  m  n o t tit tb& o p X n t m
' !iy®toli reotosted that the Joint Comission report
hy £og*i$& 2SI fto stotos of Its tolltemtlons so ttotf:
*«*, stob govoras&sit istsar torasdliatotXsr consMoy wtot toritor stops «ar to 'latett to •achieve the &to' of: the 3&scot? k&m&SBBfe* tto oBtaOlistost of am independent.,' onlfed £&$& 
■whtoh c m ltiis3‘ its’ propor ■ ptoc® mm% the tMlted 
isfelm*?3*
to M b  r o p r  dated $m®m% 23, iSetotov agato*r®stoto<J. 
tto Soviet made an eeeosation that ite arrest of
osrtoto ifef'sous .ftjflr « ® « J s iii to tto ito  to ioMte .topss m t 
.tempering ft® worts #f the Joint CdwMssion,' aoft saggostod
.that fto to© totogsttas Bo
«gafeiatod to a vagus aoow^ttoo «#,; stst&ig that*
fto ®mBvmmn% #t»Mtors if necessary
that, ft®' IffiOfics® delegation to the Joint 6 w *  ijlsston receiv© appropriate instruction® for 
th© fMIH3#safc' of the. $gp£SM& reached te*» toto®. ft® Oorsrmonts <>&<> « and the- :tU&«-S<r3U.to. April,- of this .yeas**. <iiM©toyffs tottor to'April 1 %
to, conotosion ari almost anti-oltoaottofi3.s too- Soviet 
Wmm$m IKatotor noted no ehieeiloo to UtosfeMlto proposal 
tors- Joint m  the stotoa :of its .iMitor*-
fto  Jotof Q - m m l s s f m  m &  unabto. to  sgpso to  th is  report 
tovarlng ife© status of its negotiations^ A H  efforts to' 
reconcile the draffs prepared hy the two delegsflons proved 
UtotototofM* Although the As&riean delegation d M  approve, 
'too pupated Soviet draft, nevertteloss8. they offered to
fte Soviets refused' this proposal or to discuss other Jtoriean 
'piggostlOtts«- Upon an froa the Soviets that
toy 'tei no proposals to sate^ the American delegation gr©*» 
posed tot the- two delegations agree that their divergence
of tdetip p?e©liiate a^tesitei m m  Joint report**. ?© this 
tha Soviet
*# I*
accomplish em n • im  m
government that the also
Of. to- Uteeoir wore teisg defeated through bilateral
negotiations* Accordingly* acting Secretary of State- Hobart
*
1* Lovett dispateted a- letter- to Molotov ate tte govaroMabs 
-Of China and - the United Kingdom on Mgest £6$ XfM?*
.8© denied, categorically that tore ted been oppression
t
or .IJsrseention of Korean, parties -.and itelvidmXs In t o  
limrioan sons as ©termed' 'by Molotov In. his previous letter* 
ate- stated ttei' Use. .soviet posifelon i# not only '^otetmry to 
t o  specific terms of its© agreeiaoat yon ate Secretary aiarstell* 
it is also contrary to ite democratic principle of freedom
m 
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discussion*. inasaaeli. as the "Joint Commission. m s  far from
•eisdsaustiag hi! its -possibilities for working oat agreed 
raeozmnendatioas* ?t̂  «ttoo United .States proposals concerning- 
Korea" -set forth, i» Lorettcs letter were also declared ns«- 
acceptable*
Hopelessness of bilateral action in Korea was admitted 
by acting Secretary of State Lovett In his rs-ply to Molotov 
m  Septun&er 17* 19̂ 7.* Levetfc sadly dwelt for ®. moment on 
the two rears which the United ■States "has f&fthfnlly en~ 
dearorM to roach agreement with tfee Soviet Union to carry 
out the- terms of the ' Moscow Agreement hut -with'no appreciable 
success* "98 2n a cold* formal tone« he wrote* "that it is 
the intention of rgr gcvernmant to refer the .problem of Korean 
Independence, to- the- forthcoming session of the ^®mm% k&+ 
seiably of the United Ifetions,1̂ '
In tho two years sine#, the end of World War' IIS Soviet**- 
American rivalry in. 'Koran toad run the gauntlet from Hedge* s- 
feeble efforts to the ISoseow Conference of Foreign Ministers* 
fh© Joint* Qm^&mmQ. i& 'Seoul, toai initiated. -
the ineeftion of the Joint Co«iission?s first session* whfoli. 
weathered Seviet-American differences until lay S* 3,<$6*
0 orraspondeaee m s  necessary batman I&ps&s&L and Molotov 
before the Joint. Commission0 s sacond session convened on
Hsqr '21* 19W| which sttcctapXtefesd nothing asS created a 
situation vhar& the Secretary of State regtebfmlly CQhOtefed 
that the -satter should be placed before tbe United Matieas,. 
fte United States looked to the United tstiene to
#olte tbs iapasse*
■cm rsm  v
m rn im m im  m  tm  m m ®  ifetxois
i
The situation ooairanting the Suited States as & result 
•of Soviet refusals to cooperate in forxanlatlng a lust a»l 
m tm lly ' acceptable solution in Korea presented three iogte 
sally possible peaceful courses,, tee- thought would-he to 
abandon, all K m m  to the Soviets* while a second course 
would go to the opposite extreias aod establish what would 
he in effect a virtual United States- protectorate over South. 
Sore a.„ M third • program would strife' somewhere between these 
tt%.. furnishing the- South .Korean people with, sufficient as*- 
sistanee and support to enable them to- progress through 
their mm efforts- ̂ toward a. .goal of freedom and independences 
while at the same t im  allowing' the United States to reduce 
'p^gressiteiyt, its coiiEBittiuant of warn and money in Korea,,. 
this course involved laying the issue squarely before the
*
United. Satinas ms the only appropriate and w®m5&hMg m enm  
through which Korean, political independence could he estate 
listed*^
%aetopnisd feformtim  on Korea,. m  S 3009*9
:**th 6**-
ieit©? of September 17? 19^7? the delegation of the 
'Halted S t a t e  s. r e q u e s t e d  that the following ,it©% Rfbe problem 
of the Independence of Korea*” ho Included in the agenda of 
the second session of the General Assembly* 'Which was laeeting 
at lake Success* low Barlu2 iJ îtten by the Secretary - of 
.State* George C* .Marshall* and delivered before the General 
A sm w & lf by the United States -delegate* barren Matin* the- 
bettor briefly and factually reviewed the unsuccessful at**- 
tempts by the Soviet -Union and. the United States to solve 
the iCorean problem*.
Beierred by the Assembly to the General Committee for 
consideration* the United States proposal « $  unmercifully 
sttac&ed by Ifc* fysklnshy in .general, debate*, fh© Soviet 
delegate hotly accused K&rshsil -of describing- the Korean- 
situation arbitrarily and incorreatly* t?as though the in- 
effectiveness of the work of the- USSIHSS& Commission -on 
Korea should be attributed to the USSR element**^ g©. felt 
that Marshall%  proposal tins a. direct violation of the obli­
gations- undertaken by the- United States at tk-o Moscow Confer* 
m m  of Foreign Ministers in Xteeembejy 19^5* «ad» thereforê , 
was unjustified and unacceptable-* Ul%h the Soviet position 
-unequivocally stated by its chief delegate 5 other delegations 
began, to present thc-lr views-*.
%nlted 'gabion©. General Assembly* Official ..Records* Plenary Meetings* Second Session* 1*
. . .lations*. General isse:0toiy*. O©^ral'0aailtt^#OffMlal Records*. Second ■ session* 1* fl*
iysfeitisly8-s m g ^ m n t s  were tattcewseA W  another Soviet 
delegate 9 Andrei Gros&rke,,. whose interpretation m s ’that If 
the United: States' m s  dissatisfied with the results of the 
'negotiations* and he added* *tfc© Corisi Union %.m& also $t*» 
satisfied ,<* the proper procedure weald have teen to place 
the qsm kZm  before the other three powers c&x&orfted,. bat 
*to switch the question to the General Assembly whs illegal*^ 
In rebuttal to the- Soviet Union8s two chief' spoleea©%- 
Austia arose suS atlclXy noted that the. United States had' 
recaestsd the other powers concerned to loin in discussing 
those- -proposals*. CMna and the United Kingdom -had agreed*' 
but the .Soviet Union .had' refused* loavisg no aXtefsative but. 
to bring the problem before the United nations*^
China*s 'representative* Wellington. Koo* stated. that feis- 
goverrunenfc favored the inclusion of the item in the- agenda*
Us long as there, was no agree®at among the four powers modi­
fying the Cairo and Moscow Agreements* the obligations, 
arising t t m  'those agreements remained binding* and the in**- • . 
elusion of the W s m m  question -ia the agenda could not effect 
the positions of the four governments concerned*.̂ 5“
fros wltfein-the Soviet orbit* Poland %  hange said that*. 
«lb w m  m  question of the delineation of the. competence of 
the United Hat-ions.” His government held' the opinion that*, 
»t*o groups of issues existed at- the moment f - the' winding up 
19-3&+
19*20*
that5. although the p e m M tm s the Moscdw
Ommmt tot to- ste&tSte® of % sm m itopstone# be ’
incltot m  its sgsmdao2-̂
ftort&er dlseassiem of Korean independence continued at 
t o  Assembly*® mimatleih plenary session ca %l» following 
fnesd&yv yysbi&sby dwelt «& sobs length on to- 
-featoaa. itasfmfX and fio lo tm  .regarding M a ^  sat conceded 
t o %  although t o r  nw»- close to «& m4e2?staat'ia.g s t o  
Aasartom delegation la t o  #Mat Cmae&saion m$mm& to- 
cepfe mi understanding* therefore, t o  baited States mast 
‘ttbaar t o  responsibility for t o  situation which Urn .arisen 
m  to. Smfiet-dMited States Gcsrniissica** to: Soviet delegate 
disputed t o  allegation tot the baited fctlto. could too 
up t o  -question of Korean inde^adenOG- mtar Article1% -of'
its Charter* Mm contended tot ante Articles 10, 11, mad
.•<
I*s-.$ t o  General Assembly CaEd discuss any questions relating 
to the- miatenanoe of international pmnm and security la 
jttccvdaste* with /paragraph %  Article 35* However, according 
to Tyshlushy there » s  tip doubt tot questions: rmtod by 
t o  Waited Stato delegatioii on ^j^iieularly t o ®
tisrnm M  mm imtmrnaMoml agreement such me exist® at tie 
present t£aar$ cannot 'be imde a :jaatter -#f re¥ie» by t o  
General .Assembly*1*-̂-
followlng -an. -adSrees by dear Imtt of t o t o M % .  in which 
the delegate f r «  town tinier* thoroughly disproved t o  
Samslm® delegatees interp^stations -of the ifeito J&stloits- 
3-QlMd** 22*
nations, General Assembly*.. Official Bssegds^. Plenary rr^e tings,, Second $* ̂  1
sgatost the topic* s li&toston t&rc Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist R$pal&£e.$. Gleebosd,©vskJa, Poland,. t&t̂ alntoa*
Sbirtot. Socialist iefabltov Union of Soviet i^toltot Sepnplio * 
sad fngosla^iac Abstentions were- f r m  the Sasi9n
Afgtsanistanii; S^|%, gtfatoptof; ieMno% Saudi jUrabto?
nad gprte*;̂ 3 fntore noting "blocs” ‘in regard to the Kamim , 
pceM,#® «&ve stoitor -to- tils 'tolitol xeoo^i, Sir this' tptor 
*1tie FroMd« of the to$ef^ide»ee of" Stores1* was to
the first Gomaiibee for discussion and report*.
Korean independence pa# postponed to the Ptoet Gocaalttee 
until October £8̂ , 19^?$ when Unlles began -the discussion -©£
tegitming with Btega'% attempts and' continued to the doint 
Cfeoteftstat* which theoretically m s  still itt session* Be- 
■ateeXtete- with to© startling information that on September 
2&jf- 19^7? nino ■ days after too United -States- representative -
had announced his intentions of tecpeat.lag that the Korean
*• ■
■f^sfion ‘he planed in fete tensral Assembly - agenday fete-
Soviet delegation ted proposed in. fete- Xtenfe -Soaaisslon that
Stetoft and American troops should be withdrawn, steltaneousiy
and the trusteeship system abandoned* the United States
delegation ted replied ttet ^the withdrawal of troops ted to
be considered && a part of the general problem of' fete estate
Itstas&fe of an independent governisent for fete: whole of Korea*”
16?*. Dulles elaborated that any troop withdrawals must
te subsequent- to fete ne3tablishsient of s&ciiinejcy for- effecting
*
fete transition from fete ■ present stefee of -affairs to fete -forma* 
fefea of a single govsrmsant ropreseating fete Korean people**1 
Such machinery would include supervision by a ignited I&tiona 
femporary Se»issio%-tt instructed to report to the general . 
Assembly* Elections should be held very soon* if possible ? 
tef&te March 3%  19**8* ate fetet fete number of persons elected 
should te- .la direct proportion to fete .population* ft "Mwmm. 
fefefeosal oXtefete by fete thru fete-
tetlotel govenmsnt for- both m b s *  -ate would *&g&m all 
functions w  taten by fete Soviet ate- American military
■military HI' %imm js&epr would be taken mder
United Xatlehs observation*^
.111 ayes m m  -m the? Soviet delegate Andrei -dresrls%, 
as- be arose to ©ullee* faiiently^ the daffe haired. ■
Gromyko reposted the worn Soviet accusation^ f*tha CoHiaission 
M M . .failed b&sog&S' ttisr United states did mot intend- to abide 
to the W tisetiti Bio observations were that Mores
coaid not establish its independence freely until the complete 
withdrawal of Hi. foreign tr#op% therefor©, Bio deloga-tioti 
was submitting to the CoEflBit.t©0-.s a proposal protidiiig for 
the- witfc^raml of all foreign., troops early in. l$B8a SromykQ®s. 
second proposal mo. that elected representative of .Corea* ̂ 
tte:jJOludtng p&tg&m aoaioaied by the foreign military author- 
itles^n should he heard- hr the densities and the General 
.issemfety*- fhti% “the fhsreim .question would he ■msmimM 1st- - 
em abjective m w xer j * 1^
iffe latter proposal varied little t& m  the Soviet posi­
tion which. had plagued the aSmerioaa delegation in the £$&& 
Commission during the past 25 months,. By delaying and 
'questioning the- '’‘democratic^ rep’sseatctivc%. the Soviet 
■Sssim  could ncliiem .its :nltii»te policy of seeing -a- divMed 
Eorea until, a proper and opportune moment to- withdraw, ly©- 
brows m m  raised m  the full, Implications struck the as-* 
.g&d&ad delegates- for it. m s  g^arisgly apparent that- the
%nited Ballons.. General. Assembly*. First m $ k m m t  Summry Becord jg jjttsf&nR&y. Second mm&m.#, ■2&9<*25&*
* s w
iotrieb Union Mtendpd. to mse the siioe tootles in the united 
.Hattons «Meb ted ecmfminiet t o  Q m ttiLasim
for -SO- ©pnths* Mbteugja the mm.. Soviet -position regarding 
troop withdrawals promised tp be am.eying,5 it would sot 
deter $&re&a unity -and i-adopGndeoco os effnatively os the 
loiter proposal*
- Viewpoints expressed W  other delegates 4 M  not add ' 
thing tenstruotive,*. Australia felt that the Korean question 
concerned all the states that would participate in the feane 
treaty with. Japan, but thought the- best m y  to solve the 
M®mm problem would he by agreement between the fmlted. States 
and th# Soviet Union * and 9 if these conferences failed^ Aus- 
tralia would support the United States proposal#
Poland %  Jtamgs added nothing- new when he expressed the' 
belief that the, Korean question 000XS be settled by direst 
©oaversaiioiis teteeim. the united states «d. the Soviet tfteo% 
‘’with freely elected ropreseiitatives of the Korean people 
given m  o p p o rtu n ity  to  state, their views*11 It was essential 
that tM  Korean representative.^ be freely elaeted,,3'? Usage 
ted evidently and. conveniently. forgotten that sueli m nm r~  
m t lensr 'had., pored & f Mmm during- the prions 20 lasijite* 
Wellington Koo noted that Korea had teen since the end 
. of the nineteenth oeirteryy’ a pam in a ga m  of powor poll* 
tics earrled on by Japan and Bosnia* ’ to the detriment of 
jgBtfft&m Ghtte*^ 8* $€$gxflrite& tte Polish and USSI! £»$•- 
16SM M ** 252.
V H M - *  253.
l 8 I b l d . .  2 ? h
gesiloas that re prs sea tat 1 ves efeaM be invited to
take part. M  the- p e « £  debate* Understandably* lie did not 
offer to suggest a- .method to select these representatives«
I’ho Ulamal.an delegate recalled the Inadvisability of 
conducting elections- while foreign troops remained In a 
country*, no cited that in $88**$ tout Briimlitisad agreed 'to- 
m-iatain troops for a snort time in Egypt.$ ana- that they 
m$m still there* with the Security Council confronts! with, 
'the question of their withdrawal,3-̂
fhe Waited Kingdom .generally supported the United 
States proposal^ and felt that if the occupying troops were 
withdrawn tm m  Wmm^ & m m  would result*.
&  closing the 88th session* the chairman requested that 
all. delegates' submit their .proposals In writing* in order 
that they night fee circulated before the next m a tin g *.
Tm  following day* October 29* the chairman evened'/-tie ■> 
Corraitteecs discussion- by inciting m m vks on the USSB docra* 
ajsnt* "concerning .an. invitat ion, to elected repre sent at ive s 
of tie Korean people from northern -and soatuern Ibrem to 
ta&e part in the dlaeussion. of this question*,} Remarks which 
followed..-m m  distinctly divided between the Soviet Union and 
the United State® viewpoints* deposing- upon the. speaker0 s 
affiliation with. either*
Lillies .gravely conceded: that the problem eroded the 
4mm&bmi%m wttfiKorean tent "just who m m -
the true represeataMves of ttaa Bftsean. people »*' ■ $&§#&£Wffi* 
wMie. accepting the prMelpXe of' ths U80E proposal.* tee tfo» 
submitting m  aara&nMxfe estate! iststug a United tfationa 
m rf $cm$ss% m on Korea tttee observe «&& consult throughout 
Korea la- order to ensure that the r© pro sent at ive s m m  duly 
elected end not mere political appoiritees of military author**- 
itiesing0
ftea Soviet ̂ group** recoiled quickly and disparagingly 
noted that the United Staten a^nissnt .would lead to post* 
pomsent of Korean independence y while at the ,mm. time* there 
were democratic organl^tions in teeth lorth and South Korea 
wteiati could elect repre seuiaiiws* (Iroryko charged that- 
theUirited States nm s afraid to. have .Korean re pro seat at ion 
in the United Hat ions discussing the Korean problem*!1̂  
lie suggested .that Bullas withdraw the’United States niaenSa&ate*
Additional Soviet controlled delegations derisively 
’belittled- the- African amendment %& establish a United .
Hattons temporary Uamission m  &ase&« ftee delegates ir m  .
:
Poland* Jugoslavia*. I^lorussim Soviet Socialist BoimbXie*. 
a m  the irisranian . Soviet Socialist ReputeXis united in .ntteapts 
to talk dovm the American aiaendi3ent.0 In direct apposition*, 
the delegation' from. Sew Keatand and India supported ..the 
Halted States e^ndment ms the .sols* Itsste .solution*
I t o t  of m w  rnmt&mmtB mM proposals to- first '
Cttnd&to e® t o  following tot -©eteter 30s. At Baltes
toiatetKS%. a- vote t o  late ©a t o  United States aaieatont
to t o  ussb toft to. m m rn $ m  t o i t o  fcsr '**3
to &9: mSMi- % abstentions^ ’tort t o  United States text m s an 
aiiienctoiit.o2^ Ittrtor attempts- tr t o  Breiornss-ian and ®taaas* 
t o t  S o v i e t  S o c i a l i s t  i t s p n b l i c s  to- t o  U n i t e d
States mmn&mzit were 're|seted W  OoBmittea- v o te s of %G 1#
%  and 3^ to 6* nesi^ctively*2^
t o  United- 'States amendment was t o n  toted 0%. paragraph 
1agr paragraph* and adopted?- bmt in every instance to- Soviet 
«bloe” -abstained, from veting„ fh© chairman ton pit t o  
IISSB draft resolution to to' vote and it m s rejected 35 to 
6 tilth 10 attentions*. As m concluding notes Orosyteo- added 
mimlngly tot should a f O om dm km on Korea be
.-estetligted after the teteal. Assembly had eonsfteed t o  
question ŵiifcteaf the partioi|Kifion of l^eaa re presentetiws. 
in test? toy^s dtoMsste% ’t o  USSB would not- be obi© to tatee 
part in the work of the Csiaaissioa*^1’
Mitfe, tor sulky Soviet delegation -quiet* to- remainder 
of to- day -gag spent in consideration of to. WSS1 draft re** 
solution concerning t o  withdrawal of-̂ ali foret8» troops from 
to&ft* the Hiiiippto- lategate soberly fait- t o t  t o  U » -  
idllit% decision wosHi tee .far peaching -effect «sa& ittel©
the b a s is for m Q cm & iliM biw i between the United 
States and i'm  Soviet Union in- the Far Sas-t-* and- pave the 
way -for eoomQialG. and patb-ieai reeo&stmetiGn. of Korea* or 
-else, widen the breach tetetem the: tee.ipeat pcwsrsi '!‘eondesm 
the- JSmmt .people to $G&£i$te& economic otem  and: .pive 
the way for- w » 1,v
fte French delegate took -* sly thrust at the: Soviet 
Union wkm  km asked* regarding, the USS-Bdemand that free 
elections- could not te conducted in the ^essence- of foreign 
troops* if the eleciions which Mi: been held :$M the Eastern 
Suropeatt -eamtries ted k& m  im e * tte Canadian 4te£*g&$e &ge* 
pressed surprise that «supposedly free elections* held in 
Korea 5 should have resulted in almost im&mimous 
imppsri for n particular party*
Heated discussions So the .Coasnifcfc&ate 92nd and 93rd 
meetings tetween Urotayko and miles preceded the Coi^itteate 
vote- m  the Soviet draft resolution te withdraw all foreign 
-troops fros Korea* After=tte iwtet resolution ted teem 
rejected by e -vote' of SO to %  with ? abstentions* Dulles 
suggested that the temporary Coisnission te composed of 
delegates from Australia* Canada* 0 M n %  El Salvador* Wmmmw 
India* the Philippines-* Syria*, and the Ukr&nian SSH*- However* 
tte Ukraniam detegate 'refused Balloon invitation* stating teat 
'”te- -saist decline the work in the temporary ComslasCte because
a% M » s 232o
tfi® of Itoto M l  sot teen im W eA, to- .attoad
tte pw m tifc debate «**. ifltb no m m  oom iM &m M®n by the 
'$6a$£tto&* tte entire UnttoC Bistoa M l  m m tm & im  m s  
*&&&&&:T& a v-ote *©f IfiS to %  with .V atotenbitos%^
lefertea to the Assembles fifth Budgetary
m &  M wBxktotrstfto* tte -swiet tetosatedetotei: fits -m the- 
draft tetolutito*. Ho atressei that feto -latog&ttte could sot 
rote for any m m rtd.ltw 'Q  for the edaimlseito on ICoreas **aor
*
atold M  to^totpto in any* detailed analysis of ths project,,fl' 
fhe chairman. eoMXy ato-toa. that all consents shmiM to 
liisltoa strictly to: budgetary iBplieati.ons-0 .four otter a©3#̂ - 
.gahitoss from Within the S-ouiet orbit atos%. and m o Igr «  
endorsed the remarks asie to tte Bowiet totog&te*
Action tfes initiator to the United SIngic® delegate to’ 
Iftoeite* 10s 19Vy0 He- formlXy .pronosefi that a 3?eport.shonld 
to oa&r to too- General iisstobly indicating that the total 
ttgp&diture involved would to 100 thousands: in X9*f7 5fX> 
totostoisr in' X9lv3#' f M s  ton toast to the assumption that
toe Ooua&sg&Oft would operate from Bseemter ls 19to-̂ . to Bees**- ’ 
tor lj 3L9M&. fte Coiamittes adopted the. United Kingdom :p to ^  
totol <27 to $ rotes:s with f abstentions^ and. the referred 
tte draft ratototton toot to tte totetol
2%nited lotions*, OeaemX Assembly,*. fifth. Ooesltteê . g«BttMey accord ̂  Mcoilnesn. Second B m m m :w bQ%
m ® tte tenter of sttesetfos at tte'
' £U£h plenary m & t& m  teM «t FlnstiiKg Meadows on Semester 13#. 
Spga&iQr eoMly and testtotelFV tte $g$fe3$l$$ Stefet delegate 
accused tte- United States r&mluttcm; of ooEig-lleatirig tte' 
©atlr© situation,. '%®mm®- l,it m s  not teste on tte interests' 
Of tte Korean people tet on tte designs of tte' United 0tete% 
wnieli 1ms ateermlnte ate oontinnes to tmMrmXtie end app*©^- 
p*tate solntimso.1*̂ 3' Iggtiit te reviewed .tte- 
aotteittes sine© tte m&mm: © M  lamelaM
inte a long rttiftestiou. attest, -tte United States#.
#, - zsulXes ignored-tte itelet tenets ate stated itet Itte 
teterpwtstieat ©f tte- First Comittee^s wfe-fete teen ctif~ 
t® m m  frosi m *  iroir&ote# fte irieriom telt ttet ttete tei
1 •
teen tferee tesic issoes eonfronting tte First Comittsen 
Cl) . stemM tte- General Assemllr do anything*. <£> iteoM tte 
Smasitte© act or wait until it conXd get representation t? m  
Korea to low r©rl% ate (3> Mlf we acted noi% steoM we act- 
©at tte tesla -of irrl»g to. §©i tte t e e p  « t  .first' .ate. 
create a goroneaeiit or. 'ter to ©rtete & toforte-
iteni' ftrote*^ Moteiiiag te tte- Sostetteo isai teten
tte ©ralr logical ®mmm in v2$v. of test #wtts«.
G©ttsiteteli.©» te' otter delegations tte following day 
m m  ©itter j»©-Aa^ic*m m  teo«Sorieto So otter- suggeotlona
^Halted rations* Geaerai Assejabar#- Official Becords* S©-cote S©ssl.0ns 1 %  -ii3*#33a#, " ™" v,ll,''lll,:', n i "
•0 -# a 0 to
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I' .general ■ la
northern Kam m ^'J
CoasecpM'atly, the Gmited nations So?
by table to roqpaast the permanoat r epre sentat-ive of 
$ United Hattons*Sossloa, ©oeoasmf "
i,®? *»T«
t o  0BSB to transmit to Moscow the Cosmissitos Q m m n lm ttm  
m m srdiog 'to -exchange of owies!©© with the .general offices 
ccsaoaaa&to the forces ia forth, and South Korea* Xu roflr to 
t o  taJ^s roQuest* Gromyko x e t o t o  t o t  te
toad it m to rotor to- t o  negative attitude- tefcea 
by to. Soviet government daring t o  General Assembly cs second 
ness ion toward the ostahl.tste-nt of" ite United fatlona 
temporary m m a im im  m  .Kor«a«^
Upon receipt Of- Grojaykô  s reply t o  Comissien 41opatto& 
sstotor cable to the aeayetaiy^Getteral asking him to remind 
t o  Soviet govoms^nt of paragraph tig& of regulation Ifr which 
established the Gouralsalon;9. calling oil Ifeiatter States eon« 
oaaaekt to afford every ooslobaisoo ouS facility 'to 'to. OoaR 
mission: to- the .fulfillment of' its duties, 10 answer m s  
reeeived by t o  Gsatosios*.
At t o  C ommission %  seventh meetings the-- secretariat 
imported tot to. letter addressed, 'to 'the- 'coamdlog general 
in H^eth Korea ted not teen accepted "fey to' Soviet authorities,' 
ft m s  apparent that t o  Soviet refusal in. the General As- 
sembly to.- .recognise the femisorary CosialssiGn extended to the 
Kfiaraoft -peninsula as m H *  leaving tot- Comission undecided 
as to whether to abandon their assigned task, and return
or to carry t o  tolr functions in t o  .torlean ©one, 
feiag. to- Cansisslon^s. next three iatoiafes# toiasiafc&rs 
ttorngisly discussed toir inability to communicate- with
B^rth lC<2*eas -bxA  fimlly deoMeci to refer the matter t© the 
■General Issesbly^s luterio
9i£ftU^$ie!&''*i6&* 4&&oi&gts$a& in tfee 
for the Soviet Bntei'had eoosiStenilF refused to
kg -.on
group ws' not In. session* It was Mareh ls before the
> ‘ shotald ngo sbe&d anti discharge its aw ties in Korea wherever
and to the m^m% that eircaastaoses’ permitted*
IJesasahSlê  the coimmaGiiig ‘ general In South So
head- and announced that IISAMGIK would s
on May 10s Foixoifiug a series or reeossae
* 1 Korean. “Bill
the' “inherent rights amdOf
the Korean people1*' waa over-1
were- ft
order to ensure a “freedom of atmosphere* fe the exactions*'^ ‘ 
was frossalgated tgr the military governor on *‘
sugh guarantees m  requirio 
the' sacking ? of «g£*$s$6». &Xs% the :0G8ssiaaioi 
& number of complaints tionasz'tilng the- contest of 
the national .police and the- st^oalXM “youth orgauiaaf
ef.tte police the prelection aotf -elBCtien .'̂ S m & sJ9®
the Cojislssion appointed .ssStef .teams to- supervise the 
elections .in, .the larger cities- and to tram! ttetegfe the 
9oatia9a -provinces*. ■ . ,
fte political, s&ga&laja- In south 'teea in the melss gpo«* *
ceding: the elections was far from satisfactory, Moderate 
literate end X©ft*%ring organisations opposed, the separateJ 5 "
elections' on the gronnds that adequate efforts had not teen 
m d e  to achieve sn u ^m m rn t: tfifch the Month Korean ragto* 
and. also because they tel lewd a separate election wall 
permanently divide the country, lefive support for separate 
elections & m  only ..from tte riglstewfng jpesrtar- of 3jRtgssa Bhas 
and the Haalrook Democratic fartyi, ate© ted teen agitating
s  ̂ ; ‘ . '
for months the necessity for septate elections* .and main® 
tstesi teat a sufficiently. ffee atmosphere prevailed to con** 
duct 'elections,
«
. the expected rlotettca did not moor on olection day and 
.-approximtsly 95# of the registrants* or 75$ of oll eligible 
voters-east tteir tellote- 2̂* fte American- command and tee 
gfefeth Korean. Interim Gorommsixt described the -elections m  a 
great victory for- democracy oyer eoipamism* but many. unofficial 
repots-- cmintained that the elections ted teen. conducted in 
•an ateosphers of. terrorism, i*bey pointed out that. the Coa* 
missions acted staff numbered about 3© persons*,and 1 t.uss 
upon tete limited number of -observers that the -Otmmiission 
ireuM rely to sate its report to the decpr®! teseitety,-
*% 229* - *
«. < j.
'■ foli,owls2g the elections* the fempcriiry Commission de-‘ 
parted for Shanghai to prepare Its report--for submission to 
ths General Assembly* Sarly la lsiit the € omission returned 
to Seoul to GOJifir ‘-with the elected assembly concerning mm*»- 
auras .for bh© establishment ‘of a Korean gwerfassnt* Chi 
June 30* 19^8, "the CozsnlssionAs cbelrmsm aimounced to the , 
Korean tfetlonal Assembly that the election 'results m m 'nn  
ftlM ■ oppression of the free will of the electorate In those 
parts of Korea, tfMeb were -accessible. to the ecu 
Although the Commission did not elaborate on its attitude 
toward the formation of a government.^ tho national Assembly 
■acted under Bheecs leadership together with military .govern?* 
m n t ooaparaiica^ to grmdiially aasaoa full responsibility for 
the. organisation of a South Korea gnvcrasenW 4
'By August 1%  19^3* Chiang Kai-shek extended form! 
diplomatic recognition to. the Bsptblle of Korea* while iis§: 
State Dspsjpttasnt released a/ statement on .the seise day uiiich
v ' camounted to giving .dg. facto recognition. bo - the m w govern-.
■m niJ+Z' l-mefe later* the- President -of ■ the ‘Philippines- ex- -
tended to the BepubXie* t? sincere st wishes .***. for'"the success
%%•of' the; nm i state 'of Korea^ " fta% the EepubXic of Korea.’ 
m s' well .established long before - the Ssseml .AaSe«My% 
scheduled third-'Session in.* Paris ̂  ■'
; " , 1¥ '. - 
Propaganda from the northern none assumed, threatening
^ J M 4 r » 230. -
jxroporiions during the .spring; s M  snsm®r of l$ liS9 while the  
Temporary Commission m s a c tiv e  in South 'Koran* accord ing  
to tho 'fypagyang radio,* tfm  K©rean psoiXe wore being bet* 
by the Americans and. a ©sail group of prowijserlcan reaction* 
nry Koreans*, Furthermore^ retribution, for these Korean 
traitors would he swift and dim*. Soriat aetion against 
South Korea. approached an e n tire ty  new thesis in 3wm P lfh§f 
when the cornerstone for -a .naif fterth Korean g ©wrnseniaX. 
structure was laid*
fee or ding to the pro-Soviot forth Korean -proso* a con* 
ferenoe was held in fyongy&ng sm e tim - hotm en June 2$9 and. 
July 5$ and was attended, ter leaders of many political and 
social organisations in'both mm thorn eni southern Korea*. 
Members of this- conference asserted that the JBtey elect ions 
held under smggrrisioa 'ia south Korea had been intended 
s'to disiaarsber Korea t.a i to teansfom the country into eg* 
lisoridan colony* i:î  Conference members stated farther that
not to. recognise the Couth Korean. .Rational Assembly on the. 
grounds that it .had boas, established, by ^ r f g © ^  .elections' 
aad'ttas did not reieesent the pebpfee*
fh© conference outlined a progrsua t  m  the or eat ion of a 
^genuinely4' democratic Korean i©$lsXst«r%. whoso »nbors shoal# 
bo elected: by tho free eg&onseglon of' the ̂ WiXX of the Korean
pooping Elections m m . to be held for e mm■ Su$m m - 1st* 
lonal Assembly of Korea*, mod a single unified- Korean govern** 
ttest*. which itooM include representation from northern 
-ana- southern Korea*. It. wnt aloo amouneod that tho Sap®-, 
national Assembly itoi the, 'now ■goraroBjenfc would ,see% the 
oorlfest postlht# implsmeotation. of tho Soviet ■■&m£iNB8Bfi*d 
troops,^ Its paaiaslng -tho oloetioa% the conference Im &m m  
roaMied that vpersecwt-ioo. of certain South Korean political, 
and social organisations by Ammrlcaa occupation authorities1* 
m de direct elections Impossible, Iherefore? it was dee idea 
.to .carry out m  indirect two®stage elect iortf CD tba South 
Korean' popilation would elect dele gates to .a Congress of 
People 0 s Re p'sseniatIves of South Korea 9 and (25 this congress- 
would elect- deputies to represent the South Koreans in the 
Supremo national Aoseagftyv
On August.2JL* 19MJ.* .such a congress: did convene i»
hS&#$& Just across the parallel ta tho Soviet -mmm* " A 
•special oomlttee** which 'had ^directed" the -eiseiiojiis- in. 
Southern Ecrea; reported that W *t0  or tho South Korean else* 
terete had voted despite- African oppositions11̂  fhe 1102. to 
the congress elected 3-60 delegates to-., the Supreme H&tional 
JUft8a&$3r»: - the direct elections in northern Korea m  August 
2%  resulted In the election of 212 northern- delegates, /In
^Xbld,, '*&+
.-mist be" remembered that the fempomry Commission 
tm& reported that f$ 0 of. the electorate had voted on Hay 20r
■mmlMtag tl# mm^t the stomitoa $<ma8&tm toast®©!; -tfeet 
*a&l p^p©  off' Hoarth1 m&- MmM Hsran mmm.ffe. Bar '« to tt *©* ,.•
ttctto&srtae mtsi, ĵ o^apstiss® ali<p8f3i% it®
sotteriii«it to the ©tomttotjs*^
f list® la littto ■toi&i ttei- it®. ' %Mms0, i© -eacset
II© 'Softis s&Fesss. tut© e&eaSoiitags’ ft® 'jMrtoagt « tf© tis  m m ® 8 . 
0©ss q m aep fc off f© ft® fsaps^Etr nul,
ilia  ©©©?i§sf£©» .satfe©tftl©#* .&&& the #&$$£$£* % § k m » *
m l&  ©©attornt to  togs -ter .ea». mare f itte s t s i 
vftb. t&e. north m$tm*. Q m m ^ m  «f # imlfIM
&ta$ffs& Tsgr I ^ « s f ©X«sf w ith tli©  gxna^sod. #ts©«feitors 
of o il fe re ip i troops* exerteg a B&guaiie «#pse1l. ©a iBtaetata$ 
Kfe?eftgt&'> €tmmr- MsM mm3M& .ftari If usa swefc 
iamitos to. im t ©«©i*t@i that m et te flp ,.
t o t ©  ©  $ o ? t a t  .site?©*, i f  :'ife$' t i s t o  n a r t t *  il©*4© ^  ■
ahtab ite. Swfot foim ©©aattotto reffeswegvte to 
wmBiim® si its® AaseiSsly to - ftiM gees&K* ms 
®sr©ttaa**.
T  ,
, i f  tho A 2si latef tog ©ff the teerm l tssiia&lsr £» $a*to ©a 
f^Msr* ‘fmptoetei?" 2?fj X$ft3g ft® t̂ogatê -3&ei&-'lla£tifc*
ettaffnft&Sar' f©etc « t it®  issa® -off £&re*a gBdepseftaQae* 'Reffeew
ttog to the isagafia fftoei; the ^©iissisatoa ©a '3&*ea
uni the ©x®ms0ei! tfc h©i,feff' -that.
‘**3&^**r
neither report' should he eternised*. as- loth organisations were
mi Sleg&i bodies-white ted m en set up ..la violation of tbs
$et8e£9&e& ©f the ©barter*!1̂
&  further accused the temporary .€.©asis:M©a. of -carrying
©a Its work under coaditioas of terror* Kellie ported:, oat
that tli© Soviet Union ted. teeentiy decided to evacuate all
Its troops from fieras lay Jiaswaty I* 1$%#* S'* tea&2&8£s% he
slated that there m s  no aeed to link the problem of Korea
•with pea©©’ ate security* *& propagates “alleging tho contrary
was only aimed at concealing tho true designs of some States
In Korea* u A $3$gt proposal to delete the problem of Korean
iteepeteeueo from the agenda. «  rejected m*7~65 ate the pro*
fclem tea .referred, to- the Assemblyte First committee*.̂ 2
lot until the .first C-teraitteete 200th isestlsg om .lovemter
i5? a#*8®, ■was the Korean question breached* At that: meeting*
the Gaeefe delegate warily raised, the question aenteraiag fi»
participation Kof the .representatives of the- People ®s Republic
of Korea® in the debate on the pro&lea- of Korean fade psndeo.es*
Proceeding cautiously* .he eEpteted that the diatm m  im m
Korea, to- Paris was more than 15*300- kilometers* ate tho
Korean delegation would repair© at least- a
Journey if it were to fee present trtea. the Korean question case
•up for-dteanstem*®^ Be ■thought that -aa ̂ irteasnt couM he
flatted Sations* Geteral .Assembly* Official iec©r%^ 
plenary B e m tm f 3rd 'Se&j&ft&t- 1st- imrtf 9oT '
halted. Sabi©st% eeterftl Assembly* fea&ogdte*.First Committed-* Smssary Beeord of leet inge* 3rd Sesite%. 
1st part*
■•*1 7CK
proposal tfit'feewt $e&$? sfnee attxsBsabers- agreed
■i
- m  the necessity of baring as et©piete m  M seussien -x» the
Korean problem % #  possible,**
guielily seconded the Csech request* acting that it
would be difficult for the dsncral issombly to tally smmino ,
the Korean tpestien without the- ptm sm m  of the Womm. rt$r#**
ssotattesv Cbatlxtelttg*. ho ©rtifned the ■go#&M»n£ wfeloh feed
* * beets; sleeted by the gssogftn fa Korth « d  South Eore%. sod since
it had been decided fn  m M Sm t debate that only elected ?&j3r&+
sentatires eouM M  lavitei to take 'part- In debate s ft was
êfcesr that the only persons who- eettXsS be invited were the
reproseatatiyes of tho-SOrenn Be^orrtfe People5 s H«|mblie,a« ^
M X e s  returned the Caasittswr^s discussion to the Tompor**
err Coinalsslcn ttet ho stated that; the demission m s  a :%©rt
of a credentials eoirasis-aioa** with the task of assuring that _
the represert&tfres- •’Who were faulted to participate -were-. _
truly representstire of the /loreim psofffie*^ lie thought that
it ii o t M M  te ■f?disrespeetfuiw to the -dossfssien- to 'issue it»
.Saltation to m& of the- gerernmeots before going over the-
?
ComisSion% report*.
SeXUc replied that the . point of view m ,pressed: by the - 
United States m s  illogical.* ^How could the 'first Ooimttte© 
disowsc the report of -the. f^fer&rr demission ;-m & m ®  before 
inviting the 're^esentatires- of the l&fean people to take 
partt1*^ She Czech -proposal; to inrite ̂Korean representatives 
% i . )  632.. 
g % b a . t 6:«. . , .
of .th© B a m m m t & e  m o p M H  m s  pit to a wte and
le&ptGfc&k ,3$ “ 6*,
Again at tto Bots^iWa*# 22$th m m tm ,^- while discussing 
the feaporasf Coiaaissian0s report^ the €seeh delegate st&* 
mtted tor eensMemiion a,. dwti wsei**fi©& which ignited the 
i?epr©.sent©tivos of the DeaoeFatla Bsopfcto Bepublic to 
eipafe in the debate on t&e lowon p?©hXenw
Solion sesse end «awfhll|r w m d  -§mm tin■*e*to*t$s.- aaeeef 
of the 200th ■aseting* and stated that he 'hat thought the
tied voted &mm the Osaeh psropioaĴ , ihewtores. ft 
©salt not. fe* brought ;np to r ooasMamfloo until aftor a two**- 
thirds vote of 'approval £ t m . t f a &  CasBSitt.©©* The Cnnsalttee% 
oh&Sr»% the Belgium dslegai©*.. hastily intorposoB with the- 
abatos©^. that th# Committee had voted not to consider Wm 
Csech proposal at that tln% leaving the m y  oj©a to?' future 
dteass^n *$&
the Polish steln®st# passionately ■stated that if the Co©*- 
.ed&tee really mnbod to 'til Korean ladepsndenea^ then they 
should show it by wbihg oh: the- Csocfc ;p*©p@ssif t: then they 
ttttgd Imowo Shift# rejoined that those nations which wane 
lastly responsible fcr te^sg refused the eosMission access 
M &  saying the. Committee should hear its# from
north low# 'tfihteih tefiig. it they ge$& 3$®&£3y eloeftsi;*'
Be strongly felt that It- would "be beiseafeh the Comitteeto 
dignity to g im  m&b. * to. those who h a w  defied
t$» Assembly0© Commission in thin 
57i m ‘v 936-937.
% M .  s 939.
IIsiMk replied with the m m m tS m . that there- m m  .ample 
m M m m  that the sm th. Mmmm gm om m snt 
had not been- freely elected (br the inteMta&ts of the &3&t%gm 
mbmm ^people were - thrown lain prison for long periods 
ms93&r m  the- order of the ©Ctitary governor*n di the ©fete
w w
hand* there could be m  doubt that the hesooraiie People0s 
gc^i^scst represented the Korean people* .this m s  demon- 
stated by the feet that 3 0  of the torth &ves&
$0ffola£ioa had participated In its eleetloasf sad the. dBSH 
•ms slrss% withdrawing its -oetmpytog forces S tm  tbe norths 
em, srne*^ 3s- accused- the. ,0'«iisslm'of' giving « y  to 
&&£o& States pressure In  the southern sons* *
fhe4 following' day;5. the 3m?Ioi delegate again attached 
the problem of Korean tn d ^^n ^m m  m  ©^pressed by the- tfoltdft 
States* U s e  Included in the Soviet attach « i  the Chinese 
p*oposall which -would invito re^isentati^os of the South 
Surma iaticmal IssoabXy to taho '$ss*t ifet tiio 
deliberations* .It the end -of the aseting^ the Cmch draft 
rcsolUfeioa ms- .pit' to a- vote nod. rejected 3^ with 8 
al^tUStiiaa%, while the Chinese draff proposal « s  adapted 
,3f «• %  with. 1 abstention*^
-jMtiag opeasd with, a lout -speech by the 
l^ppcr tsar of ‘ the (taott&gsgimv fte- Chinese delegate
stated that the ̂ temporary C om & m tm  hod observed the progress 
of the- rntm&imm- la S m fik SOre%. and had reached the conclusion
^ m a ,- 9**®.
60^a.».-?ss,-
of the Waited lattcae*
■Bulles tlm ig iitfu lly  .reviewed the promts® mad# t$r tls# 
Great power# during the .last war* wten they had la*.
defaisdsBKS# to JB million Koreans* a»- charged that Sort!*
Korea. was doafemtM '1# a cowssisi regies# ’teaieh m s  attempt** 
tng "to §omm. the whole of Kor-sa and threatened to carry out 
its efforts. %  force*** B# -repeated that the occupation 
troop? would M  witMrmm ®s soon ms possible* and then added - 
that the would to. such that tbs .SOrasa. people
would milly 1# imstors, In t'faelr 01-m .house and- would, not to 
terrorised by graips receiving; thalr orders from a-, foreign 
country* **62- In the .strongest language* the Aassriestfi delegate 
nterged that, as la Grace#* tie Ccmmnists were attempt log to 
Imps## their will W  fore# .,#nd the support- -of neighboring 
o m m m M t  elements*
At the 0OMS!tda30:%  23Snd seetlng* the Sî tb. K&gaa-£$**- 
preseatstiv© spate fee the 0:iroltt#e.* Ho traded' the- develop* 
f9e&$ of wtet -he called :*%. C-oiMimist 'dietatorship under BSSB 
spsriSorsMptt which had its fefedcp&r-ter# in Pyongyang* and was
itei' thef at® to JBapwa aa£fl«a?fc tea voali 1
M s i» is iy %  .* & ' tfto  g m m m m z B  « f  t ip  BsjMb££e o f  1&p®%.
■i&%3&j& ttgr safesgip0Jit' spec5©pttt.tqii. tsgp .nil ,t
^ m m i a x l m g  t v i o  w & m  a ^ | o s t © s |  , f o  l o a g  iass
■feftmsa&aer W  ■•3ptoH|wrl0t flte ■•
■0 S S  - € M :  n o t  w a a t  it-# $ e$ &  $©: i(*tise$ a  o o f o r  a a  •
p ttso % I M i  ■ S t w i o s  ;« s t e U a t  p i t t e y  .la JEaase**^. 
j*o# ais i - f © i f '  f t e s .  l a  ' S o ^ ® % .  $ $  f a . t r o o o s ^  ^ t a a y l s t i i  
m s  on. th o  toafecsit fox* a $ f ^ 5©%. a s a t t l
* 1&& 'fssa*w * itoiik. teoaaai tl® Mm^tsm 
atasafe la. I t e ©  m  ’te ln g  vfo lie # '-» is lite a ^  wl 
o f  ifs© o M  J O f s e a o s e  S t t a x y i t y  gysfesi*'**
: A t.tb ©  c o ® ttt# © *s  SfStfe. agotifig.^ S iifM s  ^ a y t t f  yowioiiai, 
tbs jfc$t fe -Sfcs%s.r aaf ■■$&&&& tfcg tallest timt tf t!»
S U S S .  % « m M  a o o j s m i ©  $ «  o a y t y f a f  e m t  j S t ^ S s i f S a i s  f o t  a n
» ifb iy s » l.  o f f & m m ^ ;, $$ He' m m  is*
jfeiga t&ai tfa© ttefctsd S t a t e s  -ta&& oagg&rat&g- dug of Afet ate** 
t n . i a l a g :  g j ? Q t & e & &  i ? o a l s  1#  a c S ^ o C * .  .It n o a l 4  t b a ^  t ®  g g s o t t c « i  
t o  % & m m  t b s  % j ? « l s | | o  o f  $ & & $ &  t n  ©l3?iy§© t>T t t e
Ik tf» Coss&t%$& gomjmisl to m%@ w^m  %iso
f?33ft aa# tbs tggft 4 i? aft y s to ta tio a iu ,. t b t  l i f i i
t i im o a t io i  ago®. tha fstoi®i5r: tpj; til rdooorae&i 'toftsgĵ iofe o£ 
tits fosasysiy ©a s r o a a i s .  tfcat; tbs- Ci
5 -<&£!&f©‘iisplfets of tfasr
m ^-: ■:
a f c » s ® ^ 3 .
P-f: m u
m Ze in  {2 } achieve ■■the ains of' reestablishing: Korea
■as- m  idtegaaSoxst democratic stab© and center conditions for i 
tl# d&v$3&£a&a£ of the country along, %mooratie j^ia&ija»% 
a n d ' C 3 >  s t a t e  t t e f  " b b a  n e t i v i t r  -of t h o  ■ • U o i ^ s s i o h  n o t  o a l r  
■did-not cootelimte to tte holding.of tree eS&ctloas* but m  
tii© conteary resulted 1st the elections in South Dqx&a taking, 
place 4a. conditions of police restraint .and suppression* - Tm  
Soviet‘draft: resolution was' rejected k2- - 6 with. 3 abstentions*, 
2 ho Jniat r©solution BU W M te&2^ ■ £U%m$ Australia m SfM m  
'United States reooss^ndsd that tte Assembly steM. toe- .guided 
by three ccosifleraticms Cl) the iade;j?endsnce of ■ the- whole of 
Korea oust achieved with the least possible dalaFr -C2). Ind©~ 
pondone© .taasf to. granted to Korea as- an .integral. unit* .and' 
tho Assembly would '.not approve any plan which Mgbt wettaa 
the prospects of achieving the aigj% .and (3) the l.ss©#aiy 5 
would. lend tbs fyilosf support t© ensure that ©tery effort
t
■wm- mad© for- no^iliation .teteooa. tfce' two: nones* 'Ste Joint 1 
d r a f f  !f ^ . s o l n t i < m  ® s  a d o p t e d  b y  h i  ,**•- 6. w i t h  2  a b s t e n t i o n s * . ^  
ffes. First Comitteote report tflth a text o t the adopted 
rosetetton m s  considered at' the General Assembly*© lS6th 
plenary m e tin g  m  meeuMw 11$. 19W. ite Fin'anlon delegate 
..ferodiately d m r  comparisons t e f » ®  the southern a©a©f: itor© 
tlx© A s i r t e & s  ariigr a g i s t e d  bgr • « d i s o r © d i t : i n g *  t h e ' ' t m e m x  p © © p l %  
and. the sartfcsra sos% where the p o o p i ©  ©ajwsd a real '£sm#* 
do2%  achieving- stony successes in the. field .of *d&3fto&a$tea** 
tion*^ ’ ; * t
^%nited -S&tlcm yearbook* i$k8**k9f  283,
/■■.■ 1 ■ 1 ‘ ( _■-- -. ■
' ^ f e l t e d  f e t i o n s *  G e n e r a l  A s s e m b l y *  S f f t e i a l  l e c o r d s . .
^  1st part.* 3 0 8 2 * ^  '
In a tSfse sj««ei»s
f i m t  life f a a t s  h$$ ! » # & ■  ^  s a i  a ©  sj^gfefe
©otffesl ® X % a a  t v ©  ^ X f e X g a  e s s & g t  J s
■Ites% ©tat©®. the 3§jfe&e»Fassiss tipi of' ifet tfgiB
nii?sfe: sise't «fe .Xiipisifeti©& ©f:• tin? ©Xi ^©©tioss^ eX©at^fc% 
w & r  tfcgt m i  iife/tteitet' States vfeicii $ 3m &  at ©fasMrig 4©®3» 
© M  fciEalai: J3»feij Sores jfejfc© && MmuzSmm uiU im ^^A , *
':tgb& J&&2& teat X&t© eootheg* ioag ©©©s^aM cm 'if
'tife  M u  its # . g ts lfes ':p ^ l# is s  la  Scmlh^itopoa*.'
approving a Q«ia4iaa. .&Qg&tai& tiiiob. he# -fcfce’.e&&ofc 
w£ ©&■ the m w  G:m m M4im P, ©XX srnmh&m q£ -the
.siy ©‘iite the ©ssefi'tas ©f Cagm&st ajccd - tip USay?
SS% the ’peet&utioa. euftalited fejr fife ffest vis •
:sioptod fey m I toto .©f %§ *►■ %  •ififfe 1 ifesfefitts
.$ S©iX©i im ££ W£o& p%?3Saet f se "ttfe 't©®siiMf S©t#
-©f the Xtopgsteaiea m s  wte€ &$$& i® J®et©f ;8: M* *> $*
& a  ©©©©gfesi* 'X 2iSr the G © f 3 » m X  J i s f e i i s X y  i*e^-
'$£&&ttM. it© ioiifey if the js^rimi^y©©? rtiiPtfB# tfe© ppfeiai 
©f |p£̂jft .X?i§©ipî©©o% tni itatifc $ 'mmmA Sja&gesfc la M% 
liaXfiai?© <jf■ the ©iisy© Ifej&IXi© <sf'• Item fey tstel&Xsfaltig u
C©8iiimii», tfeM its £j?sfc ssstlag ia SatmX - la l̂feai-
«S3f 3 $ 0 # : & a &  m A ®  .iaaê lst'fti ©ffp&fea to ‘mtotwrfe the Baa©*
*%feia*f sm s* 
*****ŝi=;
-erat'ic F$opl0s_s fhe Soviet tlhioa nsf$- ye^hes-ted
ttjswsugk, the jfe^ias^Gengcgl to lenci its toed effloe.s- to- ' 
establishing aontaot tetme-a toe Comiosioa end the > 
llerth* ffae SmW* Qommmut did sot reply to-tbo tfaqa&st* 
traseMssicm. of 'a dl2?ae.tly: to 11 Sang,, through ■•
shipping etennsl% srla Hc^2®s%, m s  'tctttosf result*-- the •■• 
Ca3o&S£&o&& m<$ms&&. were to no avail m &  'they mm s m i l e  - 
to eoataet the 3ort&. Iami.n ems&mt proposals
mm ?©saiT83& fzm the Sertte coaoemiag .sesss of achieving 
JCttFean natty* they wore raiseted. as heing^immsietsnf with 
the Oanorel. AssembiyS's reeototions of grvemtet I5** 19̂7* end 
ifemsbar 12, 19t8jx
, Although the. .Be$hM'io of Eorea. fait. that they were a 
creation of the Hhited- Hati«% a&d therefora; leohed to- that 
lio-dy to. solve tissy of its pollem*. htill' t% refused to «o&-* ■ 
spwicdgo the Aoooiahiyis. racc^^sdaticms. that the Commission 
mm  available for observation- sr4 consultation in the farther 
■ of repe-mot-af i m  government based on the. freely 
expressed will of the people*.*1
fhorofomft the lepumie of S&coa did'net call open the 
Cosfiiig sloii fa? a M  .la mee t ing the dene loping- problems of 
- representative gov'ernmsiit* Cyagma Ehea made it orystal clear 
to the O0hb£39&c&  that lm' tiowed any suggestions for' Sorth* 
-Sooth 4iscmi5oios®t -even, unofficial^. as being ditloyal*^^
3%&ta6 Sations 29®*
7ai M d c„: 290*.
M  the im &  of this at.i--iiu<I©.s t o  aomsilssioii did not suggest 
m w attempt at eontaet with the lorth*.
Ito $sgM&$s$oti% m rn$M $M m  m m : tott
tli The ea&lttoroi propaganda. «a& hostile- as©*- lotions whteh mark the relations- bstoori the taw :porisr of Korea render to- proepeet wf unification rffi©e sad sof© • remote*|S> aa long as. the opposition of the VBBR to t o  #fiaasrta- of the Tfnitad nations Cosaaiesfoa to achieve to: o^attes- hf" the denera! tsseshXr resolution gf 12: Baoomfaer continueŝ . neltor a relaxation of hostile .nor any .otto mm f&cHi**
toe to m tostantlal degree the aehtoofaent ofimlfieatloao'73
The CosMlsslon aelcaoifledgod tot the antagonism
t o t o h  the $s$& stsi t o  itetoi: Stoop wtotofNt to he .one 
of t o  teiio Jsetos ttatei^ioi the present difficulties eon** 
.touting l*orean. hnifioation.<5. server* 'to CoE«toto also felt 
tot tte ”teoad©hlogn $£ the. BspuhXie of .Kfcr&aAs jwXIticaX 
Ik s * would it §©■• m o t  tot plotless- -Of' insurgent 'uprisings
tdUsMa 'to- ® & m to. would emhle it to play a. more «JV 
totlm  'fart In .toXtosg toflcatien* °fhe situation M  
Korea $$ now no letter- ton. it m s- M  the beginning and to- 
Ceslssim -had ant M m  able to W mMMmM the aehlersmmt of 
to- &kksk& ilsseisMySs-
Sueh. mo- to- pessimistic attitude presented to ~to- 
taereX Assembly at to- -fourth session -opening at £&&& Bue*» 
t o p t Hew Torky dtarto to- s o t o %  United lot too
Ingress M  -m M m % m  unification m &  independence Im&
t o n  ttaougiilr t e l o e l s e #  t e r  the  Soviet W m i m  for te t# e  gpi 
Just m  the  Soviet delegation ha# .stymied A m rte m  efforts m  
the  Joint fefsalssife* Th e  future £ m  Korean
iisdepejidsaee- and aaifloeilm' m e  still fei*,
m
felted fetelons uonstlieretelfe of' Korea. m i  not restricted 
to the feaeiĴ -Aseeiiilr#̂  fe -feiiaa:rr 1%  1$**% the  
feuncil a easmmt&etMm fitm  th e acting Foreign
JSnlgtef of the Bepublie of .Korea .making application for mm?* 
Mrship in. the felts# Hationss and declaring an acceptance 
of all. obligations of the <&8&*t@£».7& The application also 
stressed that the Bspiblic of Korea wap the direct result of 
the mndats of the General -Asreatelrv ‘
.Sss application laid doremnt until Pebruarr 15* 'When, the 
Soviet representative opposed Its inclusion in the agendâ. '0a 
contended that tha -so-called. Sepublic of Korea m & m  illegal 
$0®%wmhtg nothing teat a .puppet regiss which ha# been estates 
.listed ter the occupation £cm m  $m South. £qs#&* the Soviet 
delegate- ©feiceted to 'referring the .application, to the Com* ■ 
iilttae on the Mtiission of few* !<!aehecs0.
30 charge# that the .gDveriasfisaat. ha#, been elected hr .tere 
icsii fsXlMtmy i m m -0 to the of vhmnk m*%£m
rerrerlas on the lines of the- Iasi pieMseit©: $m the  fear***
?%niied fetlmg- mrnthmM* - ■ l8gc
tn  spite of the Soviet delegate5 s ejection#,.. the Security 
, Cotmoiiss .president* ;proposed to refer the item to tbs Vo®~ 
riittoe on the Admission of Hew llimbars* f M  proposal m s  
G&SSfaS&f, $ - * 2 *
At the ©oiialttteij w afctag  on W h*9$ the
tetot repostiitstfee- reflated the omm orpMit# which he 
hoi. ttsed In the fetteity -fiiihefiU %  addition5 lie charged 
thnt the feapeKosy Qmm&zmfm m #  alee ̂ illegal Imcmwe- com** 
sMomt$m. of the Korean qmstim by the- United latioas m s  
illegal*.'*1' In opposition. to the Soviet views* the point was 
£g&&&'1$r a im  mmbom of the Connell that the Bepnblie of 
Em m  m o folly qualified for i^#erhhlp mite- trtieie h- of 
the Otetey mi& stressed ti»t- it& G &m m t Issesidy had &I** 
r#My «3$g«£Sfed it# yfew# oa. the sXeotlons oni the Sagallty 
of the1 By « rote .of 8' - f * the approved
the -&p$&le&i&Ki ani- returned' it to the Security Connell f or 
.tether oonsMomMoiw
Gaee again before the. Security the application
on# dsnotuadsd vehemently by the Soviet ■tengnte* fhe Bnnsinn 
nlso sisgriXy th# f& m m - m m ia iag. in ite©#
#isS e$pp#$$&£ fel# M t  and dissniIsfb#Mo&. «lth the Aasritei- 
that- tte im c m  ;in tees not# there at
tM  request of the of S f » #
- Tm  ©fete## formal draft resolution which had reSf&sasndad 
the admission of the Bepnblio of ten# to -membership «ss voted 
*t£KE 1®?' the 'Connell* fhe resolution received f vote for -and
0: against* aod slsee one of the negative votes, wee that of a 
smmmm&t raeiaber* the resolution.- m s  m t adopted*??
' Coasurrsai to the Befublte of .Korea5 a application for 
KoiSerafoi^:. the -aewnritar Gtm&$X else readied’ o rotaoot for 
m t& axtfxLp t̂ '.cable frees the 'sinister of foreign affairs far 
the Ba!soer*atlo. People* s. of &»s08*?^ X%o days Aster*
liteisif lls. 19^9* the. SoriOt .reja?e-senta.tive requested tirnt 
the application be placed m  tt© COiajciî 'a- p?os*isiOQsX. ag$a&s* 
Xha United States delegate attaoted the application^ 
stating that the only roaopilsed -go®ori®at In Sores m §  the 
Bapiolic of Korea-*. the Soflot delegate contradicted tim 
ds&es&te-ts shares* Insisting tlm t the JiSiaocraiio 
People%  Bepublic had boon osiaMished -m a result of oll*: 
Sbsfeaxi aloofloas*
At- the goan&i1 %  hlGth mating^, the Saule t Union sub- 
sltied a draft reaolht.foo- that the applicatloa -tm
rsfsrred to- the CtmLttee for lew Members* the blrrsjilan dele­
gate .aepgjoTted the while the delegates' of <&$&&*
Cuba*. Camdar SssEMagr*, asl- &&$& .united -in opposition* gfter 
the sortot. -resoteition ft*& feeea rejeete%  8 .a’w ith-1 afc**
stehsfcioa* the Soviet delegate stated that the Aaglo-iisericmu 
*Ss|lieW: in  tim hecurltir §«moiX had- ceaaibted a naw act o f 
iniustiee against oiso of the oldest' 'peoples 'In A®ta*. who had 
e re rr le f it t e t e  might asst rseson te 'te  accepted in to  t ie  
batted ist tos * ^
'Sprite* o f M3mm 'ob&xp&& tx* ite ;
te s ^ ra i'I.s 0 0 ^ % %  w m & n& i 3%
19̂ $ * m i fla s fe la g  la #  ’B p S , ti#£ fe y s  t i»  Jt§^
-,sii^3.y TOisd craor jp rc^a ta fc io& g  to  Ke&ftoa - So t$&
ftg©w$&r m A  tfea gtife iiesi t& . ite  M . Sac,' f m li i lm i
Cĉ isfiisse .£*» ogmsMs^iioa awSt ssg©f%*^®
• B s r tli^ r  macaissiiOBs mat eooosim isg tfco
2 $ i^ 3 @ fti^ iw  im m  e o c tia a ^ i, is  i t e
f tm  m rf& ixiga l& tttoo t* SmptSMtosi* 2$*. mitd. 6«i©!j#3? S j 1*9^*' i i  
i t s  t& ird  is s iis g i tfaa O e ia itte a  m is i!ts i,f  %&.** 4 * 4 
3 f# s o i« iie ii fefesi% fe€. 1^ ife  J ^ Ilip g iiia s  B m p^sen istitm ^- is**: 
y it in g  f& s im lsg m ito i- fi?£S3 ill®  B©jft*tel;ls o f lissea to- 
p it#  t t i  t& a iis o s m s ifis  t&e- .:sfjgtei i©  Also#-
■it». C '#ia»itt#e 35 ^  7^ a -S oyls i dm B t ■^s©3a^.ie&:‘
iswMiiig' yojroesei&afciyo©. froa fete Ilfeitesm S&pibl..i#- feo 
aigadfes in  tfee G a s^ ite s *®  -tiscmasisms*.'
’•■ • fte gemrml ifetsais ®s oosiewcl sftmisd tw.dimft roso*
:lsii:fepa* ■ dafjiily fey ■tfes- IsiiM Sfemts% CM m $ tsatit
■tlis: Bfei3>ifip$aa% tfe®, « took &b£a ■ of Wm aî iasioas of' tte 
ggsyiess ijsmiasiĉs soporfc' eg* *#$£ mmtm̂ .. ifemi:- it®
.sfeosid sdstisas to fiaasilofi*, $te ’So^ist mstidalS^
that the solution of 3&®£mm unity iadopeodame m ®  to ■ 
task of the liorean people* and considering that the Cons* 
Mission^ g&tlvi&i&s as teing m  obstacle. to unifi­
cation. and therefor© shonll' 1© tenafuaksd*
lit' t o  debate ufaich followed* the'South tm m n  golegata 
rs#s©bted that tho tteltod fsfims steuM eomtto© its efforts 
t©Ward E e m m  unlf ieatio% and in vtof' ©£ -increasing: ipsrriila- 
.attadlsss from tit©, north.? tbs Qemml&simi ofcouli. ha augaieuted tp 
military observer©* Keeeover* he hoped that to- t2ato&' 
llatiohs would formally declare that its Isitor States %m$e 
responsible for his country* s security* ops urge to. aonsirfe-S' 
wh© m s ®  friendly- to the Se;fhbiie of Korea to give it to 
necessary military assistance- to e©pe with, t o  security 
problems, oanffecgit&g iif
The delegates- m $ porting' to Joiist draft resolution near 
sMefed tfaafc to- ■d.ossaissi® had fulfilled an Important task 
as a stahlisiag factor in those areas of 'Berea where it had 
keen jsrodfcted to exercise its tactions*. Other daMgsMons- 
.snpgortsd ths .Joint re.S:Olmtioafi hot there'was .am organ tod 
m fm m t ament fhea opposing'to recognition of t o  Be public 
of Kemt% as the c.omitryffa .national g-oyer.î nf»
•The .Soviet delegate oonfteed his. assertion * that to. 
©.©passion m s lllsgaly. and ■ that the ,%sterican refusal' to 
eva’custd its- troops, from Its sons w  the laaiix dabercnt to- /
(
t o  ©strklilistoat .of a -and Gesoeraiie- Eoroa* ©ace
iagaf% to. Comsissto. w  .adoased of &M ixm tha Hatred 
States 'la its eolo&ial |®sctice& toward to South .Soroa&s#^
Oa October 3* the Coisaittse voted % V 6 to adopt the ioint 
resolu.tioris tdille the Soviai resolution was. pejeetedg Mir .** 6.*^
' fba |4 Boe 'go&itical &GGs&t$ae*s'' report adatonM® t o  
draff m m iu t& m  adsjiM by $&.m & considered a f t o  ftsssBtoiy ss 
233fcl .plenary meeting on Oetoter 23? £9**$* along -wtfclf the M  * 
Hoc Political ’GoimLtoe'* a report,̂  t o  dsseiably also fend tte 
original .Soviet, draff resolution? itoefe had teen releeted 'by 
t o  €-c2Mitta%. and. .tiad dean for
33js -debate In. to' General Mstesfaly followed. the same 
general linos ' as t o  discussions .in the .Id Eoq Political 
Comittoo ?. and when the Joint draft .resolution. recoar^aded 
to. Cisasffcto t o  voted' afca%';*t m s adopted' da ~ 6^. 
dust OS' taSetiy and dseisimXi^ t o  dm»iil Kssaa&Xir 'rtlaotad 
■to- revised. Goviet draff resolution^, fe ** d?, with 5 abstentions* 
$;tas?. t o  General assembly cnXaiinsted its two .year policy 
regarding t o  fortunes of .Korean uaifys .and. avowed a continual 
interact;. by t o  appoiatoat of a G m m im im  to ’**{fe$&fento it® 
seat m ; K m m * ^  - ligfit •:SontliS''latarf. to- dorth Korea invasion 
of .South. Korea m s  a pressing;' item, on t o  Security Goamcilts 
■agenda*. Little «a§. contributed by to- General Assembly toward
% w a, as*.
Waited latito-*, Gostol aaso»blyf. QSZia&eCL. aeoor&s-., Plenary Keatings.* .Fourth Session* 230*.
tte pro^si of W m m  otlasr 'than perhaps fpcgasing
w o r l d .  f rt t m f r i m  o u  g o r i a t ^ & s e r i o M i  i l l s  in  i l m h  £ e a £ t t g u 3 a »  
f i m  fea&ic Jjstoase Serief~Ai^rlaaa rivalry c m & i o u & d  to.. 
Impede and' fiscally. desire^ area the im st- ootimistlo iiagas 
f o r  a  i e e t t X s ^ t t *
•!to- tfail&dftefciflsss- CJô iips.ida jit 'its .report for 19^9 
aptly susssed tap the sitimtifm wtes ft coacMed that 1Tvitfeoat 
a new/ effort t$r those powers to reach a p m a m n t  m  the fsss**- 
hloa of .Korea % ae sahthaatial -progreso tomrd the aefcieyeiaani 
of ta&fidstic® on the'hasis of tfae principles- approved lay the 
j Q e a e r & X  Assmtisfc? c a n  h a  i a a d e * 11^
m s s h i  m m m m . m m s m m
t
Outside the United Rations?. there1leisfe particular inci­
dents apparent to interested lust helpless observers* which
osp&asised the p?o$r#osiw of s#^lat*«te»‘rtoa
rivalry- in Koma*. ^h©m’eiXeaXXy s. the problem of Korean 
indefssndenee a s  before the General Assetftelf* 'teat that world 
agency mas unable to eontribat© to a lessening of Soviet- 
&99?£c8& nttftodo# toaird tte Sorem matter* fbe govliet. Union 
siaftf' refused to i^oGgatsn tte- General participle
tt& a  fa Xbrsa* and ec^tinued with a solution of ft# pressing 
proteleis of achieving complete Xsmerican withdrawal from tb» ' 
southera son#*
Mhtle tte Soviet Tinian fostered, »» ■inemasissglj 
antly -snft economicaXXy strong Uesoeratie Peoples's. Bepitellc5 
fte United States 9 aware mow tfe&b possible cooperation with 
the .Soviets in  uniting. ICoi’Oa was £ & $ & %  vainly atteiiptM to 
correct &a& msg&j&mx&i ttetr of the. js&ab ita#' years
by «m ineffectual aid program.. which is#' not endorsed, by the. 
American omgress*. Mhile the Soviet Union extended credits 
and aid* .both ecoaoinie ®m military*, to it# northern ixoiega* 


























































































all troops W  the -end the year* I feniafiii *ts9ti£&3y $m®**
'Iat tea rejected the Soviet proposal9 andattempted to a-p*. 
preach the subject,somewhat more -cireuiaspeetly* proposing 
that the lisKfem troops be witMvmM.m® soon .as -practicable*^
Such a policy was not acceptable to the. Soviet Union, 
end during the following year* lf*f8s. an unending sires® of 
invective poured from the pro~Soviet press and radio through*’ 
out t&e worlds condemning the United .States policy m  regard 
to troop withdrawal*. flie American military gorsrnsiettt aae 
hocused of Wlltog a "puppet, regime" in- South Korea, from 
which the United States intended to strike .against the S m M t  
Union*
Aacoi^ingiyv the Sorief Union. addressed a note to the 
United. States government on September 18s 1#*% two days 
before the formal opening of the General Assembly °s third. '' 
gssbl«% in which the Soviet foreign minister lasted that' the 
Supreme national assembly of Korea had on September' 109; I$ S 9 
addressed itself to the USSR and the United States with- a 
request for the. simultaneous ■and immediate withdrawal, of 
S'0fiet" m d  jter&aa troops from the Korea® peninsulao2 Ifer#**- 
emx’v the Uresidinm of the' iJSSM: considered this act ion possible 
and had tnstmetsd the Soviet Council. of Ministers, to Initiate ' 
the mofoitent of troops so that the evacuation would be non 
blnded ty tte end -«f fh -a formal t#nefi the Presidium
United llationsj General Assembly., .Official Bgcorfts* Plenary Meetings,. BecoM Session*.
%oreg|is Indeuendoncel gar Eastern' Series, IS,. lib*.
«XS9~
or t o  Swgpsm Soviet expressed tbs bops tot tbs «g®visrffe~ " 
m m i of the fb&ted States of America would also $gr&fe to - ■ 
evacuate. American troop® from southern Korea within this 
piJ*iod«^ ■ ! * t o  renewed Soviet proposal msreeolved with soi® gm*=-
jirto in .tortoo qg£&ter%. but m s  ititofreto. to n̂fist. tot
t o  Septets believed that t o  '8aB8can&$& $eo$&*# BopsMio
m m  bad. safftsSant t̂oagfcb. to stand toaldtenh t t o
■toisto tot- te be!toad t o  Baited States could sot te
Into t o  ievint &&»■£* -to would sot .agree ts 'm m  ~
Soviet ̂ oto®l -concerning Korea *.
©a. Soptoher %  19^8* t o  State Department released
s. formal M i t e m t  of the ’Hottod States position on the 'tttto*
drawa! of occupation tones is Korea^' Ibe statement oelbXy
and formlly announced to the Soviet worM that It .bed tos ’
tte “consistent” view of t o  United States government that
to'Mot interests of the 'Korean people would'be ’‘served
tr t o  withdrawal of all • occupying forces from. Korea *$- to-
earliest practicable date*, ” furtbenaores. this view «
osiboiMd in. t o  General Asseublsto resolution of fevosher ,13%,
X$3f?$ in which provision was aade for such withdrawal nas
soon m  practicable -after the egtaMlstont of the Korean
§ which St m s  the intention of tot resolution
to Ming info being*** t o  soviet Union # 1  also lectured for'
3»ia., 115. 
bftia,. H 6i
$m& i t  Am m m fjrt&c oat tea jiw^isioiaa o f tee"
o f itô fos&o? 3k* a^%  'tho ip s ^ c m -o f t?t»o$r 
.dsmfat ^otsM &d&fefcXoo& iaire 'tea n M m ^  '
1 Sigkfc 4aa?&-affcos* -f»be gt&toM &’Ovso&oa&o* %l»r SMM; .§#* 
3K&tttia& .fw?aaBr «ajsw*r©tf tb *  nmM-  'note* o f 8&$Mfce»- 
Wm §y » ; Itejfesrteat acrte &t&to$ tfe&t' tfio tfeii©€ 
isssfrftiXt. teat tfto -q̂ s&ixat-vt trsogp igiM$dmm2.-‘Wm& a $«&  o f ‘ 
%tat largoa* ftttstl0H. & f ^Sm &m unity* usai |^5a^aaaiic»,*‘ and 
sMai: saa»«ligfe tootH y* ftti«rfe its  v$sw wUtl te- $eosexi£ed ob 
the* a fjro fris ta  &3&o t<r tfte ’lfiil,te€ $$£$$$' dteZogot* to  tte  
GoiiaraX
gjCtflat' tsiotSeo fttr itif. £&o :Gmmml iisiMhZsf®# tetiri. 
mmSxm m m  f i i e M  to  M n to  M l ««&*
tamSat. aiisaSt&aamia tgmw w iftfesM it trout Mmm*  .Srnifi m 
pofiJteg' wm  df«tmts€' fo r oo; oteoa? jsirfoso 'tin® to : acw ^,ieala" 
assisting Koreoa « i  to  o&ta's’oos jyssrioas is iil^
tsazjr tqsPBOO ubifife jN»»teei in  X&eifc a t the laafst#i»o -of- tea , 
ia fttb lia^a 3oa$0$&« - S*»0^offtot- ■ %e®m -*gg$. $od$o* tofcofcbor wttfe 
%M#l©^|!se oaxgp&SgBg*? %i*is:ftfeay oftstgod ®*g^loas t i ^ i #  
isaP uM ls tte  Settot faroos- oaasggmttsiy Stem. '-tbo
- £<$&* %  SeiseiffM 3 %  mmm%,
. x^soiotfesi Mtete- tea $&tts& ®mm$jmAMk mu.
Wm.ifetto® $batog ¥4asr ttiet ©eoopa**-
Wmm the teginniag of the ‘octepation?. American authorities ted 
regard©#"' the ley to  South. Korea-°s internal security as hteag, 
the -state of readiness aaalatefised W  Xerten defease fm m 3 ^  
ratter than, the prospect :of; the continued fmsemte- of A m rioB n  
occupation troops* Accordingly,. the American occupation ©#«*-' 
fieers ted directed their efforts toward training ate etjuipiag 
o rsspeefehle -security fere©*
Beginning with, a mli~ir©;|u©i ©at ■ thoroughly iopsi eon*. 
stefcuXatory of 26f 000 under Jtmeriean ailitnry. g€^orm©o.t} the 
Korean forces were allowed to' grudtaally expand. until they ®  
'terte appro2£iitmteiy lOOjOGO- mm* fttfcl scale expansion m s  not 
permitted until -after 11»- fm m fo lm : -of -fcl» 'lepOftie- of J
t
August 3Js.s, l$ k 8 n Consequently, the Soviet proposal was 
timed to catch the young repiblie .hurriedly onlistlng. young 
mm M  m- attempt to teiM up tteir forces* The Korean con-* 
statelatory^ which cooprated w ith- the mticsml folio© fore© 
ia tesWcaining- law .ate order,. were we li~tr allied ate .fanatically 
Icy&l to the South Korean Bepublic* Organised under the a&» 
ministration of-the South Korean interim gmreriuiBnt, .all up* 
'g t im n ts 'm m  ©sfefuily screened for political; beliefs -tef-er© 
ttey war© sworn’tat© the opaxtry%.sewto*
In contrast, formation of the South Eoremi arsy ms- under 
the suprvisioa of African ussy officers mo- urged that -appli­
cants te given a- physical e:ptsdmfion,. and not- cuostioned
his paitetei telfefs*- Sy .ite uss «f sscfe.- «dte8a>*-- 
©ratlcu iMthodSj! many coaisunisfcs ate titter symp.thiser:s in«- 
fxltratod into the -South Korean'.-arty, where ttwpr contrite ted
to. 'tereirl eng. mltfmteXy* revolt*. 13.1 t fused efforts by these 
o^csis^ists to effect a $ou$ clteiai within the awsr*. together 
with the . incamsiag nrtte-E of m m m aMt .guerrilla hands which 
controlled large -sectors in .isolated- South 2 M i  districts^. 
m m pted the Saticnai Assembly on M tresaber 20 „ X$%% to pass 
a reaolntion. urging. the continued presence- of American troops 
until the. ro$&ihXle*s security forces were fully rnpda© of 
mimte-teimg. .internal. security*
Korean fears war© not. appreciated by tte DepartsBnt of 
Jlrhy*. which announced five weeks afterwards .on Oocenter 2Sf;. 
its intention for an early and cample to withdrawal of £jbsjp*. 
can military forces from.Korea* The statement pointed, out 
that this was. la conformity with the- &ss©rafeXy'{s
ro0ointioES'j «n& further cited that, a revolt -of ,fdissMsnt 
elements1* in- the South. JCoBeaa axsgr had teen, efficiently and 
x̂iickly pat - down by the corstabuXstory, tf-m .indication of the- • 
capacity of the native security forces to defend the area 
alonco'*̂
The Soviet "Snioa. mads .am. appeal to ©XX. Korea on Dec&&>' 
ter 30> 19̂ -8 j Wten It amounted that it had complete Xy' wifeh»- 
dram its troop 'from Mmbh Korea*. Tib. communist regime In- 
ifer therm M  ted sttengthened strategically ty tea ewer** 
whelming successes of the Chinese d-osMmists* Two weeks 
after the Soviet - withdrawal^ ttepls^aimtang mnmotifbod the 
less, of' f least in5. and. ragari©.& that Chiamg. mi-Sfeefe. m s  : •
%3®rge it McCime * Korea. Thiaar* 2€6*
■~X93*
filling to enter Into 'peace with the 'CMncse 0«t*;
Scinists.s M t  on M s  own titrms-*.̂  Tha Soviet sponsored regime
to If or thorn Korea m s  further hound to 'Moscow by th» &$pa£n&*
Hgrnt of eoioaol-General Tarentyi Shttkov s.s namMss&dorR to
the Democratic PeoplMs B©public* Egriftg served as tho
Sotfiob re p p o ss iita tiira  to  the  IM iib  Copm issiha fo r  n e a rly  20
months* the now ambassador m s  mil acquainted with his-.'-tbsti#®-
in. fforth t&6&$i9 together with M s  government's policy toward
th© BepubXIe of. Womm*® Continual Communist propaganda la*
cited President Syngman -Ihoo to bitterly attack the north
Korean regime and its leaders 0 He denounced as i,l£es,? tbs
.stories published in Moscow that his had givem-
the .United -States industrial leaders control ■ of 30% of South
KaroMs economy, Bhs-o predicted that the heads of the Sorth
Korean government mmM soon-be plmoad" Jftei?ore the firing.
9squadn for their- eytmf-s against the Eoroan people. *
^UUch was the sitiiation 'in Ifc^s-ia-yum 1% lfM?s when 
a Department of State Bulletin aimameed. that the ^United • 
States- forces will soon Mm- 'aeooaplishsd their withdrawal... - 
from South Ee©©a»w *?hree weeks later? hte last 8,000 of an.- 
cstimboi- 5$ $080- jyssricaa troops which- had landed in South 
Korea -cm- September 10? X$%5$ quietly withdrew from tbs 
.peMnsuim-:t. leaving only -a. Soman Military Advisory Group 
€KM&Gl$. consisting, of afprcesl»te^ $80- & w  per s o w !
% i  2§a UsS?- Z m m tsr 12, 19%9S l» 
t m , . it.
tit'mt as an- lin k  to- t l ie 'SopaMio o f & o r e %  *
m&- to  :In s tru c t W&mm- M  the. m o  o f dm eriean m ilita ry
30o-gwipaxni which was Ming transferred to their government* - 
Although the raspsctlv© osxmpyins artaios M I withdrawn fx-m 
bteir- sones, leaving a' highly iuflawnmble situation, Sot SbM  
,tear lean rivalry continued through economic and- Miliary aid 
to the Ir proteges*.
■ n x
Both, the -Soviet Union and -th© United states provided aid 
programs.'to and. further their policies in the Korean
peninsula* f M  record of their 'assistance to the Bsraoeratic 
People* s Be public and the-. Be public of Korea is indeed indi­
cative of the regard which the world, leaders held for their 
creations.*. certainly the rivalry -grew more indirect and 
-subtle under the guise of aiding the Horth mjl sooth Koreans®
%n Mophratioa for close cooperation and nsdar'sisnding 
between the. north 'Korean government and-the Soviet Union,
Kim: 11 Bung petitioned the Soviet Union early is I9l*-9 for an 
audience with Stalin* Anticipating a Soviet- invitation to. 
confer with its. leaders, -Sis SI Sung ■presented feis ©sMsef 
"With the thro© issues' which' M  had decided, to- discuss with 
■the Soviet Uniont - (1) -.'the import- of" asachinery m & spar© parts 
frosa the Soviet Union?~(2) an agreement for economic, cultural-, 
and. tscteoloiisml asistance^ (3) the estabiisMorrt of
•“'1 9 5 -
credits. in order to control the prto of imported gootfs# ■ 
During the last week. In iebruary*. 19%'? he an& six
cabinet mam'hors flew to Moscow where they were received at the
M m o m  airport fcy foreign -Minister Mole%ovs •&«&. treated., with 
considerable respect and honor Erring tteelr stay la the
Soviet capital*- the' ioviet.-g’oreaa agreesmnb*. which was signed.
m  March '20, X9%3 bound the north Korean economy closely to 
the Soviet, Union,* the Month .Korean gpvurnitsst was promised 
-credits asc&mtiag to .212 million rubleŝ . tn he paid m&T- a 
period of three .years bsginaitag July X* 19%s -and was to be 
repaid, at. 2 percent interest daring the three years following 
July 1, i952«^ fbe interest «as esgotly twiee that deimniod 
a year later from, the Bed. China5.s PaopleM gbveraiaetifc* "f©~- 
.getter with the- credits, Stalin. proe&aad m  m o z m m s  trade 
increase, between the two countries*
On the day fellm-fing the signinĝ , a Pravda editorial, 
eeiogissd the. agreement nsm- MLL m  the other agreetBhts
" * *
signed during' the sojourn of the Korean delegation as eor*» *. 
responding to the vital. interests of tte- poop.es of'the-two' 
oountries.5Mnd the. agreemnts ̂ opened wide vistas feu* future, 
economic and cultural Cooperation hstween the Soviet- Union 
and. the Korean. Democratic People5s Republic*Mother' 
important feature m s  that the. agreement provided for-.
' lipayho-i '78*
^Ihid*-, 78. -.  ■* . •■* . • i
~3prav&u l^rch 2£L$. te*p?4iit©d In tevfot Jfc&ss'
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the forth Korean Desoersfcto Pe0pto% '£*&&!;& m & fm t'm r  
strengthened' W  cooperation with the IJtotoos© So»a®sitots»- On 
Mm %>% X 9 ^ s■ the Chinese g.owarn0®»b% official Central Bswe 
toiaay aeelere& that the GbS&tm Ccmmmistn 3aadt sig*@d m 
mtual defease- pact with, the-- “Bnssiaa a$oiis<ttft3 forth Mmmm 
a M  had fhrtoer pledged -ait to- M&ms®- €&«MUt&8 to 
tbe «joint struggle against itoiloaa saS Bsmsfc iB®#rlallaa.''19 
the news rep^t stotoi that toe serto Sorem pact fgo3&$& ftor 
defense against aggŝ fihtoJi. of whatever nature* |otoi 
action-against an attach so either* snpply to lorth Korea -Of 
srp% sat ©rial 5 and m n p o m r  -fr«« Ifehctoia from Jt&y %  $$k&?
pato August 3$ X9$M*
If this newspaper report were true* it xaaaat that eon* 
mmist forces wore' Ito&ed to «u nnbrotam «rc stretching: across 
M&'&mm. Asia* 'and oonfrontei: only to§r AraartoRn occnpsttlon troops 
to Japan^ the embryo PepnbXie #f" Korea.* and Chisrig Katoshel£cs 
fettering ragJte*. St «i; apparent that to©’ goriei«ereahe<t 
Doscoratio People Pepihlie m s  an integral part of tbo
#o?tot -Union*'® far Eastern policy*. -which toad steadily and con~ 
sistently developed daring
I f
ttorto lorea wa© ;p*®to%ly' gmfltafe loss .fcg&afeaft. topon 
totoraat-: economic ©onslderattono than m s  Sontb 'Sorm#. By 
¥ feto© M&: greater fee&vy Xntostri&l dereXopment and its:
•%hs 8 «  i^fe i;iasav, « ksf 6* 1S»% ?,-
“ W n  7»
suf@rS©r jB&it&ftt la m m to. m f e a l  resources*: the norths 
eni republic e©old profeabXy Iswssfifc .& substantial. exporter , _ 
mt industrial raw .mterials with less effort than could" the 
.southern republic*. fh© South Korean eansum r hoascboM 
Industry was vitally effected by its relation to aorttem 
®ere% and it- Was apparent early M- tfeft occupation th a t %tm- 
m m & m  at the teriean-spc^ored rapahlle would be deter** 
ained by American ©conoialc aid*
9 sm  the beginning of the occupation through July.* X ^ %  
the felted States spent or obligated ©wa? 250 ailXSeim tor 
lores® assistance*^ U m t at this sum we®it tor such »s* 
saatlai items as- food;, fertilizer*,- and agricultural supplies* 
feill Beoeffiber* 3$%8$. ail -ecouosiie aid. Whs md&e the adminlse 
tratioa of the Bepartswat' the- Af8$rt; and m s  appreciated 
J ^  * g w » a w ^  and relief in Occupied & m m *n M  addition 
to this appropriation^, the felted States negotiated; m .*2b£a»- 
tial Financial and Property feitleauent A^eea»ntt:t' under which 
St agreed to pay .to-- usast of the produces ordered from Japan 
fbr the Korean people,, felted states relief also included 
a# a .gift to the Sepiblie of Korea various .«tso©li«©ons^ 
asseb% including 101 locomotives valued at 3S millions^ and.. ‘ 
approsiriitely • 2*v Millions were to the Korean govern**
ip»% Jm fall fur debts incurred by the Amn&cagt no**
onjsitlea forces telag. the menpitloa*^
til© fliii
- 2 0 i ~
.teisrleam mom of occupation. in a&ft ”.i tonld like to
mto it tew plain tlmtg .yes.5. tore ¥411 t e a  to' to a Korean 
ĵ ogratms m. there had. to he 0 |&Qgrai& la the ttssf ton zoos of 
0aaramw*n^  Such awareness was net shared bf ̂ ndentorg0 s
colleague s9 for t o  following Boatlî  Senator Styles Bridges
?
.angrily demanded that? nfQogfssa bo told how such Is pXafmed 
for foreign spending instead of toing asked for mousy in dribs- ■ 
and 4r&to»t,:So
Although t o  Sooth Korean oooaomr waa recovering soma~ 
tot- from t o  offsets of t o  disastrous divisions still the 
19^ production was far below the pre^lltoration level® H a w  
Industries required new &.q.axpmntf : M  addition to the countw's 
needs- M  petroleum* fertilizer*. coal* m w  rubber* ai6
certain. foctistoff a® Without luaerican a l %  there u s  e serious 
'disewpeuer totoon south. Kortes escorts m A its tsost funda« 
laantsl retirements for imports* jRbt 'msAy « s  t o  southern 
mxm poorly .supplied with -.natural resources*. hut the exist-* 
tug. resources; were- not mll^domlppsd fen? exploitation* She 
South Korean eeonow ¥»a tightly inteinioven with t o  northern 
m m *  mad t o  entire, peninsuia m s  tend to t o  .Japanese t o  
dustrial eoonow* A lack ■©£ basic industry and resources in. 
t o  southern gone created * ; disproportionate eeonow?. and to- 
tost Intentions of -to South Koreans could not correct this 
situation* ftore, m s  little doubt tot if t o  Bepublic of' 
a?ib.ta., 3W 2. 
a6ibia... ?»»•?.,
'“SOS’®
I « a  w  to survive politically and economically^ It nonld 
r#e<l a. strong aîl. aid program from th© United
Statea*;
Oa Seeesher 10* I 9 ^ s' adminls ty a t ion of Korean a id i M
relieved. from the Pspartseiit of ABsy and timnsferred. to the
Economic cooperation Urogram* Under this agreement* the
United States, agreed to m m m - the rospoasihllitios foe- a®*
slating the. sooth Korean gorer-oiasot in financing- a long**.
range economics rsimhillMtlna program*.
fhs fruE&a adialni Stratton repeatedly urged the importance
of • aid to Korea, and .in 19^9* a 1*?0- million dollar pro®
gtss m s  talcem into consideration -hofore the Ooiaeiittee on
27Foreign, Affairs in, the Horse of Bep?es©ntmtlvits*. As a part 
of the to-gtisgscr accompanying this b|lls 0©cratary of Stats 
;Bean Aohasoia warned that the south Korean govertaaont t&x&d 
fall *withla three ao&tfts4* if economic assistense i^ra not;.- 
provided*^ The Underscoretary .of State also advised the 
CosBslttee aaa&ars that "without a, ©oaf tenet ion for the -ffm * 
sent of outside assistance the Korean ac&B&ngr wcrnl£ suffer
a rapid and Sm vi.t&M e
In spite of these timings,; the i&raaa. .situation received 
scant attention fees the tot congress during the first session* 
fhera xms a gmvaSlixsg a M  .see1*' attitude in the light- of
other far- emsiora developments, notaMy China* the &mr$mm
■ sS& to .+ . 192,
ignored ttowiatoi; of toe of Womm
economic aid Mho declared that rtth© %pjMic of Korea could 
n o t stand up without til t& m  the United 3tato&» to reply 
to the qwstion of' what the- Korean situation would fee. to'.a. 
ftof If toe: $^ta& $£«$*& to® not stoato-aids. to doctored 
timtt
.I" do not know Mhother the civil war wooto fee over ljjr that ttoe or toot there w m M  most 
certotoJar fee « civil w : to Korea* the dtooo%« t e  to- which victory weaM go to pretty oto&rw*^
fto admlatotrator of' Korean mS€ stated iurttot that the odds
toftoitoto favored ito ioiwffeioto tofetog over too pr̂ niihto*;.
Ifelcr General € her too 0*. Hotoicte*. former Beputy Milton'
^m rnm m  cm em vod with these ofeservatloas an® added tfe&to.
If' t h e  : l a s s i ^  d e c i d e ®  t o  # s s %  t h e y ;  . e e ® M  t als e -over South. Korea wlthottt any great military dlf» ftoolty,, they mm- right there with, largo armies* toy troops that ■ m- im m  there wtold suffer another 
&ota.n03Q
M m m  ospctoi® fey 
IiiiiSttoa' on® ftofeerman ms®.. Idsitol ̂ eddr!®^ c M  personnel 
m w rnm ntm tim s- of the Jotot Chiefs of Staffs when they tm« 
tolsstody agreed that to wohM tot: to wise to Keep troops la 
We&mfcfr tofetog; Into m tit oos^tttouo aa$. lotoat^
tol world, mmm&m- -of too Hotted .itotoo»5i-
toto- •$w&i$3a& civic© to® cot- w a y  too Slst
«&bg*d*& and offcrto to enact Xeglstotolem provMing Jar Korean, 




istod W  t o  s®»p*©:ss isr'to tte§ ihS3,t Ofc Oe&olftr11%
t# *%  :ii*M i# to ' .1^3 %tis «M $a&  taade- 30 'JB&Ui&tfc 4£$2&fe8 
amiS&hih .for tbfr parSM. faS r 1 to  Ctettor 3% S#§#j as® -■on 
Catcher 2%  aiKJtte-.30 a i l l t o  4gUL&?s rnre pr0vi4e4 fo r »  
toiag fettor S%, 2#§ to Mtemaaor 1 %  I&Sfck Otort^sitol. 
critSes o f  the a ^sx ln ls tm tM n  m&t&3?&& suffieSs&t sto h g il* t® • 
jemont :t o  passage of' * 60 aSJSto- 4oll.ar .for
t o  a£to i ^  m 1 2 .
O to iiP  ee©gr@s% tlm Mmm  vote $ri# reoeftfei. w ith 
4isaaTT3 aa4 press oritiefsfsg. o f the M1XSS: 4sfeat « m  strong, 
f  fee. .iit ie it to  gpi -^ io i^ o a f rr^otlcsi: to  the 4 a to t asssrod 
to - &4ainistration9; aM  Sts aepahlieaa advocates of' ooops*^
Y , '
t i t m  t o  o ^ t o s t o t t o .  So- foreipi. ofSoSf%  t o t  t o
fe£& souM ho X0«tt«^£f$eretf% 00 fehroar^r %  S$S% 'to  Mmm
£tolSr approved a 60 M l S l m  dollar approp^iatSoa vhSch
.»
ossteislet m i$ m $ x  f t o  3 %  4f$9* the ISIS eoataioM t o . w *  
msto. j a ^ t o  that $$& should 'ho 'to a to te d  ;|lii» t o  eveht 
of t o  fototisa -of -a eoalitto govereasmt «&&&. tolsdas one 
- o r  m f e g f t *  o f  t o - S i « 3 t t t o  f l i i %  o r  o f  t o  i s r t r ' » »  i ®  -so®*, 
t o !  o f t o  go^rnaaan* o f Barth Sereo,*^
O rttlo s  o f to ; t^ Ip S ito tS cm %  Koreaa old program 
t o t  t o - t o t o i  s ta to - M t® r to ®  m
totoJo1*5 la Sooth Kor©% -m& m m sm ^ t o t  t o  Qm m m i&t 
m & m  In to- toth w ® M  t*$& ■®v@r t o  smmmm. ■$m®mmm% 
hefto- too .tog* 4 m m $ m  t® t o  S t o t o  m i  0 m  ogpioissed
b y  the Aaarleaa, $S.ste% b m A c  i r x m
m -|?tp tobaits ite $&? -1%®%#, sftes; te s to to f t t e t  '***$($' ;jeobli83s 
■of ttefsr East certainly icill mot $» sottloi. if jywfc. Ctestsl 
and $&$. o tte r  .Far Sms# n a tio n s  .s i#  fMok -jsm& hops t te  b a ite d  
Bt&t&B, 'nesH oopc with the situation
' l&£t* tte faitm# ttfttfljasr fm&KhsS. Sfes mf" lim m tg b -mm fa* 
*&$»»$& ©so&omfs sis «$$*$$?' Iteiafteter w
nil to .furnish the BopuMic of Stew with military. assistance;* 
fte resulting spograia accomplished nothing loiamt haiMing m. 
la S llta r ily  strong and capable He-jmbliw
Military #o tte -f«tii S M & &  urns
4M$MbM lath ig& s|ito®3%. (1) that .teaiste#.. mmfe the Mutual 
ffefbastt Assistance it# of 1$*9S- M  (2) that .ftraftsted. dwfsg 
the fiscal IS^O* t®r the transfer of' ©q»ip®ont s p m  the
-of Agtsmiem -oteftpatiem fhssisa#^ 431 the mssl^tote 
*&$ js^totst. upon # € tots <m' the 3tae*& «l3,.|#aŝ r
forem # m m  to  bo m  in te rn a l, s e c u rity  fm m .a its -  o% nim ont
ms- to be such as mold permit tte &ev&X.o$s$nt of a. weXX« 
tmteofi fore© ubleh uowM p^serre internal, ’se.cw.lty*. pretent
&»£&$ -m€ ■*$»■ Sttis $iis£ls% «ai.
,*
imter mriih€ -0® otter mgpessiet* hr tte north
$&g$a8»*
Wum the. baited States occupation forces- w e  utthtam 
from the peninsula %  f u m S; X9**9* they loft behind them
m S M m f m & narti, *&§«&-.«troasfirrtft t® the ■ -
■ • .,. -T- ■
% £ ! & >  * 2 5?-
Is© to the Mom-m ge¥om~'
-a©$u
'33*9 extent .of iste |a?og£aia;t*as in relation,
to the rust amount of «ld _ g lm n  to the northern regioe by;- 
the iwlet Union during the five years* X9b5~50* homvar* 
certainly the greatest deficiency under the psro'graâ  and om  
that was virtually ignored by the United itate% t-ias leMer*-. 
ship and - training for the- ̂ trained South Koreans*. A token  
group of 500 Ask* icafis ® s  created in order to instruct the 
South Koreans* but this’ group freirod totally imdeuusbe in 
terms of the ext sting -situation.,
■ Historically* there lad not been a loreafe o t t  since 
1900* and- during: the Japanese occupation the K m m m  were 
■not- permitted to -possess fireums* m ob less he trained in 
their formal n m *  E m m . during World U-ar Xf,r E & m m  effort 
sad piptiolpii ion. in the Japanese %iar progratt m-M limited 
t&- m m r n m  late- batafclisiis*
the- sock a n y  - e-reef ed in South Karen by issuing equip­
ment to the. .soonest of recruits could hardly he cc^pared 
to the Soviet -organised Berth Korean arisr* which m s  ra~ 
ported to ‘he in- excellent fighting condition,
{Sk^B, til
a w m m -m  n m m m
i
Tim Hovietereated lortera regiias ana the 
sponsored Southern Bepublio*. and ©©cmoite- expreosioiis
©f telr- v*63£0b&2; m?m only a mgnJJfteatton of -
rivalry te©ughoui all Sastea Asia* tfels riyalry tMs 
initiated by jim T tm n  conm sslom  made to Stalin at faltas 
s M ; its. M a t e y  during: the following fte years is a disasir- 
G$$ and sorry Teeord «f insffeotmalities. a M  inconsi steaei©©*. 
IMP© is no cosparatsm heimsn tbs lEirrieari policy toward 
'Step© and its ooimtepart serosa tbs vbirii*-. HUil© former 
.pMiae sinister CliureMlX rand 4&m the 1Tircm eitria,inrt at 
Fulton* ItesmiM*. on April. 6?. X9̂ d.§ ami.-.a eterotf terteti 
policy stiffened 4ft Bu£o$&$ te*,* O^co-Stor&isix aid.
.Seriia air Xiifc| the -smss- Hnited States abandoiied CJjiaa* 
to the Ceramists* Maciirihur succeeded la building a stent 
mti^emmm±sm. redouM in tte tayaaos© Islands eonearreni to­
te- M m vM m  is. tM $m * \
E l  V \
<\■j i V
As- early as X9M% sueh a Soyiet-AiasriGan rivalry is. i
■ ' • * iAsia m s  accurately jredieied t® the Hated States -Govern** d 
wm& by. Osteal B©«§te MaoArtte^ t e ‘doubtlossiy tews . ’ \
ff» Pacific tfisHcaî r other African* Hi an angry
Xetfc$% to- wrote ttot 'the ■Flaiiife %&*$&&& ito Ptolfie with
their IsiXXipGO -of IntoM tents will deboirato tto course of
X-history for- the ton ttonto«§ years.* It?©n tofors tto
Salta Ctoi%toisto$ to warned that 6%sXi« also M  that.
FtoifX# picture an# little fighting in .Btooj^/toa actually
XodMhg over M s  shouldor toward Asia*. Sto Suss£$ns m m -  ,
dotomteed to m m m &  the BP#S'0**̂ a|̂ >iisto Wto* and ro^ottiSro
Fort Arthur m  a waro^htor outlet on the JlsoXfSo* MacArtfat»r-tts-
StosiE: ami iBpassSonata warning- went unheeded by those <teter-°
sfeiing jterioan. Far Sastt&m poX icy* as did succeeding obser**
nations by other reputable observers.
Xn !fay* 19^5, tofofe frest-toiit t W '  departed for hit
Potsdam Conference with 3iali% tho hm ri,cm  j\®tbaasaSor to
tto Soviet Union voiced a mttiing. coacerniag Stol#t Stoontioss'
la the Far S&ssfc* Sterc&feR stated to -satisflid the
BUtofam- would enter the Pacific war tocstiso -of -.their repulto*\
m ists in the Star Bast (Salta )'Tt and to- also belie wed tto Soviet
tfcetasft' greatly feared the Baited states w M  eouelmle a peace-
With tto Jajssnoso without Soviet participation* Purttormores
*0*. St was Important that we-to tormina our policy 
as., to a- strong or ̂ fea& Chiims ttot if China -ee©** firmed ’» l *  Bussian inftonco would .ptoo' 'Sa qulchly and toward. ite nliHaate domination <><,» tto.ro ecmici '. 
to no illusion about anything- such as a llfras-.Chinan
■~2S.{K
tte follcMing My  at a State igs&felttĝ  m»*$a8&
^slssod his ooatefitim-ttet fcte Ttoited States- should
bate a clear outline -of .its far Hastens- polisgrv Ha- tetter
that ■ the falte Agt&aag&t should te
»«<> in. light of tte ISact ilmt Russian bad hot observed its pert or that- cnmte&af f and also in tlie light of the cassation of iiostlXitios .& ' fufop% 'which barn ebaaagot tiba jitter of fact cm 
ublob that agreeuant m s  tern*
Harriaan concluded uith the penetrat'teg question of i/aat tbs
Aiasrtosa eb|oot4.tes mte co&cerning tbs- future of ispaa^ dea**
traction -os* tetentien as a jcwrt Itosdlass. to- say:s • tbs oo*
haGsadorte searching inquiries nera not- acted upon by the
gtste ©epas?tiaeni*
ft/o aonths after SarrSsmnte warning to tba State
partnent y the absinlstrat ion and -tbs State Bspartmnt received
still tetter m m lng, by tte relm m  of the Mar JMpgrteBKfcte
Military intelligence Mtesioits dteBtio and gsroi&stie &m>~
body Report* lbs teport aoSaotodaed ttet tte .te^btisntal
ooteteions.ssy be ssBDg&rlssd as £&llmm $
**,* CD tbs of'tte CMnsss S-ssaaaistsis' -Soviet clecK)cro,cy? (2)- the Chinese CDnroimist -
mmmmM-M part of tte international Coisaualst !raovamat j. sponsored and' guided by Russia*. and <3) 
iter®, is reason to- tellste ttet Sot 1st Russia ■ pirns to -create' Hass-iari«dotdmtecl aioas-telfete eburia, Soros* -and probably lortii -Cbiasc (**■> a sfecfig -mid stsMs China &mmot exist without fte * natural resources of Manchuria .gad: Hortb Chincu
C5> lo -order to protect- 'tbo ssppatim of IJanofiaria and Hprth China frcss' Chiaa.s it is essential that*
3tbld. 56.
'Safe. ttmMM partiofpitos .in II m ' ‘
left* . a n #  B a s s f a n  o f  ja iXi t
f̂Ĝpu '3M X'f&S '.
fe tbe* m e t o t  $
oetetef •*»£ ife .far iao% witte poXMIna% eeonomXeal5: «&&
iĝ **
in Ctelxtef an# tap













f &©■ protelem of pfst^wger faaee in tbs Far laot 
fW0X^%/fasof®^ m -.'tM  Bsite# States .is eoa*<AXUM;»U*V*4W?
oaetmm in ttee for -tot ttes defeat of’ =l-â nf f ii Bear 
n a n  t b s -  s m t S S .  S t a i n s  $rts
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ft ft ft ft. p« m
.strategically eonti>o&s the ■o&giBmd&m- to 8«
.tifawfflftBg'ta.y. loos Stetom loom-ms m motossms to the Koreans*
fte  e$^£$*$£ar ootiismiloi the- .far last te*Jteg tho
komm?9 mo a rasmlt o f the .Japanese jeep* 
F* a  $0ts& mom*- oaciatea M  the fa r  'last*, 
the $t&&&S9 C €8*in isi%  a llo i ^  t te  Soviet ©aiom .ami mhtlo
$&#$$- possore- to- ftapt that wli»
While the G t m m n l B t  m m m  m t x t t m e d .  to- isasferao®. through 
£&&*» -smecessivs .#«erioam ®Issioi*o to  ©Mam resSLtod 
JUaertm& deadeX o f  -$i& am i to  tfe» S m eiteta® ^
that Ohiamg .Kaî sh©lcc s regime ms 
to  the- gm®Txm&Tktz£^~£mtMtGXks
-«m a 4Q0
jsatl*:S0% the 'Baited- States gmmsmmmb M 
Although, the im|so; 
mot to tlm *■
some :
st smoaag- m s  
O m a m s  *  t
p*©3sor% too- osem * 33fo6$
s :gromp
I atoii w&oas. oto» %in sfcbstefte©..*. ntheve 'M  m  uto® ila© jroStas oo tort we m n  M  iaslai 
m&. seoure- m t H  fe u fjs&t Cl̂ ina -stsmstiQ,' fcfeo
t&t mime© 




ecmeemlng: an Amriesa |
$gr to: oaasier of 19w$ 'fctee 







so&tom ISMseaas' itete ifiSoiioaioas©: by American nHttoy power» TJoooyof* m  can aa3 t o a M  gl̂ te
428ft% t il
to© stteti military essistaacs- as no &to a «  filing and will 'have ©ompletsd in the very osar fnture 
so titagr os® at. laaat hoM. tt&ftp aiatot tbs nortom fioreaas*
j a prsdiettea of a  f 
Tfm Secretary adtsltfei that lorean Easiness is m o
fte- situations la tbB' ifm te  tangled problem of to* lar
^sSional Be 
» * <’>A' ** 1$
tto «&Q8ot ym t&ok tb m  inf **& eaa m f t . '*%&«jli give you a good figfettrsg efiamo* if -yw are teeve W  mmfSmt- oemoaicaXXy 
mui p ro te c t jmmtmXwm*™!
fliu% ajpSy- fom* afte.jc5 tte- Mmpmms® mmmmk&t 
&0 -a. eoteilmtlon to an imffoetiml 'l&sqpie&a iPWp- Bastsi'ii

Aetosom« Beam. <1893- Actosoa studied ami-practiced t o  nstil appointed, toetetery of the treasury fc' If 33* He served in' that capacity -until feeing *$» . pointed assistant secretary of' state .la X9%19 followed #  ea a|>p©iataent to under secretary of state in 19%te 
He has teem secretary of state since X9%9*
jt*atf£S«. .ireMMd ytoont, <1889~ Arnold graduated fromthe Waited States Military Acadesy at West Point ia If 15* 
toltedtag. &$*&& War %  to tee &&$ mwimm- ate-tended' the t e y  Qo&mm 'College -mil the Anay War College iteiag. the tmsaties* His World -War IX coatet cosaaamd consisted •©£ commanding toneralg 7§h Infantry Division 
daring tee operations on teyte and.. Okinawa*
Ms&ia* warren Bofeiason- <13-77** * 5- Austin studied tor lahie net t o  state of teraont, m s  admitted to the ter Sm that .state .la, 190&* ' His abilities nor© recog­nised early and. to- sorted on various commissions com* 
corned with the ■ adjudication of lorM War I*, -fife is- credited with derising the- plan which w  adopted as the Act of Cfeapaltepee* to became a temporary delegate for tbs United States to- the United .lotions in I9k& 9 and the- following year became the permanent delegate te the U*t*
Bradley*, general of the Afsor* ter Balsa* <1893- ),Bradley graduated £ *m  the United States Military teadsasy «tfe West, pointy and .sorted, in a variety of commands during the twenties and thirties*. He was recognised as- a sound tactician,, mm®, United States faces' tended in lorth Africa, Bradley ms- coEsaaiiding officer of the- II Corps* He served in Iforth Africa end tte campaigns la.Bicifc, and when the elites tended in 
France, June,19%%, he had & M K Q &  -of another corps, After the war, he served: as administrator of veterans - 
af&irs I9%5^X9%7, and m s  Item appointed Chief of Staff,. United. States Army, to m s  appointed Chairman -of the Imtet Chiefs of staff iti 19%9, and has served In. that -capacity until tto- present $£a»*
Altort &«$. €l88f*= )9 Brom ,gratmstet & * &  %tomilitary aeadesy in If It ami- served through the- various 
gteto% .rislni to the rank t>£ mjor general fey-19%! * Bitfte Is toom of tea m r  % im aocompXtetants, and ia lf%7* to- relieved general Arnold as' tto chief Amer­
ican detente -to the -Joint Soviet-isBrican Cm m i-ssim *
BrldgO®* ttyio.% ( .  h  Bridges graduated from bis
native. University of iiiffij and entered the nemjmpars. of t o  state* • He server! as -editors of' various state 
fair magazines*. state governor* 1935~X9365 aod as- Halted States senator sia.ee 1937° He is' a- BepaMieaa and is-, ' noted for foreign poliey work*
B y r m %  -asmo ftooi% €1879** I* Byrnes graduated f r «  the l«r school*, fdiversity of South Carolina* 'and ■ptooticee lew until 1939* He served as a Beater of t o  IMiied States Senate from 1911 and culminated his 
-senate- career in- 1925?* Be m s  re-elected senator in 1930 nod- served, again until 19%* Presldsnt Boosevelt appointed Byrnes associate last ice, of the- gssgeom Court, in-19%* and he served as a Justice for Um 3mars*.During the x © %  he served -xn various govermoant adminis­trative postss Director of Soonomie Stabilisation, 19%* 
X9%j Director of Par Mobilisation* 19%“*19%f and finally,. secretary of state* 19^5-19%^ Be formulated much of 'to Baited States post-war 'policy in Bumps*- At t o  present time* ho. Is governor Of South Carolina*
Chiang Kai-shek* Begun a revolutionary career guite early da to --served: ia the first and second Chinese revolutions under Sun Isi-seiw He captured Hankow and established the Hanking If at Iona 1 Govamssjat and began M s  campaigns against the Chinese CoBsaunists* He m s  Resident of the Bepublie and Yuan until 19%* whan be resigned ' premiership* retaining Presidency and fullxailiiarr . powers* Following World War II* the struggle with 'to Coimmm-ists bur st into f lame* -aid was denied by the - -Waited States, -..and- Chiang forced to retreat to Formosa* where to- -tea established a Provisional Chinese govetotoat In exile*
Churchill* It-*.- Hw*: Winston Spencer* <18?% ), t o  son of
.-toted- lord fiandolph* Churchill -has a long -aid distinguished govemmeatal career.* -to served ia t o .  British m m  and 
m  & * r  correspondOEti £895*190&* Following M s  .retom frusi the wars-*, to entered Parlimnb -«o -a Ccasarvatlve* ■
He ms- President, of -to- Board of trade X908~19IOf Hose Secretary,. X9XO~I9HS) «aS. First lord of the Admiralty* X911-1919o ‘ to- was act-Ivo In. the government during the twenties .-and., thirties*- contingent upon which party m s  
in power* ■ Ho was prim -sinister sad iSSaisisr- of Defense X9%*X9%», and - in Britain^ first post-war election,GXsmnt Ailes, Socialist Party* defeated Mis*. Hpon his defeats to assumed his former post m  toad of t o  Con­servative Party* and last- year* l$$l$ defeated Clement A t o %  and at the .present time* to Is f s im  Minister.*.
■m m w  commissions 
■ the London and Moscow 
no a special aide a M  adviser to 0 of State«SsStt In be ooo-. : fros lew fork state to ''fill aof that- stators senator* ;H@- has teen the -State ,. „ 
Meat's special consultant '.since: 19^9* Ms' .okfosr In the' United Nations has been ootstaadiftg*. seeing. «s MS'
IMsUj, H't0 Hon*. v«vj,h3*- v# > ^bive B*.Fe from Warwick and neasington in 1925* the thirties^ be- served .fora time as. under secretary of state for foreign affairs5. until his resignation in©
. to. disagreement with British foreign policy .in. the thirties* Be associated himself With Winston Churchill^ and while the: latter- was Britain's prlam Minister*. Idea
to. these duties* he was his' party's leader-in the House of Comsonsa If ter the end of World War II, - M e n  has occupied a- post Second to that of c&urchixl9 in the party and the gorernmsiit*
El^Suairi^ Fayes Bays (Syria) Since World. liar XI* he has teen, alternatoarepro sontat ire to the United lotions and ‘ ‘
} 3 Mi.
sorter at many distinguished colleges in Australia and. England* Mm was Minister for m w during World War If*, served as a United nations representative on the Pale* stine dispute* Be was chairman of Australia's U0B* .
at the 2nd and 3rd sessions of the Cerasral 
mL of the 3rd session^ 19^8*
$
as U*BoS oB
Ai f (X908~ )5 An econom
as special ■ consultant to the 0*3*S«E* embassy in
*. D« U a* l£39*2?tt3» -Following a " .....^  Cuba* toe returned to the
Karrima% William ivere-Il, <1891-* ), Extremely wealthy* he-
attended-Kale University, and upon graduation, entered 
a firm of' Wail Street Investment bankers* His nam  m m  
graced the .doors as a full partner* Brown Brothers and 
Harriinan Gompnsy* By virtue of his number of Union 
Pacific shares5 preferred and commonf toe*also m m  chair** 
man of the railroad5s board* His'liberal 'Maas and ■ 
contributions to the treasury of the-Democratic Party, 
attracted h i m  to  .President. Roosevelt* and 'in. 19**X* he-' 
m s  appointed United Staten .Mhsssaddr to the Court ©f 
St.*. James* After a. two;year .stint In Bondoa,. he .and bis- 
family moved to- Bosow as the United States Ambassador 
to the great and true- friend of the United States.* The end of the- World War II s m  him moving back to london inhere he served another year as ambassador* In 19̂ 7, ■ 
be returned to .the United -States*, and m s  appointed '■ 
Secretary of' Commerce in the- cabinet of another liberalr 
Harry S» frumaxu At the present tine. he is democratic 
a-spirant for the presidential nomination*
Hayashij Sadogu,. Count* {.Japanese statemn)f Educated in
England5 a writer in the English language* he returned 
to Japan. In 1889 to serve as a governor in. Kobe* vice 
.minister to China*. I895̂ l89f>| to Russia, 1897'**lo99|
.end to England* IyQ0*»19O5* In. addition to his political 
■service to bis country*, m  translated English books m . 
political science' into Japanese for his less fortunate 
brothers*
Helmick* Charles Gardiner* army .officer* (l892« )5 As army
officer.*: who graduated from, the United States lavs! . 
Academy in If13» served for a year as an ensign* and 
then transferring to the army* He attended the Army War 
College* and. the Command School at Fort beavenworth*
Be advanced through the ranks to brigadier general by 
19h2» Served as deputy military governor for Korea, 1S*»5-19M3. 5
Hiaayoshi. toyotoBl, tbs Salto, 0536-1590 s Possibly thegreatest, soldier and statesman in Japanese history*
Be gent of Japan* X53l~X59Xs -and the following year toe 
invaded the Korean peninsula*, in a plan to sutojucate 
China* Although he--, was defeated --and died In Korea*, 
he gave the Japanese an international status in the Oriento
lie* Hlrobusi* (18̂ 1«1909) * During the Japanese reformation period, fie cmtributel to the -fall of the shogunste* - 
and became a provincial governor la .28680 He tosM various- 
ministersblps from 18?8 until 108$, the follotrlitg year 
1889s toe promulgated the Japan©se eonstitutlon* and 
held office as premier* 189^1895* 1398* 190G~X9ai« Appointed Besidenfê Cenaial In Korea 1905* to© m $ '
fPOSidSfl't 0 f 
eXb&jST tte 0®
.j&pga&se Privy Otmoil® ufaesi- toe ifas
F t& t  Sm  f fe r b l%  % $$* «hlob the Mmmn m :
1% &r ClSt3*»: ) * A gTttimte ®£ * tester* S «6Js»lie habere# tte §ai^rs£ty of Illinois* Bfedgh 
aateted. the first. WmM- War as -a -sMscantt lisateajsiii*. 80 adrsnead throagto the s?a&ks t# jsa;|.©r general by X9w* St: ssrved throngliont IforM H&r 11 la the $m $£M  
t^-oparaiiooa*; and. by the war% «ai®. eoiwiiSM ths 3X£f Corps on dkiaam* C«saaot:lRf general ®£" States©irons la JKjrest
, \+v71~ If. Born £« S@m»ste% to entered tb*-b-r there in  1891 * B& santod iiith distiite%i« in dite dor tag the S|̂ a$sls»|»0r.|,as3a. War® sod ;m ^m m € at the- end of the war to p&etie# %mh lib nbts «leetei te-ti lease « f  S#ir#te»tetims# IfOT^lfPl® and. 1923<*3,§3i® servofi as a United States senator* Sa attracted the eye of loosovelt,. 3a 1911 and. ees named aseeetetary of state nntll. lyMt*. la lf%|f te the Hotel Peace Prise,*
Philip C»* ,<3897*-. I® .1 scliOiarly;.s%^teEit #f l s %  fee ieotnred .In lit at. Colaiibia University. 19P^19M£® rising to m tti&X M&; ssnrM -an ii&ay ■oft®*
iiissiens as legal «dvisor®. and has teen asiif© in legal work connected with wrioas WMted. lations emtt&s&isatfr* 
in 19%9® -te- w s  apteiated satessaclor»-at*l§rga by presf** dent f rtman*
mu, Inter©® Barest® 110^5^19111®, d distinguished Js$am tm  
gtetesiaaa and diploraat* Somra serred. as assistant foreign .sinister® 1896~1898* la held diplomatic 900%.$
fesfeingto% D*. C» 9 St* PetersteJfg® sad Peking*. Efe "' ~ '" se rejare; ■■-•-*■- *■ ■- **■ •
M m * Wellington* <I888~- ■ ) s itoo m m im i. all M b  education*, including a iSt* at GelniaMa Be m s  his 'country's rets*© senta tire at various' peace coMorenees £a the twenties and thirties0 Ha m s  act lag prime 
minister soft lainls-ter of' foreign affairs 'is- '&926*X$2?* During WorM liar II* he * s  GMna°s ambassador to Great Britain* and in Xf%ef. mieret' the United lations as 
■0tiiaaca sealer delegate
'tm m p: Oscar sicted*,. fPoX&Ml* <190h~ . A noted lawyer* hut tetter teown as an ecenoialot̂  He; m t  -professor of" 
economies at various disarican unltersitles* Inciting Minnesota* Michigan* and dhleagG* He is the author of 
many .scholarly werfel m  economies* His pesent' -address.
M  Wmmw*.
iansdenmo* {Henry Charles Keith- f itsmurtce)* 1 graduate of 
M$m m i Oxford*. he --served in the- w  'and. -Indian offices under Gladstone,, .He m e  foreign .secretary daring 1900=*
W S *
toettf; Bohert {1899s* 1# liter graduating t mHarvard*, l#o?ett ent@rei.the inrestinent. banfcing fioMs, ussnoiaulng himself with Browa Brothers end Harriman Company*. Baring IforM liar XI*,. he m s  assistant secret tary of war for air^ and from I9h7<£$&9.j was • the -as* sistast secretary- dr state*. 1& has 'been the Secretary 
of Defense since '19$U '
Mao&rthur* Douglas* <IS:8G*» Graduating from t M  military
t&ad&agr in . W m .f. MaeJkrihur' served ‘ in yartois cocnmnds until World War XI* francs*., he was wounded twice in .action* He m s  chief of- staff "for the Baited ■ States 
amy .fro® 1930-X935® and then tools ctega of Philippine national defense* 1939~1937° He -resigned fro® active ' duty until July 26* when he assumed coamnd of
Halted States Forces In, the Her Sssrt* . Following the - war* he was chief -of American -occupation forces in 
Ihphh 'ant is credited with an cnit standing lot In the Japanese Islands* He was relieved by Sronan and £8* ■ 
■tenet to the Bhlted -States daring 1991*
»l|&i Yakov tW Q6# ) * Malik has hat eistenslw training •nv forelgn affairs* 'Hams Soviet fusbassador to-Iapans 
2gfca»£9fe& Following M s  return to the t?4 $«£*&«$ he served a# deputy ■ minister of foreign affairs .ter two 
years* -and then m s  m p0infed the sewfet delegate- to 
the General 4sseiihly<,
Qa-orge Catlett*. (1880* > « 'Marshall ipmdaated.
from the Virginia. Military Xhstilttt© aai isgr 1936 «a&-$’ t^ifpdfer general* . 1® « t  Chief of Staff' for the BnliM States Arecr* !939*!9̂ !?f and m $  tb&n appointed a. $j£&£s& envoy* With' the rank or aabassadors to China* lfers!iatl5s off oris to achieve a. trace tetveen the Chinese Cossaanists and the- Ihonint&ng were: f«h£3.%. and - tin© waited Stato© abandoned chiaitg lie was- appointedsecretary of state* arid fcarsnilated ah© .groat HarsMll Blaa| a plan to retoMXXtate thm world5© eoononr with
«*<*:Klo&ailovtotê . {1890* outstanding record -of revolut'ionary aetlfItios lei up to m A onlairatlng with th© Bolsiievlki. Bevolntioa 
$& i$Zy'*‘l$lB<s He he m m  a- aetibe*" of the Follttonroau' In I92I5 of the .Fresidinia in 1929* 'eat ‘was- appointed People5s Gosiiissar 1 %  Foreign if fairs in 1939* &  
offf.toa antll tin tad osf WortA #ar Jf̂  
TsJaaitttr of:' foreign affairs* ' I loaootr Conferanea in 19̂ 3. and t M  Yalta Conference in 19̂ 5*.
Edwin Wead©ll.s loll corporation } 5 Pauley teas a -successful career as ait oil eorpor* .fttioa executive eomteinad' with r©al*estat© spacnla&Ien* Birring world War H *  PresXdaat BoosovoXt sent his: to England to Be. Petroleum Coordinator for hDad^hoas© supplies to Russia and .Britain.# If ter- the. wr»s end*'he was appointed reparations eossaissioner with the rank
i» rats- ij. as
Roosevelts Franklin B** (l88a«19^5.)# Roosevelt-: graduated
mm %4r.£,-W»55.- iAS3i jS» tfiAWA ¥i«S 4Vt??V Xt?4> «EhSenate in 19x9 for three yeas*©#- BO was appointed .as* sistant secretary of navy- in 1913 and sorted in that capacity until 1920* He -was ©looted: governor of Sew
to a eaJBSalga fa? president. HB m s  m te& U S in tbs
ensuing -etoerttcEu
.ShwfeMt* Robert Wilson, C1890-1923SfaatoMt entered the United States. lavy m  ■ a young midshipman of Ik- yearss -and' served in the navy until an inawry forced his re«- 
tireaent in 1891* If ter his rettoemont from the navy, 
his interests turned toward the study of birds:, and lie contributed to various- mgasines on that subject.
Stalin, Goneralissxmo Iosef Vissarionovich, Stalin .bas'd long record of revolufc.ionary act ivf ties*. From 1-897 . to 19'l?f he w a s  in. and out of various prisons and was exiled from Unset a for -som© t&$» He teesae fenerai .Secretary .of dentml CraazBitte© of the Partyin'’ 19225 and three years later, became a isember of the Presidim, the supreme Soviet .governing, board,, through, a series of purges during the twenties and thirties, he 
X m c m m  sore mtid more ■powerful*. He assumed the title of generalissimo in 3#f-£*.
itlilwnll, Joseph {1883*3 3, Stillwell, gradated from
the 'united. States military deadest in 190b, and- in the 
following years served at various oommds? ftttosdtof 
the Army liar- College. So was a Chinese language- student 
at.-, the University o f  e&liffflmffc at the- end of World lar 
I,, -and thereafter was in Peking studying the Chinese 
further, During the- tldftlss. he was military attache 
in Peking, and at the-. UoS, .entry into World War XI, 
Stillwell assumed tocmcd of Chinese armies to. Bums* 
lie vainly attempted to- bring order into the Chinos© 
army* and was sacked by Chiang imtoshefc at f ho end of World War XX*
Ttobcrmam, Thomas S., <1900- - ■>., Timberraan graduated from
the fnited States military academy in 1923, and served 
in.various, commands during the twenties. He attended 
Cbinose language schools is. Peking, 1931~1935* ’ Until . 
tb© U.S* eat̂ -' isto World War XX,. Ttohermant served us 
military attach© -at various U.S. "oisbassle-s' throughout 
the tforld*. During World War XX,. he was is fha- Opera* 
txons Division of the War Department*
Truman, Harry g*s. (X88b~* ) , Truman managed the familytars in H/sscur! until the outbreak of World Mar X*.Ho entered the United States army, and was retired to inactive duty’with the rank of captain* He studied law, owned: an ill-fated baMrdashry, and finally was 
appointed a circuit Judge-to, 193&* He-ran for the Senate to. that year,, was elected* and in 19^0, was re-elected* His Congressional 'career is notable' fra?' M s  stint m . a Senate investigating committee. President Roosevelt 
selected Truman m  ■»■ vie©. presi&entiaja running mate is
19¥Kj, m M. the following year when looseirelt died*. Tseanan rose to the residency of the United State®. So iss 
re-elected in lUMJ.
Tandenbarg* Arthur If*.., Yande&berg graduated from the Unlwr- stty of Michigan* end 'm s editor of the Grand Rapids ■ , •SeraM from 1906*1928., He was emoted to the United .. 
Staten Senate in X928* I© sorted with groat distinction 
M  the .Senate -and is. responsible tm  saseh of the United States Foreign- .policŷ  la ..the; postrmr period, S© was .? chairman of the senate. - Foreign Relations Committee <te~. lug the post-war period.* A staunch Bepifeiiean through­out M s  life.9 fee died in $$*&• -.
Vincent* John Garter* .(1900- . 1, Tteeni fens a long record- as a foreign service officer, in  thft State .Bepartmeat*Sc at tended feting language school* '1923-1930*; ‘and m s  
a cnagnlar off ter in China during the' thirties. He ms- appointed assistant to the. chief for Far Eastern Affairs in 29*»3* cod tfes following year m s  .appointed ' chief of the State Department8 s Far lastem Affairs*Ee attended, earimss ■ post-war oonferencasg, and in recent -months .ha.® t e n  the target of pr.©Mj0iHnaaif,sm chargee*. ■
Yyshte!<y? Andrei ffenrareyitch*. (1883- )9 fyshinsl^ entered-Hassfan rerolutdenary worm shortly after Sta-llti,. After the. Bolshovlldt devolution* ho practiced' law* and m s  ..ispieiM prosecutor far various, Spurge trials*0 Ks- served as deputy 'sinister for foreign affairs. during ■ World War 11*' .and ® s  appointed minister for .foreign' ■- affairs in 19̂ 9-, *
Wefeby James Edwin, (1906- )* A successful lawyer* Wefefewas- appointed assistant to- the Under Secretary of Treasury in 19^6, Be was appointed Director of the 
Bureau of Budget la 19h65 and served in that capacity> uritil 19J4-9f wherrh© was- appointed under Secretary -of State*.

Ssaeer.pt. from the Report o f the 'Meeting .Of the Ministers ' of -, 
■"Bokl Iga' Affairs' of' the'ifiien - :&t .Soviet SmlalliSt Bapiihliesf • the' §&£$$& £t»te& • of ',jmmi®m9. «na. the United Kingdom*. Masoo%
m m rn m  im m  sm m m
1* With -a v im - to  the re«ostaMishiieat of' Korea -at an 
$ e g $ a f t & '  s t a t e  t  t h e  - m m t t o a  o f e r t f t l m s  f o r  t h ecoantrp oh. democratic principles «jg& the earliest p o m S M oof the ■disastrous results of the protracted -Impm** os© domination In ' Eoreay, there shall hfe- set sap -a p?oi?isioml & M m -  democratic gowmeeht 'which shall tste mil the- '
sarp steps for -developing the industry* transport -and agrl* ■©Ultms of form and the .natioml' culture of the- I m a m  people* So fk order tu assist the forsation of a provisional Korean ■gmeimimh uni kith m.-vlw- to -the ^ a l ^ w r f '  elsto^tim of the- appropriate measure s?, there shall bs established a Joint Coisiiisslon consisting of '3^pr&smtat Ivek mf 'the United 
command in southern .Korea and the Soviet m a m x &  in northers*
In pmpgrttig; t&afcf -fropnmls the Uet^selm shull salt with. Korean democratic parties and social organimtions* fha :moeias^lR?llms :i«a3te& out ■ the csmiiisslm shall be nee**- seated for the-’ consideration of the- Qovaremnts of the Union 
.■of Soviet. Smisillist'. Sh;iUille%. Chl»^ the- 'Wm&oO.-KM0m-m^k- the United Stat$s$ prior to • final decision hgr the t »  -Severn* 
amis on. the jotai $eo&gm fm *3* It .shall fee the task of tbe -joint ffioateissionf. with the- . fartlGlp&tim bf the provisioml. Korean.''deammtie government and -of the Korean democratic organisations to worb out iB.a» 
.mrm'y-also for’-miffe# and ass-I-stiaf ;Ctmsteostolpl-'itlie :poXl~ tIcal.S: eeonoaiG and social jprog&es* of the .lormr peopIe2 the deveiepteiit of dejaocrafcie- self«govermasnt ant the establish- msitfc of the x m tfo m l independence of %mm*,
fter p ^ g o M s  .of ■ the Joint ■§o«isslm. mail he sohsitted5, 
fm x m fm  consultation with the provisional Korean Uovern* m n t  for the' fO-Sash consideration of the tm m m m m f® o f the , United - States * Union' of Soviet Socialist- lepuhllos^ United 
Kingdom-y and ublhsfcy :fm the working oat of -m. ap^amnt. con»- ■mrislrig a tear pew-r tr«s%eom% of .Ssts ■fm a ' farlM Up to fti?©- :p«m* •■
%>.. for’ m m t i e m t l m  -of' .wfgekt p r o M e m  &£fm ffm  hotii soar-ttera .and- amhterirEmm -and. - for the ’eiafemstfoa o f 'mmmmm  establishing permnent- coordination- .'in aiMnistmtim^mnkoalc mttaru m  tween ’the- ’States U n r a l  Ik southern, Ikumand the soviet command In northern Koreas ..a .-eanferencG’ of the 
represeiitatives’ o f the: United atalk# and Mmiot mmmoMs In. Emm- shall .he coisvened. within a period. ■&£ two weeks*
ft!Pb© J o in t Commission will ©ossult with Zmmmi democratic parties a M  social organisations which mm truly democratle 
In their aias and metbods and which will subscribe to the following declarations «ge.s .»,.*■.. - . declare that m- will uphold the alms■of the m m m ' m m & im  on Korea as .stated: in paragraph I of- this decision* naselys**Ttoe peseta dI istoent of l e m  as mtk independent ■ state-f  the creation of conditions ■ for developing the country on demo* ■cmtic principles ? and- the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous resnlte of the protracted Japanese domination In Korea* Further-* we will abide by the decisions, of the Joint Couaission in fulfillment of paragraph 2 of the Moscow Decision in- the formation -of a Provisional Korean heiBOcratic SovemiMiiti further* we. will cooperate with the- Joint Com* mission la the warding m b by It with the- participation of the Provisional Korean, tamecjsM© Q om ^nm nt -of proposals concealing measures foreseen by paragraph 3 of the- Moscow Decision*
-cratic. parties and social organisations to consult with the Joint C m m isB im  Is being woriced out by Joint Stib-»aoimissIon Ho* 1*- flbsn details of the procedure are completed it will
i m s i s
m c r y l Wwm̂  la t te r  off tte.Aotlsg mmttmxm off State *® tteSwiet Off' .PO®tpt £ £ & £ & %  JMgg&ab 2 %  19**7*
*•
Stole# ftofosalo £fef&£$2itg Soioa
3U M  batfe ite- fwS*5*S* ssi tys«. wmm  off te e %  tte te  shall W- M M  early ©taetiensi to- stes# istolly p*©**irMlotiai l e p i t m  &mh m m * - feUag ©tell be br ■, se^et multi-pafrty tadUtet m  m fea&t* of w a im m A  m ifm m  ami ©MeMona © M U  be tell la aeeortaM* nitb I M  %ms ol©fb®€ 
by I M  pm w m t %mmm MgtsMfee# In aaab oooa*.
2U, f&mm pemi&&Q6t&. m m tt MiisMtee# ©tell # « #  tap?#*1.
@©»Mbti?#S' fa miMi?# whMti oeffleet the popet*ti«i. tetwem bfa* peplaOieisit- off il» It# s«®ss% tte«# Mpeepeiibiitlyes t© 
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